Mountaineer Mine (ID No. 46-06958)
Mingo Logan Coal Company
Mahon Enterprises, Inc. (ID No. GXI)
Wharncliffe, Mingo County, West Virginia
January 2, 1995
by
William A. Blevins
Supervisory Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
Originating Office - Mine Safety and Health Administration
100 Bluestone Road, Mount Hope, West Virginia 25880
Michael J. Lawless, District Manager
OVERVIEW
Abstract
On Tuesday, January 2, 1995, about 12:40 a.m., a powered-haulage
accident occurred in the No. 1 belt conveyor entry of the 6 Right
longwall panel, 40 feet to the right of Survey Station No. 110,
resulting in the death of Dave Thorn, contract beltman.
The belt crew was in the process of pulling a 400-foot roll of
54-inch conveyor belt from the belt winder to the track entry
with a 15-ton track locomotive. A 1/2-inch steel wire rope and a
chain were connected between the locomotive and roll of belt.
The accident occurred when the chain became fouled against an
anchor pin installed in the mine floor. The rope came loose from
the chain, striking the victim in the neck as he was walking
toward the belt winder.
The accident and resultant fatality occurred because the operator
failed to take appropriate precautions to assure that persons did
not enter an area where a known hazard existed. Also,
appropriate precautions were not taken to ensure the work area
was free of obstructions and that the equipment used was
maintained in a safe operating condition.
Background
The Mountaineer Mine of Mingo Logan Coal Company is located near
Wharncliffe, Mingo County, West Virginia. The mine is developed
from the surface by 10 drift entries into the Lower Cedar Grove
coalbed that averages about 60 inches in height. The mine began
production on June 26, 1991.
Employment is provided for 305 persons on two production and one
maintenance shifts. The mine produces an average of 30,000 tons
of raw coal daily from four continuous-mining sections and one
longwall section. Coal is transported from the sections to the
surface via belt conveyors.
The immediate mine roof is sandstone and is primarily supported
with 48-inch resin rods.
Ventilation is induced into the mine by a 7-foot exhaust fan
which produces about 600,000 cubic feet of air per minute and a
54-inch bleeder fan which produces about 50,000 cubic feet of air
per minute. The mine liberates approximately 151,000 cubic feet
of methane daily in a 24-hour period.
Mahon Enterprises, Inc., provides general contracting services
for the production operator on all shifts and employs 49 contract
miners at this mine. The principal officers of Mahon
Enterprises, Inc., are Amon Mahon, president, and Lenville Mahon,
safety director. The contractor performs work outby the working
sections such as cleaning, rock dusting, erecting overcasts,
spot roof bolting, and cribbing.
Mingo Logan Coal Company is a subsidiary of Ashland Coal, Inc.
The principal officers of Mingo Logan Coal Company are Markus
John Ladd, director/president; James Thomas Dilley, director;
Chester Russell Maberry, vice president; James M. Mullins, mine
manager; and Clifton L. Frye, superintendent.
The principal officers of Ashland Coal, Inc., are William Creel
Payne, president; Clarence Henry Besten, Jr., senior vice
president; Marc Roger Solochek, senior vice president; Kenneth
George Woodring, senior vice president; and Roy Franklin Layman,
administrative vice president.
The last regular AAA inspection was completed December 15, 1994.
A regular AAA inspection was ongoing at the time of the accident.
STORY OF EVENT
On Monday, January 1, 1995, at 10:00 p.m., Jim Auxier, contract
belt foreman for Mahon Enterprises, Inc., arrived at the mine
office and received his work orders from Carlos Porter, shift
foreman, before beginning the third shift. Auxier's work orders
included removing conveyor belt from the 6 Right longwall belt
conveyor belt winder.
About 11:00 p.m., Auxier instructed contract beltmen, Guy Farley
and Randy Stafford, to get a shield car and two track locomotives
from the supply yard and informed them that they were to remove
two rolls of belt from the 6 Right longwall belt conveyor. The
two rolls of belt were to be loaded on the shield car and
transported to another underground area for storage. Removing
and loading belt from the longwall panel cars were regularly
performed by Auxier, Farley, and Stafford.
Auxier and the two beltmen proceeded underground with the two 15-
ton locomotives and the shield car to the 6 Left spur track where
they were to wait for the supply crew to pass. While the belt
crew was waiting for the supply crew, Farley walked to the 6
Right belt where he met Dave Thorn, contract beltman.
Thorn informed Farley that he had observed a bad splice in the 6
Right longwall belt conveyor. Farley told Thorn that they were
going to load belt from the longwall section and that he would
check the conveyor for bad splices. Farley informed Auxier that
Thorn had observed a bad splice in the belt. Farley then
proceeded back to the belt conveyor to make an examination of the
splices.
After the supply crew passed, Auxier and Stafford proceeded to
the 6 Right longwall belt conveyor belt winder with one of the
locomotives and the shield car. Stafford removed a 400-foot roll
of belt from the belt winder and connected a 1/2-inch wire rope to
the locomotive. Stafford then passed the steel rope through a
sheave wheel attached to an anchor pin in the mine floor. Auxier
connected the other end of the steel rope to a 1/2-inch steel chain
which had been connected to a bar inserted through the roll of
belt.
Farley completed checking the belt splices and walked to the
track entry where he could relay signals from Auxier to Stafford.
Auxier signaled for Stafford to start pulling the belt with the
locomotive. Stafford started pulling the roll of belt until
Auxier signaled him to stop. The roll of belt continued to roll
until the chain became fouled on an anchor pin installed in the
mine floor between the conveyor and the right coal rib. The roll
of belt had been pulled about 30 feet from the winder.
