UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION

District 4

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
(UNDERGROUND COAL MINE)

FATAL POWERED-HAULAGE ACCIDENT

Mine No. 1 (ID No. 46-07622)
Cedar Point Mining, Inc.
Kencole Energy, Inc. (ID No. VGK)
Meador, Mingo County, West Virginia

September 30, 1996

by

Ernie Ross
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector


Originating Office - Mine Safety and Health Administration
100 Bluestone Road, Mount Hope, West Virginia 25880
Earnest C. Teaster, District Manager

OVERVIEW

Abstract

On September 30, 1996, at about 1:30 p.m., a powered-haulage accident on the 4th West Mains No. 1 Section (006-0 MMU), Mine No. 1, Cedar Point Mining, Inc., resulted in fatal injuries to Roger Glen Duncan. Duncan, age 21, with 11 months mining experience, was operating the No. 2 left-drive shuttle car, tramming from the continuous miner in the No. 2 working face to the mechanical belt feeder in the No. 4 entry. Coal was being mined from the face of the No. 2 entry and hauled to the belt feeder in the No. 4 entry. A two-shuttle-car haulage system was being used to transport coal from the faces to the belt feeder. The No. 2 left-drive shuttle car was utilizing the last open crosscut from the No. 2 entry before turning outby in the No. 4 entry. The No. 1 right-drive shuttle car was utilizing the first crosscut outby the last open crosscut to travel from the continuous miner in the No. 2 working face to the No. 4 entry. As the No. 2 left-drive shuttle car was passing the first crosscut outby the last open crosscut in No. 4 entry toward the belt feeder, it was struck by the No. 1 right-drive shuttle car entering the No. 4 entry from the crosscut (3 to 4), crushing the victim.

Background

Mine No. 1 of Cedar Point Mining, Inc., is located at Meador, Mingo County, West Virginia. The mine is developed into the Lower Cedar Grove coalbed from the surface by four drift openings. The Lower Cedar Grove coalbed averages 45 inches in height. Cedar Point Mining, Inc., assumed operation of Mine No. 1 from K.Y.V. Coal Company, Inc., and began production on August 28, 1992. Employment is provided for 31 employees, 14 of which are employed by Kencole Energy, Inc., Contractor ID No. VGK. Employees of both companies work together on the 005-0 and 006-0 production sections. The mine produces an average of 1,800 tons of raw coal daily on three production shifts utilizing two continuous-miner sections. Coal is transported from the working sections to the surface via belt conveyor. The immediate roof is sandstone and is primarily supported with 36-inch resin bolts. Supplemental supports are posts, cribs, and conventional bolts. Ventilation is induced into the mine by a Fairchild 5-foot exhausting fan which produces about 70,000 cubic feet of air per minute. This mine does not liberate a measurable amount of methane. The principal officers of Cedar Point Mining, Inc., are Kennith Layne, President/Secretary/Treasurer/Safety Director, and Thomas Duncan, Superintendent. The principal officer of Kencole Energy, Inc., is Kennith Layne, President. Mr. Layne obtained contractor I.D. No. VGK for Kencole Energy, Inc., on May 15, 1995.

The last Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) complete Safety and Health Inspection was completed on September 17, 1996.

STORY OF EVENT

On Monday, September 30, 1996, the day shift began at about 7:45 a.m. The 4th West Mains (006-0) crew, under the supervision of Kevin Dotson, section foreman, arrived on the section about 8:05 a.m. Mining operations began in the No. 3 left crosscut working face. Routine mining of the seven working faces continued across the section. At about 1:30 p.m., mining of the No. 2 left working face had been completed, and the continuous-mining machine was moved to the No. 2 working face.

