UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
Southeastern District
Metal and Nonmetal Mine Safety and Health
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT
SURFACE NONMETAL MINE
FATAL POWERED HAULAGE ACCIDENT
I.D. 38-00002
Lakeside Quarry
Vulcan Materials Company
Greenville, Greenville County, South Carolina
October 3, 1995
By
D. B. Craig
Supervisory Mine Inspector
and
Darrell Brennan
Mine Safety and Health Inspector
Originating Office
Mine Safety and Health Administration
135 Gemini Circle, Suite 212
Birmingham, Alabama 35209
Martin Rosta
District Manager
GENERAL INFORMATION
Timothy Edward Cox, haulage truck driver, age 20, was fatally
injured at about 3:20 p.m. on October 3, 1995, when the truck he
was operating went through a berm and fell approximately 65 feet
to the bench below. The victim had a total of three months
mining experience, all at this mine.
The MSHA district office in Birmingham, Alabama, was notified of
the accident by a telephone call from Bobby E. Rider, divisional
manager of personnel and safety, southeast division, at 3:45
p.m., October 3, 1995. An investigation was started on October
4, 1995.
The Lakeside Quarry, a multiple bench granite operation, owned
and operated by Vulcan Materials Company, was located at 202
Brown Road in the city of Greenville, Greenville County, South
Carolina. The mine was an open pit quarry operation with a
crushing and finishing plant. The principal operating official
was Louis Lester Callahan, III, quarry superintendent. The mine
worked two, 11-hour shifts a day, 5 days a week, and one, 10-hour
shift on Saturdays and Sundays. A total of 35 persons was
employed.
Granite was drilled, blasted, crushed, sized and stockpiled. The
finished product was used in concrete, asphalt and for other
purposes in the construction industry.
The last regular inspection of this operation was conducted on
August 23, 1995.
PHYSICAL FACTORS INVOLVED
The accident occurred at the 850 foot bench of the quarry. On
one side of the bench was a wall from which material was blasted.
On the other side was a highwall which dropped 65 feet to the
bench below. The width of the bench where the accident occurred,
was approximately 65 feet. A haulage road that went from the 850
foot level to the crusher was 16-1/2 feet wide and 10 feet back
from the edge of the highwall where the truck went over. A berm
averaging 4 to 5 feet in height had been constructed between the
road and the edge of the highwall.
The truck was a 1974 model 201 Euclid R-50 off-road haulage
truck, serial number 65059, equipped with a 635 HP Cummins
4-cycle, V-12 diesel engine and an Allison 6-speed Torqmatic
transmission. The rear axle fifth member was equipped with a
no-spin differential.
The steering axle brakes were air operated, shoe/drum actuated,
by a type 30 brake chamber at each wheel. The rear drum brakes
were air over hydraulic operated, shoe/drum comprised of two
wheel actuator assemblies at each brake drum. The truck was 33
feet long and weighed 87,700 lbs.
Maintenance records revealed the right rear brakes were relined
on May 25, 1995, and two new wheel cylinders and two new wedges
were installed on the left rear brake. A new parking brake
lining was installed on August 10, 1995. A rebuilt transmission
was installed on August 10, 1995.
An examination of the truck after the accident revealed torque
tubes in the truck's frame had pre-existing broken welds. The
throttle linkage had severe wear spots in several areas where it
had been rubbing against other truck components. The right rear
brake drum was worn beyond its recommended wear limits and the
right rear brake shoes were incorrectly sized.
DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT
On the day of the accident, Timothy Edward Cox (victim), reported
for work at 7:00 a.m., his regular starting time and was assigned
the task of hauling rock.
Cox obtained the Euclid R-50 truck and began hauling rock as
instructed. Work continued without incident until the victim's
truck hit a front-end loader when the accelerator seemed to get
stuck as the victim backed his truck to be loaded. However, Cox
continued to use the truck and at 2:55 p.m. went to the 850 foot
level to get another load.
Due to the narrow area on the bench, it was necessary for Cox to
drive past the loading area and then back the truck off the road
at a 45 degree angle to be loaded.
After loading was completed, Cox was to have pulled the truck
forward, toward the highwall then back the truck, positioning it
so that he could turn the truck back onto the road to go to the
crusher.
After Cox's truck was loaded, he pulled the truck forward, backed
up, and began moving forward again. Witnesses said they heard
the truck's engine revving, getting louder and louder. The truck
"jumped" several times and Cox was observed turning the steering
wheel and trying to operate the gear shift, the brake light came
on but it did not stop. The truck went through the berm, over
the highwall and fell 65 feet before landing on the bench below.
The truck hit on its left front bumper, fell onto the truck bed
and remained upside down.
James Nations, utilityman, saw the truck drive off the highwall.
He drove to the bench where the truck had driven through the berm
and radioed Louis Callahan, quarry superintendent, for help.
When Nations arrived at the truck, he found the cab crushed with
Cox inside and the engine still running. Upon impact, the bed
became separated from the frame and slid against the cab causing
it to collapse towards the front of the truck and the steering
wheel column had folded. Nations attempted to kill the engine,
but could not pull the emergency air shut off handle. He then
went around to the other side of the truck and manually released
the engine air shut-off dampers.
Mine personnel attending to Cox were unable to detect a pulse.
Attempts to free him from the cab were suspended when the
emergency medical service crew arrived at the site. The victim
was pronounced dead at the scene by the Greenville County
coroner. He died as a result of crushing injuries sustained in
the accident.
CONCLUSION
The direct cause of the accident was the inability to control the
vehicle before it went over the highwall. This was due to the
accelerator linkage sticking, which caused the engine to "rev" at
high rpm and took away the ability of the no-slip differential to
release and allow the truck to be steered to the right.
Contributing to the accident were improperly maintained and
defective primary brakes on the vehicle.
VIOLATIONS
Citation No. 4522605 was issued on January 3, 1996, under the
provisions of 104(a) for violation of Standard 56.14100(b):
An employee was fatally injured on October 3, 1995, when
the Euclid R50 model 201 haul truck, serial No. 65059,
company No. 4262, he was operating went over a highwall.
Wear on the truck's throttle linkage and also on adjacent
components along the throttle linkage route indicated the
linkage had been rubbing on the truck frame. This would
cause the throttle to stick. The truck had experienced
the engine revving up, when traveling across uneven
terrain, without having the accelerator activated by the
truck operator.
Citation No. 4522606 was issued on January 3, 1996, under the
provisions of 104(d)(1) for violation of Standard 56.14101(a)(3):
An employee was fatally injured on October 3, 1995, when
the haul truck he was operating went over a highwall.
The right rear brakes on the Euclid R50 model 201 haul
truck, serial No. 65059, company No. 4262, were not
functionally proper. Incorrectly sized brake linings
were installed on May 25, 1995, evidenced by the lining
size being mismatched with the brake drum diameter. The
brake linings still showed some of their original mill
markings which indicates the right rear brake assembly
was not maintained properly. The old brake drum was
reinstalled in lieu of being replaced even though it had
numerous open heat cracks and showed excessive wear of
3/16 inches beyond the manufacturer's recommended maximum
limit. The brake activators, plungers, rollers, wedges
and cylinders were found to have considerable damage and
had not been replaced when the earlier repairs were made.
This is an unwarrantable failure.
Respectfully submitted by:
/s/ D. B. Craig
Supervisory Mine Inspector
/s/ Darrell Brennan
Mine Safety and Health Inspector
Approved by:
Martin Rosta
District Manager
Related Fatal Alert Bulletin: [FAB95M35]
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