UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
District 4
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
(UNDERGROUND COAL MINE)
FATAL MACHINERY ACCIDENT
No. 1 Mine (ID No. 46-08382)
Redbird Mining, L.L.C.
Gilbert, Mingo County, West Virginia
January 19, 1996
by
Vaughan Gartin
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
Originating Office - Mine Safety and Health Administration
100 Bluestone Road, Mount Hope, West Virginia 25880
Earnest C. Teaster, Jr., District Manager
GENERAL INFORMATION
The No. 1 mine, Redbird Mining, L.L.C., is located at Sharkey
Branch near Gilbert, Mingo County, West Virginia. The mine is
developed from the surface by four drift entries into the Upper
Cedar Grove coalbed which averages 80 inches in height at the
face areas.
The mine began production in August 1994. Employment is provided
for 18 employees, 14 underground and four surface, on one
production shift and one maintenance shift. The mine produces an
average of 500 tons of coal daily from one continuous-mining-
machine section. Coal is transported from the section to the
surface via belt conveyor. The immediate roof is comprised of 27
feet of gray, sandy shale with coal streaks and is primarily
supported with 42-inch resin-grouted roof bolts. The roof
supports are installed on 4-foot lengthwise and 4-foot to 5-foot
crosswise spacing with 8- by 8-inch bearing plates. Ventilation
is induced into the mine by a Joy 5-foot exhausting fan that
produces about 85,000 cubic feet of air a minute. Methane was
not detected during the last inspection. The roof control plan
in effect at the mine was approved by the Mine Safety and Health
Administration on May 12, 1995.
The last MSHA safety and health inspection (AAA) was completed
November 16, 1995.
DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT
After arriving at the mine site, Chadrick H. Cline, section
foreman, prepared himself and the day-shift crew for departure to
the underground working section. This section had been
preshifted by Rex Backus, preshift examiner, and his findings
were called out to the surface. Cline received the report and
entered the conditions observed by Backus in the preshift mine
examiner's report book. The day-shift crew departed the surface
around 7:00 a.m. and traveled to the working section via a
rubber-tired man trip pulled by a battery-powered scoop. Travel
time normally takes 15 to 20 minutes. Upon arrival on the
section, Cline traveled across the eight working face areas to
check on conditions and conduct face examinations.
Upon completion of the face examinations, Cline instructed the
crew where to start mining. The continuous-mining-machine crew
began normal mining activities around 7:45 a.m. in the No. 2
entry with a Joy 12CM3-10AKK deck-operated continuous-mining
machine. After extraction of coal in the No. 2 entry, the
continuous-mining machine was taken to the No. 1 entry and, upon
nearing completion of the extraction of the 20-foot cut of coal,
experienced problems with the coal gathering arms. Cline and
John Hall, electrician, decided to take the continuous-mining
machine to the No. 8 entry for repairs since this was the next
place to be mined.
The continuous-mining machine was positioned near the center of
the No. 8 entry, 21 feet outby the face area for maintenance work
to be performed. Cline instructed Robert Brewer, shuttle-car
operator, to bring some cribs up to the continuous-mining machine
so that the ripper head could be blocked in a raised position.
Roy Aldridge raised and lowered the ripper head for Cline to set
the crib underneath the ripper head. The crib was approximately
48" high, and the 12- to 15-ton head was lowered onto the crib
between 11:00 a.m. and 11:30 a.m. At this time, Hall and James
Messer, co-owner, proceeded to take out the universal drive-shaft
assembly for the gathering arms located on the left side of the
continuous-mining machine. After removal, the drive shaft
contained some damage to the splines. Messer took the drive
shaft to the surface so that repairs could be made. After
repairs were made, Messer brought the drive shaft back to the
continuous-mining machine. Cline and Messer proceeded to install
the drive shaft. Hall, who was scheduled to replace the valve
chest on January 20, 1996, due to oil leaks, decided to change
out the valve chest since the continuous-mining machine would be
out of service for repairs. Roy Aldridge assisted Hall with the
valve chest repairs. In the meantime, Cline and Messer continued
to work on the drive-shaft assembly while the valve chest was
taken off.
Messer proceeded to crawl under the ripper head and onto the
gathering-arm pan to help Cline with the drive shaft. Messer
realized at this time that he could not assist Cline at this
location, so he crawled out from underneath the ripper head to
assist Cline from another position. Cline was positioned across
the left side bar, underneath the assembly doing repairs. Messer
was crossing or stepping over Cline's outstretched legs when the
crib gave way, kicked out, allowing the ripper-head assembly to
fall on Cline, causing crushing injuries. The miner head had
been on the cribs between 1 and 1 1/2 hours. Messer checked
Cline for vital signs, but none could be detected. Hall, who was
positioned around the operator's compartment, realized that the
assembly had fallen due to the onrush of oil which spurted out of
the hydraulic hoses that were disconnected from the valve chest.
