UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
DISTRICT 4
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
(UNDERGROUND COAL MINE)
FATAL POWERED-HAULAGE ACCIDENT
NO. 2 MINE
I.D. NO. 46-08395
WAYCO LIMITED PARTNERSHIP NO. 1
HAMPDEN, MINGO COUNTY, WEST VIRGINIA
DECEMBER 18, 1995
by
Jerry W. Sosebee
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
Originating Office
Mine Safety and Health Administration
100 Bluestone Road, Mount Hope, West Virginia 25880
Earnest C. Teaster, Jr. - District Manager
GENERAL INFORMATION
The No. 2 mine, Wayco Limited Partnership No. 1, ID No. 46-08395, is located at
Hampden, Mingo County, West Virginia. The mine is developed from the surface by five
drift entries into the Hernshaw coalbed that averages 50 inches in height.
The mine began mining operations on June 1, 1994. Employment is provided for 18
employees on one production shift. The mine produces an average of 1,200 tons of
raw coal daily from two continuous-mining-machine sections configured adjacent to
each other, forming a "supersection." Both sections utilize the same dumping point.
Coal is extracted from the working faces using two remote-control Eimco 2460
continuous-mining machines, both developing five entries each. Section haulage is
provided by battery-powered Eimco coal haulers. Coal is transported to the surface
via a belt conveyor system. A dual-head Eimco roof-bolt machine is used to install
roof supports. Supplies are transported into the mine by battery-powered scoops and
battery-powered man trip.
Ventilation is induced into the mine by a 5-foot fan. The fan operates in the
blowing mode and produces 102,000 cubic feet of air a minute. Methane has not been
detected at the mine.
The immediate mine roof is shale. The roof is supported by 42-inch resin-grouted
roof bolts. The supports are installed on 4-foot spacing with a 6- by 6-inch bearing
plate. The roof control plan was approved by the Mine Safety and Health
Administration on July 28, 1995.
The last AAA inspection was completed by the Mine Safety and Health
Administration on October 4, 1995.
DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT
On Monday, December 18, 1995, the day-shift production crew, consisting of 11
miners under the supervision of Jack Daniels, section foreman, started work at 7:00
a.m. on the 001-0 and 002-0 MMUs supersection, and without incident, the regular
shift was completed at 4:00 p.m.; and all employees stayed over to finish work and
not work the weekend. One of the jobs was to repair a bad place in the No. 2 belt.
The No. 4 belt was still running because they had not found the bad spot yet. Barry
Dillon, mechanic; Eugene Ray, Jr., continuous-mining-machine operator; and James
Adkins, coal-hauler operator; were instructed by Daniels to repair the ripper motor
on the continuous-mining machine used on the 001-0 MMU left side, parked in the No. 5
entry 70 feet inby the section coal feeder. At about 4:20 p.m., Daniels instructed
Ray to move the continuous-mining machine, allowing clearance for the roof-bolting
machine to pass to the face of the uncompleted crosscut left between Nos. 5 and 4
entries. Wade E. Marcum and Danny Bragg, roof-bolting-machine operators, were
instructed to install roof bolts in the 5 left crosscut. After installing the roof
bolts in the crosscut, Marcum and Bragg trammed the roof-bolting machine to the
crosscut between the Nos. 6 and 7 entries. Bragg stated Marcum left the crosscut
about 5:00 p.m. and traveled down the No. 6 entry to catch the man trip. Bragg
stayed and emptied the dust collecting box on the roof-bolting machine. The most
direct route from the No. 6 entry to the man trip in the No. 4 entry was across the
belt tailpiece in the No. 5 entry.
Approximately 5:05 p.m., Bragg left the roof-bolting machine and traveled to the
No. 4 belt conveyor tailpiece located in the No. 5 entry. Upon arrival, Bragg
observed the No. 4 belt conveyor running, but shut it off so he could travel around
the coal feeder. At about 5:10 p.m., Bragg heard someone calling for help and saw a
light at the No. 4 belt conveyor drive. Bragg traveled down the No. 4 belt conveyor
about 180 feet to the No. 4 belt conveyor drive, where he found Marcum about three
feet outby the No. 3 belt conveyor tailpiece on the right side.
Marcum was lying on his back on the mine floor, across a 4-inch waterline. The
victim told Bragg he was hurting in his lower back and needed help. Traveling back
up the No. 4 belt conveyor entry, Bragg obtained help from the workers who were
making the repairs on the continuous-mining machine located inby the coal feeder.