Auxier examined the roll of belt but could not see that the chain
was fouled against the anchor pin. Auxier again signaled for
Stafford to pull the roll of belt. Stafford started pulling the
roll of belt again. Under tension, the rope came loose from the
chain, and as it recoiled, it struck Thorn who apparently had
just walked into the area.
Auxier was positioned on the left side of the conveyor and heard
the rope come loose. When Auxier walked toward the roll of belt,
he saw a cap-light lying on the mine floor in the belt entry.
Auxier then discovered Thorn and removed the wire rope from
around Thorn's neck. Auxier instructed Farley to call for an
ambulance. Stafford ran to the site, assessed Thorn's vital
signs, and began CPR with the assistance of Auxier and Farley.
Stafford, an emergency medical technician, also determined that
Thorn had sustained critical injuries to the neck. Four miners
carried Thorn about 50 feet to the track entry. Thorn was loaded
in a personnel carrier and transported to the surface while the
miners continued administering CPR. Thorn was transported by
ambulance to the Man Appalachian Regional Hospital where he was
stabilized before being transferred to the Charleston Area
Medical Center. Thorn died at 10:15 a.m., January 3, 1995, while
being treated for the trauma he sustained.
INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCIDENT
The Mine Safety and Health Administration was notified at 1:10
a.m. on January 2, 1995, that a serious accident had occurred.
Mine Safety and Health Administration personnel began to arrive
at the mine at 2:30 a.m. A 103(k) Order was issued to insure the
safety of the miners until the accident investigation could be
completed.
The Mine Safety and Health Administration and the West Virginia
Office of Miners' Health, Safety and Training jointly conducted
an investigation with the assistance of the mine management
personnel, the miners, and representatives of the miners.
All parties were briefed by mine personnel as to the
circumstances surrounding the accident. A discussion was held
with the three miners involved in loading the 400-foot roll of
belt at the 6 Right longwall belt conveyor when the accident
occurred. Representatives from all parties traveled to the
accident scene, where an examination was conducted. Photographs,
sketches, and relevant measurements were taken at the accident
site.
Interviews of individuals known to have direct knowledge of the
facts surrounding the accident were conducted at the mine
operator's training room on January 3, 1995.
The physical portion of the investigation was completed on
January 3, 1995, and the 103(k) Order was terminated.
DISCUSSION
Training
Records indicated that training had been conducted in accordance
with Part 48, Title 30 CFR.
Examination
Records and the examiner's date, time, and initials indicated
that the required examinations were being conducted in the 6
Right longwall conveyor belt entry.
Physical Factors
Loops were braided in the ends of the 1/2-inch wire rope. The
braided loop connected to the roll of belt came loose when the
chain fouled against an anchor pin installed in the mine floor.
According to Auxier, the loops were normally secured with clamps
to prevent slippage. Auxier stated that one rope clamp had been
installed on the braided loop that had been connected to the roll
of belt. Clamps were not installed on the braided loop that had
been connected to the locomotive. Two new rope clamps were found
on the mine floor beside the belt drive. There was no physical
evidence to indicate that a clamp or clamps had been installed on
the rope to secure the end of the braided loops.
The 400-foot roll of 54-inch conveyor belt was being pulled with
a Goodman 15-ton track locomotive. The track rails were dry.
The belt winder for the longwall conveyor, on previous panels,
was normally installed adjacent to a crosscut. This allowed the
rolls of belt to be pulled directly through the crosscut from the
winder to the track. Due to the length of the 6 Right panel, a
braking system was installed on the belt conveyor drive unit.
The belt winder had to be positioned between the pillars which
required the operator to pull the rolls of belt forward along the
pillar before they could be pulled through the crosscut.
Thorn had assisted the belt crew on several occasions when they
had removed and loaded rolls of belt conveyor at the accident
site. According to Auxier, Farley and Stafford, the victim was
aware of the hazards involved when the belt was pulled with steel
rope and had always positioned himself in a manner where he would
not be exposed to the wire rope during removing and loading belt
conveyor operations.
Farley informed the victim that they (belt crew) were going to
load belt from the longwall conveyor when he first arrived at the
belt conveyor head drive.
Auxier, Farley, and Stafford did not see the victim enter the
work area.
CONCLUSION
The accident and resultant fatality occurred because appropriate
precautions were not taken to assure that persons did not enter
an area where a known hazard existed. Also, appropriate
precautions were not taken to ensure the work area was free of
obstructions and that the equipment used was maintained in a safe
operating condition.
CONTRIBUTING VIOLATION
A 314(b) Notice to Provide Safeguard No. 4186456 was issued,
stating in part that a fatal accident occurred while transporting
a 400-foot roll of conveyor belt. One end of a 1/2-inch wire rope
was attached to the roll of conveyor belt, and the other end was
attached to a 15-ton locomotive. The wire rope was under tension
and pulled loose where the rope was connected to the roll of
belt, thereby allowing the wire rope to strike and fatally injure
a miner.
The notice to provide safeguard requires all areas, where
tensioned pulling devices are being used to pull or load
materials or supplies, to be blocked off or secured to prevent
any persons from entering such areas. Only persons needed to
perform the work are to be allowed in the areas and they are to
be in a safe protected area while the tensioned pulling devices
are in use. Communications will be established to ensure that
all employees in the affected areas are aware of the work being
performed.
A 104(a) Citation No. 4624774 was issued stating in part that the
ends of the Flemis Eye-Splice made in a 1/2-inch wire rope were not
properly maintained with clamps or equivalent devices to prevent
the splice from failing when placed under tension, a violation of
Section 75.1725(a), Title 30 CFR.
Respectfully submitted by:
William A. Blevins
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
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