UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
DISTRICT 5
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT
(UNDERGROUND COAL MINE)
FATAL ROOF FALL
Mine No. 2 (44-03808)
Navajo Coal Company
Wise, Wise County, Virginia
July 8, 1996
By
Harold J. Burnett
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
David L.Fowler
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
James R. Baker
Education and Training Specialist
Originating Office - Mine Safety and Health Administration
P.O. Box 560, Wise County Plaza, Norton, Virginia 24273
Ray McKinney, District Manager
GENERAL INFORMATION
Navajo Coal Inc., Mine No. 2 is located on Dotson Creek
approximately two miles north of Wise, in Wise County, Virginia.
The mine is opened by five drifts into the Norton Coalbed which
ranges from 28 to 36 inches in height. Twenty-four miners are
employed at the mine on two production shifts per day, five days
a week with an average production of 350 tons of coal daily.
The mine operates one section, advancing five entries, utilizing
a Jeffrey 102 Continuous Mining Machine and a continuous haulage
system which consists of a 94L Bridge and 506 Bridge Carriers.
Coal is transported to the surface by a belt conveyor system.
The immediate mine roof consists of shale and sandstone which
contains draw rock and/or small slips. The roof was being
supported with 36 inch mechanically anchored bolts installed with
two Fletcher Single Head, ATRS equipped roof bolting machines.
The roof control plan was adequate for the conditions encountered
and persons interviewed were familiar with the requirements.
The MSHA approved training plan was also adequate for the
conditions and mining system and records indicated that persons
were being trained in accordance with this plan.
The mine Cleanup Program requires loose coal and coal dust to be
cleaned up to the extent possible with the continuous mining
machine, and after the continuous haulage system is moved out of
the place and it is permanently supported, the remaining
accumulations will be cleaned up with a scoop. (Two scoops were
provided on the section to be used for this and other purposes.)
Navajo Coal Inc. assumed control of this operation in September,
1994. The principal officers of the corporation are:
Scott Moore....................President
Keith Ison........................Vice-President
The last safety and health (AAA) inspection conducted at this
mine by the Mine Safety and Health Administration was completed
on April 15, 1996.
DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT
On Monday, July 8, 1996, at 7:04 a.m., the day shift crew under
the supervision of Freddie Williams, section foreman, and Danny
Addington, superintendent, entered the mine and traveled to the
004 Section. Work progressed as normal until approximately 11:00
a.m. when the accident occurred. Jerry Wayne Adams, utility man,
was assigned to operate the right side Fletcher RR1 Single Head
Roof Bolting Machine in the absence of the regular roof bolting
machine operator. Earlier in the shift, Adams was instructed to
assist Jerry Strouth, roof bolting machine operator, on the left
side of the section. Joe Addington, continuous mining machine
operator, and Robert Woods, electrician, had completed mining the
No. 2 Entry and had mined the second cut of the shift from the 4
Right Crosscut.
At approximately 10:40 a.m., Joe Addington and Woods moved the
continuous mining machine into the face of the No. 4 Entry. At
this time, Adams moved the right side roof bolting machine into
the 4 Right Crosscut to begin roof bolting operations. A line
curtain was installed on the right side of the No. 4 Entry to
assist in ventilation while coal was being mined. The line
curtain was installed across the opening of the 4 Right Crosscut.
After mining the No. 4 Entry, Joe Addington and Woods moved the
continuous mining machine into the last open crosscut of the No.
4 Entry for the purpose of servicing the machine.
At approximately 11:00 a.m., Joe Addington looked toward the
curtain installed across the 4 Right Crosscut and could not see
any movement or a reflection from Adams' cap lamp. Joe Addington
then looked on the inby side of the line curtain and called for
Adams several times. After receiving no response, he crawled to
the location where Adams was working. Adams was on his knees at
the operatorūs drill station trapped under a portion of fallen
rock, which was approximately seven feet long, four feet wide and
two to eight inches thick. Joe Addington called for help and
Woods immediately came to assist him. Woods had to move the
machine backward approximately three to four feet to facilitate
recovery of Adams. (The fallen rock had completely cleared the
roof bolting machine prior to moving the machine.) Several
attempts to lift the rock failed. Other crew members, Dan
Addington, Strouth, Jackie Wells, Jeff Pilkenton and Eric Mullins
responded to Joe Addington's call for help. After retrieving a
lifting jack from the section belt conveyor, the rock was lifted
and Adams was recovered.