In the meantime, Daniels had knocked the power at the section power center to the
equipment on the 001-0 and 002-0 MMUs, and the No. 4 belt conveyor drive. He heard
someone calling for help and also saw someone running down the No. 4 belt conveyor
entry toward the No. 4 belt conveyor drive. Daniels traveled down the No. 6 entry
for 180 feet and crossed over to the No. 4 belt conveyor drive where he saw Marcum
lying on his back on the mine floor. Daniels proceeded to get the first-aid
equipment. After returning with the first-aid equipment, Daniels, along with Adkins,
Ray, and Bragg, administered first aid to Marcum while Barry Dillon called the
surface to notify Benny Dillon, superintendent, of the accident. Marcum had been
secured on a backboard stretcher by the five other personnel at the accident scene
when Benny Dillon and Steve Lukacs, an EMT, arrived on the scene. Lukacs talked
with Marcum, checked vital signs, and treated him for shock. Marcum was placed on
the man trip and transported to the surface where care was turned over to the
Stafford EMS Fire and Ambulance Service. Marcum was transported to the Logan
General Hospital where he was pronounced dead at 6:55 p.m.
INVESTIGATION OF ACCIDENT
The Mine Safety and Health Administration was notified at 5:50 p.m. on December
18, 1995, that a serious powered-haulage accident had occurred. Mine Safety and
Health Administration personnel arrived at the mine about 10:05 p.m. A 103(k) Order
was issued to ensure the safety of the miners until the accident investigation could
be completed.
The Mine Safety and Health Administration and the West Virginia Office of Miners'
Health, Safety and Training jointly conducted the investigation with the assistance
of mine management personnel and the miners.
All parties were briefed by mine management personnel as to the circumstances
surrounding the powered-haulage accident. Representatives of all parties traveled
underground to the accident scene where a thorough examination was conducted.
Photographs and relevant measurements were taken and sketches made at the accident
site.
Interviews of individuals known to have direct knowledge of the facts surrounding
the accident were conducted at the Mine Safety and Health Administration office in
Mount Gay, West Virginia, on December 20, 1995.
The physical portion of the investigation was completed on December 22, 1995, and
the 103(k) Order was terminated.
DISCUSSION
Training
Records indicated that all required training had been conducted
in accordance with Part 48, Title 30, CFR.
Examinations
An examination of the records indicated that the required
examinations were being performed. Dates, times, and initials
were observed throughout the mine indicating the areas were
examined.
Physical Factors
The investigation revealed the following factors relevant to the
accident:
The mine is a single 10-entry supersection system (001-0 and 002-0 MMUs)
using the same dumping point and belt conveyor system.
The No. 4 belt conveyor had been installed on Saturday, December 16,
1995, in the No. 5 entry, and the accident occurred on the new installation.
The man trip was parked in the No. 4 entry outby the belt tailpiece which
was located in the adjacent No. 5 entry.
The route taken by the victim was not the normal route of travel;
however, it was the shortest.
No facilities were provided for persons to cross a moving belt conveyor.
The No. 4 belt conveyor was 190 feet in length, with a speed of 535 feet
per minute.
Power for the belt was provided from the section power center, and the
equipment was still energized with persons still working on the section. The belt
was still running because they were still trying to find the bad spot to repair.
Seam height at the No. 4 tailpiece is 54 inches, with a height of 30
inches between the top of the tailpiece and the mine roof at the point which it is
believed the victim attempted to cross the moving belt conveyor. The height between
the mine roof and the No. 4 belt conveyor head roller was 6 1/2 inches.
The space between the back stop mounted on the No. 3 belt conveyor
tailpiece and the No. 4 belt conveyor head roller was 8 1/2 inches to 18 inches.
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
A 314(b) Safeguard No. 4624562 was issued to Wayco Limited Partnership No. 1, No.
2 mine, stating in part that the mine operator failed to provide suitable crossing
facilities on the No. 4 belt conveyor where persons are required to cross a moving
belt conveyor, a safeguard of 30 CFR, Section 75.1403-5(j).
CONCLUSION
It was the consensus of the investigation team, from the interviews, that miners did not normally cross moving belts. The victim was taking the most direct route from his work place to
the man trip and attempted to cross a moving belt conveyor, lost his balance, fell onto the belt, and traveled over the belt conveyor head roller through a space with 6 1/2 inches clearance
between the mine roof and belt-head discharge roller.
Respectfully submitted,
Jerry W. Sosebee
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
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