UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
District 7
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
(Underground Coal Mine)
FATAL POWERED HAULAGE ACCIDENT
RB Coal Co., Inc.
RB # 4 Mine
I.D. No. 15-08293
Pathfork, Harlan County, Kentucky
March 20, 1996
by
Peggy Langley
Dennis Cotton
Federal Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspectors
Dean Skorski
Stephen Dubina
Pittsburgh Safety and Health Technology Center
Originating Office - Mine Safety and Health Administration
HC 66 Box 1762, Barbourville, Kentucky 40906
Joseph W. PAVLOVICH, District Manager
OVERVIEW
On March 20, 1996 at approximately 5:30 p.m., a fatal powered-
haulage accident occurred at the RB Coal Co., Inc., RB # 4 Mine,
I.D. No. 15-08293. The accident occurred in the 38th crosscut
inby the 002-0 MMU Section head drive, in the number five panel.
The mine is located near Pathfork in Harlan County, Kentucky.
The victim, David D. Ledford, was operating a Model 482 S & S
Scoop and was engaged in cleaning loose coal and soft mine floor
from under and around the front bridge section of the Long Airdox
Continuous Haulage System when his head came in contact with the
metal frame of the elevated bridge.
Rescue efforts began by fellow employees and company personnel
and were joined by State Department of Mines and Minerals and
continued until the victim was recovered. Ledford was
transported to the surface area of the mine where he was
pronounced dead by Harlan County Coroner, Philip Bianchi, at
approximately 8:35 p.m.
An examination of the scoop and its components by MSHA
Investigators and Technical Support personnel revealed an
electrical capacitor lying loose in the logic box of the scoop
which could have resulted in a malfunction of the running
protection circuitry. The possibility of a fault existed which
could have resulted in an inadvertent high tram condition that
would not have been detected by the faulty logic unit. However,
it could not be conclusively shown that the loose capacitor
existed prior to the accident. No other conclusive evidence was
found, nor were any other contributory conditions found.
GENERAL INFORMATION AND BACKGROUND
The RB # 4 Mine, of the RB Coal Co., Inc., is located in
Pathfork, Harlan County, Kentucky. The mine originally opened in
January 1990 into the Upper Harlan Seam which ranges in height
from 36 to 50 inches. The mine is entered by five drift openings
and is ventilated by an exhaust fan. A battery-powered track-
haulage system is utilized for the transportation of miners and
haulage of supplies.
The mine employs 41 persons on one coal production shift and one
maintenance shift per day five to six days per week. The mine
produces approximately 2,000 tons of raw coal per day. Coal is
extracted from its deposits by continuous mining machines and
transported from two working sections (001-0 and 002-0) by a
conveyor belt served by a mobile bridge system and is finally
transported to the surface by a series of belt conveyors. Coal
trucks, owned and operated by B & S Trucking, are then used to
transport the coal to the RB Coal Co., Inc.þs Preparation Plant
located one-half mile from the mine site and shipped by rail to
various utility companies. The mineral is leased from Black Star
Land Company.
The Principal Officers of RB Coal Co., Inc. are:
Duane Bennett...................President
George Bennett.................Vice-President
Richard Scruggs................Secretary/Treasurer
The Principal Officers of the mine are:
George Bennett................General Manager
1913 Lake Street,
Corbin, Kentucky 40701
Earl Hensley.....................Superintendent
David Partin.....................Safety Director/Engineer
Middlesboro, Kentucky 40965
An MSHA regular Safety and Health Inspection (AAA) was begun on
February 12, 1996 and was ongoing at the time of the accident.
DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT
On Wednesday, March 20, 1996, the evening shift maintenance crew
consisting of eight employees, entered the mine at approximately
2:30 p.m., by rail mantrip and traveled to the end of the track.
The crew then completed their travel to the working section using
battery-powered three-wheel buggies. The 002-0 Section maintenance
crew consisted of five employees under the supervision of Harold Lewis
Blakely, Foreman. The evening shift maintenance activities began at
approximately 2:50 p.m. and continued without incident until 5:30 p.m.,
when the fatal powered-haulage accident occurred.
David D. Ledford, scoop operator and victim, had started his
shift at approximately 2:50 p.m. The 002-0 Section was in the
process of þbelting backþ, which is the process in retreat mining
of moving the belt outby along with the rest of the section
equipment in order to allow room for the next line of pillars to
be mined. Ledford, Blakely, and Michael Johnson, Roof Bolting
Machine Operator, had been removing the top and bottom belt
structure. The crew began to tram the mobile bridge system outby
along the lo-lo belt structure for a distance of one crosscut.
The crew was hampered from doing so because of loose coal and
soft mine floor. Running over the loose coal and soft mine floor
resulted in the front bridge becoming lodged in the mine roof.