Messer informed Hall that Cline was underneath the assembly and
Hall immediately started to connect the hoses to the valve chest,
which had been taken off 15 to 20 minutes prior to the accident.
The hydraulic hoses were reconnected to the head assembly, the
assembly was raised, and Cline was removed. Ronald McCoy and
Richard Trent, EMTs, checked Cline for vital signs, but none were
present. Cline was placed on a stretcher and transported to the
surface. Cline was then placed in the care of the Stafford EMS
Ambulance Service and was pronounced dead by Irvin Sopher, Chief
Medical Examiner, at 1:15 p.m.
INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCIDENT
The Mine Safety and Health Administration was notified at 1:45
p.m. on January 19, 1996, that a fatal machinery accident had
occurred. Mine Safety and Health Administration personnel
arrived at the mine at 3:30 p.m. A 103(k) Order was issued to
ensure the safety of the miners.
The Mine Safety and Health Administration and the West Virginia
Office of Miners' Health, Safety and Training jointly conducted
the investigation with the assistance of mine management
personnel and the miners.
All parties were briefed by mine management personnel as to the
circumstances surrounding the accident. A discussion was held
with an eyewitness who was working with and in close proximity to
the victim.
Representatives from all parties conducted the on-site portion of
the investigation on January 19, 22, and 24, 1996. Photographs
and relevant measurements were taken and sketches made at the
accident site.
Interviews of individuals known to have direct knowledge of the
facts surrounding the accident were conducted at the Mine Safety
and Health Administration Office located at Mount Gay, West
Virginia, on January 23, 1996.
The physical portion of the investigation was completed January
24, 1996, and the 103(k) Order was terminated.
DISCUSSION
Training
Records indicate that training had been conducted in accordance
with Part 48, 30 CFR. An examination of Cline's training records
revealed that he had received all required training.
Examinations
Records and the presence of the examiner's date, time, and
initials indicated that the required examinations, including
electrical checks on the miner, were being conducted weekly.
PHYSICAL FACTORS
- The accident occurred on the working section in the No. 8
entry about 2,800 feet inby the drift opening.
- The mining height (roof to floor) at the accident site was
80 inches.
- The continuous-mining machine was a Joy 12CM3-10AKK, Serial
No. JM2127, manufactured in 1976 previous to the time
hydraulic line load-locking devices were required. Load-
locking devices had not been installed subsequent to the
machine's manufacture.
- The ripper head was not centered on the crib support. The
crib was built approximately 48" high and was in position
approximately 1 to 1 1/2 hours. The investigation indicated
that the continuous miner did not move when the crib
collapsed, and the head fell.
- The blocking material (6" x 6" x 30" crib) contained both
oak and poplar woods. The crib blocks were comprised of
old and new blocks. The floor was firm with some loose
coal. The crib was built by Cline, and it is not known if
it was checked during the time of the repairs.
- According to all witnesses interviewed, only one set of
cribs was used whenever the ripper head had to be blocked
for repairs.
- The valve chest assembly had been removed for 15 or 20
minutes before the accident occurred. The counter balance
valve (cbv) was stated to be in place and connected to the
hoses from the head jacks and was in place at the time of
the investigation.
- The continuous miner was tested to see if the accident could
be simulated. Tests with the hoses off the valve chest, as
they were reported to be at the time of the accident, and
the counter balance valve in place, could not get the head
to suddenly fall; but the head did creep at rates between 8
and 12.5 inches per minute. The counter balance valve was
not functioning properly in that it was leaking, which
allowed the head to creep.
CONCLUSION
A fatal accident occurred because adequate or proper crib
blocking was not installed for the ripper-head assembly of the
Joy 12CM3-10AKK continuous-mining machine. While repair and
maintenance work was being performed on the universal drive-shaft
assembly for the gathering arms and the valve chest was replaced,
the victim was positioned over the left side bar and underneath
the assembly. The crib kicked forward, allowing the assembly to
rapidly fall, causing fatal crushing injuries.
The condition of the hydraulic system was a factor in this
accident. If the counter balance valve was in place and not
blocked open with foreign material, it should have kept the cutter
head in an elevated position. The onrush of oil at the
valve chest location is indicative of some undetermined condition
in the hydraulic system. Load-locking valves were not installed
on this machine.
CONTRIBUTING VIOLATION
A 104(a) Citation No. 4638302 was issued stating in part that
adequate or proper crib blocking was not provided for the ripper-
head assembly so as to prevent motion or movement, a violation of
75.1725(c), 30 CFR.
Respectfully submitted by:
Vaughan Gartin
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
Approved by:
Richard J. Kline
Assistant District Manager
Earnest C. Teaster, Jr.
District Manager
Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
 FAB96C01
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