Surface personnel were notified and the local rescue squad was
called. Eric Mullins, EMT-First Responder, examined Adams and
began administering emergency treatment. Emergency treatment
continued as Adams was transported to the surface. Adams was
transported to the Wise Appalachian Regional Health Care Hospital
by the Wise County Rescue Squad at 12:23 p.m., where he was
pronounced dead.
PHYSICAL FACTORS INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT
- There were no eye witnesses to the accident and no contact
between the victim and other members of the crew after he
entered the No. 4 Right Crosscut. A line curtain installed
up the right side of the No. 4 Entry prevented anyone from
being able to see directly into the crosscut.
- Approximately four inches of loose coal and coal dust was
present on the mine floor in the No. 4 Right Crosscut making
it difficult to maneuver the roof bolting machine. The
existence of mine floor irregularities interfered with the
proper cleanup of this place with the continuous mining
machine.
- The victim was found inby roof support under a portion of
fallen rock which was approximately seven feet long, four
feet wide and two to eight inches thick.
- The roof bolting machine was positioned with the rear of the
machine angled toward the left rib with the operator's drill
control station inby permanent roof support. The roof
control plan requires the machine to be positioned with the
rear of the machine angled toward the right rib as much as
possible to obtain the best protection from the ATRS except
while installing the roof bolts adjacent to the right rib.
The crosscut being slightly off projections from the
beginning resulted in the roof bolts being installed on a
diagonal pattern which would make it more difficult to
comply with this requirement. It appeared that the crosscut
had been pulled to the right in order to connect with the
No. 5 Entry which had not been advanced enough to allow cut
through. The section loading point had been moved up to
where the continuous haulage system could not be taken back
to the No. 5 Entry face.
- The victim had completed the installation of the third bolt
in the first row of the second cut from the crosscut. The
next bolt in the installation process would have required
him to maneuver the machine to install the first bolt in the
second row adjacent to the left rib. During the interview
session, the persons who recovered the victim from under the
fallen rock could not recall if the ATRS was against the
roof. However, the location of the ATRS and tram controls
would have required the victim to be under supported roof
while lowering the ATRS and/or maneuvering the machine.
Therefore it is assumed that the ATRS was against the roof.
- Draw rock and/or small slips were present in the immediate
mine roof but were being cut down with the continuous mining
machine when possible. The primary roof support consisted
of 36 inch mechanically anchored bolts on a four foot
pattern with oversize bearing plates when needed.
- The victim was not performing his normal duties. He was
classified as a utility man but was operating the roof
bolting machine in the absence of the regular machine
operator. However, records indicated that he had received
task training as a roof bolting machine operator on 12/22/95
and had performed the task occasionally since then.
CONCLUSION
The accident occurred when the victim was operating the controls
of the roof bolting machine from a location inby roof support.
Other factors were:
- The roof bolting machine was positioned with the rear of the
machine angled toward the left rib with the operator's drill
control station inby permanent roof support.
- The construction of the roof bolting machine is such that if
it is angled to the rear of the bolts being installed, with
the rear to the left rib, the operatorūs controls are
exposed to unsupported roof.
- Four inches of loose coal and coal dust on the mine floor in
the 4 Right Crosscut made it difficult to maneuver the roof
bolting machine.
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
- A 103(K) Order No. 3785391 was issued to insure the safety
of any person until an investigation could be made.
- A 104(a) Citation No. 3355268, citing 30 CFR 75.202a was
issued for a person working inby roof support.
- A 104(a) Citation No. 3355269, citing 30 CFR 75.220 was
issued for a violation of the approved roof control plan.
The roof bolting machine was not positioned in the manner
required by the plan. The rear of the machine was not
angled toward the right coal rib to afford the operator the
most protection from the ATRS.
Respectfully submitted by:
Harold J. Burnett
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
David L.Fowler
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
James R. Baker
Education and Training Specialist
Approved by:
Ray McKinney
District Manager
Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
 FAB96C19
|
Back to Top