The mobile bridge system was then trammed forward toward the
pillar line to allow room for the scoop to clean the loose
material. The front bridge system was then elevated to its
maximum height. Blakely instructed Ledford to clean up the loose
coal and soft mine floor from under and around the front bridge
section of the Long Airdox Continuous Haulage System. Ledford
brought the Model 482 S & S Scoop he was operating into the area
on the offside of the haulage system and proceeded to clean up
the loose material. Ledford removed a portion of the material
away, dumped it, and then returned to continue the job. Ledford
scooped another bucket of loose material, then backed out of the
area. Blakely proceeded to the front bridge carrier away from
the work area. Ledford then maneuvered the scoop in order to
clean up more of the loose material when his head contacted the
metal frame of the elevated bridge.
Rescue efforts began immediately by section personnel and the
accident was reported to the surface. Rescue efforts continued
to recover Ledford by section personnel, company personnel, and
the Kentucky Department of Mines and Minerals. Ledford was
recovered at approximately 8:00 p.m. and transported to the mine
surface where he was pronounced dead at 8:35 p.m. by the Harlan
County Coroner, Philip Bianchi.
THE INVESTIGATION
Gary Harris, Special Investigator of MSHA's Barbourville District
Office, who lives nearby, was notified of the accident by Earl
Hensley, Superintendent of RB Coal Co., Inc., at approximately
6:20 p.m. Harris telephoned Edward Morgan, District Staff
Assistant, who immediately notified Irvin T. Hooker, Supervisory
Coal Mine Inspector. The investigation team was then assembled.
The Investigation began immediately with Jim W. Langley,
Supervisory Coal Mine Inspector and Peggy Langley, Coal Mine
Inspector, arriving at the mine at 9:00 p.m. Assistance was
requested of MSHA's Technical Support Division which performed
the engineering and technical evaluation of the scoop and its
electrical components.
PHYSICAL FACTORS INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT
- The coal seam being mined is the Upper Harlan Seam.
- The mining height in the area of the accident was 48 to 50
inches.
- The 002-0 working section was engaged in retreat mining and
was in the process of "belting back".
- The 002-0 working section is located approximately 10,000
feet inby the surface drift portal.
- There were no eyewitnesses to the accident.
- The Scoop involved in the accident was a Model 482 S & S
Scoop, S/N 482-1918, Approval No. 1G-3056-1. The scoop was
normally used in clean up activities such as cleaning up
loose coal and soft mine bottom and hauling belt structure.
- Cleaning loose coal from under the mobile bridge section
using a scoop, however, was not a common work practice
according to statements obtained during interviews.
- The 482 S & S Scoop involved in the accident was not
provided with a canopy because of low mining heights on the
roadway leading to the charging station located some 30
crosscuts outby this location and adjacent to the end of the
track.
- The scoop controls were found in the "on position". The
pump motor and the tram selector were in the "forward
position". The scoop was running with the bucket lowered.
The bucket was raised during recovery operations in an
effort to lift the bridge section.
- After the accident, an examination of the 482 S & S Scoop
revealed that the headlights, service brakes, and emergency
deenergization device were all in working order.
- A functional test was conducted to determine if the scoop
was safe to operate. The scoop was repeatedly trammed to
test the tramming circuits. Initial tests indicated that
the scoop was working properly. The logic box, used to
detect faults on solid-state battery-powered equipment, was
removed from the 482 S & S Scoop and tested. Initial tests
indicated a malfunction in the running circuit protection.
The logic box was then forwarded to MSHA Technical Support
for additional testing.
- According to statements obtained during interviews, the only
equipment in operation at the time of the accident was the
482 S & S Scoop being operated by the victim.
- Information obtained during the investigation, revealed that
the victim was an experienced scoop operator. The victimþs
training records indicated that all required training was
up-to-date.
- The victim had a total of seven years of mining experience
but had less than one month experience at this particular
mine.
- Evidence at the accident scene indicated that the victim had
been in the process of loading a small amount of spilled
coal and loose bottom material.
- The mine floor in the area of the accident was dry with a
slight dip in the inby direction.
CONCLUSION
The fatal accident occurred when the 482 S & S Scoop being
operated by the victim traveled under the elevated bridge
conveyor pinning the victim between the frame of the scoop and
the bridge conveyor. A co-worker stated that he heard the scoop
surge into high tram immediately before impact.
An examination of the scoop and its components by MSHA
Investigators and Technical Support personnel revealed an
electrical capacitor lying loose in the logic box of the scoop
which could have resulted in a malfunction of the running
protection circuitry. The possibility of a fault existed which
could have resulted in an inadvertent high tram condition that
would not have been detected by the faulty logic unit. However,
it could not be conclusively shown that the loose capacitor
existed prior to the accident. No other conclusive evidence was
found, nor were any other contributory conditions found.
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
- A 103-K Order, No. 4244736, was issued to assure the health
and safety of the miners until an investigation and
examination deemed the area safe to work.
Respectfully submitted,
Peggy Langley
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector, Accident Investigator
Dennis Cotton
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector, Accident Investigator
Dean Skorski
Pittsburgh Safety and Health Technology Center
Stephen Dubina
Pittsburgh Safety and Health Technology Center
Approved by:
John M. Pyles
Assistant District Manager
Joseph W. Pavlovich
District Manager
Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
 FAB96C10
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