The section's belt feeder was located in the No. 4 entry, two crosscuts outby the last open crosscut. The trailing cable for the No. 1 right-drive shuttle car was anchored in the No. 3 entry on the left outby corner in the second crosscut outby the face. The No. 2 left-drive shuttle car was anchored on the right outby corner in the last open crosscut in the No. 4 entry. The shuttle car switch-out point to the belt feeder was at the No. 4 entry intersection in the second crosscut outby the face.

Keith Norman, continuous-mining-machine helper, had worked on the day-shift production crew for approximately 2 weeks. Norman had previously worked on the midnight shift, general crew. Norman stated that his duties included servicing and cleaning around the section belt drive at the start of the shift and at 12:00 noon. Upon returning to the section after the 12:00 noon section belt drive check, he would relieve the shuttle-car operators out for lunch.

Norman stated that he had traveled from the section belt drive about three crosscuts outby the section tailpiece, back to the continuous miner. He then relieved Roger Glen Duncan, No. 2 left-drive shuttle-car operator, out for lunch. At about 1:30 p.m., Norman relieved Kenneth Wolford, No. 1 right-drive shuttle-car operator, out for lunch. Duncan resumed the operation of the No. 2 left-drive shuttle car.

The continuous-mining machine had just completed mining the crosscut on the left side of No. 2 entry and had been moved to the face of the No. 2 working place. The route of travel utilized by the No. 1 right-drive shuttle car from the No. 2 working face to the belt feeder was outby in the No. 2 entry to the second crosscut, then left across to the No. 4 entry. The route of travel utilized by the No. 2 left-drive shuttle car from the No. 2 working face was across the last open crosscut from No. 2 entry to No. 4 entry. The No. 1 right-drive shuttle car entered the No. 4 entry from the second crosscut, while the No. 2 left-drive shuttle car entered the No. 4 coal feeder entry from the last open crosscut. The shuttle car switch-out point was at the No. 4 entry intersection at the second crosscut outby the face.

Norman had hauled one load of coal from the No. 2 working face to the belt feeder. While tramming the second load of coal from the No. 2 working face across the first crosscut outby the last open crosscut, he noticed that his trailing cable was lying in the haul road near his cable anchor in No. 3 entry. Norman stated that he stopped the shuttle car to move the cable out of the roadway.

Wolford had finished lunch and was at the continuous-mining machine in the No. 2 entry. He observed the No. 2 left-drive shuttle car, operated by Duncan, being loaded. Wolford noticed that Norman had not returned for another load. Wolford stated that he thought Norman may have had problems with the trailing cable on the No. 1 right-drive shuttle car. Wolford then traveled across to the No. 3 entry and observed Norman moving the trailing cable out of the roadway. Wolford assisted Norman in moving the cable.

With the trailing cable out of the haul road, Norman boarded the No. 1 right-drive shuttle car, utilizing the outby end seat, not completely facing in the direction of travel, and began tramming through the crosscut from No. 3 to No. 4 entry. Being seated in the outby seat and tramming outby, with his back to the operator's side rib and looking over the loaded shuttle car, caused restricted vision and not being able to see properly in the direction of travel. Norman stated that as he began to turn outby from the corner of the crosscut to the entrance of No. 4 entry, the shuttle car stuck in high tram. The panic bar was struck to avoid cutting the No. 1 right-drive shuttle car's trailing cable, according to Norman. He then realized that he had struck the No. 2 left-drive shuttle car, operated by Duncan, as it was passing by the crosscut. Norman restarted the No. 1 right-drive shuttle car and backed away from the No. 2 left-drive shuttle car.

Wolford observed Norman tramming the No. 1 right-drive shuttle car from the intersection of No. 3 entry through the crosscut from No. 3 to No. 4 entry when the accident occurred. Wolford traveled from the intersection in No. 3 entry to the No. 2 left-drive shuttle car in the No. 4 entry intersection. Wolford spoke to Duncan, who was in the operator's deck. Wolford saw that Duncan was hurt and called for help.

Kevin Dotson, section foreman, and Elbert Steele, electrician, arrived at the accident site. Dotson instructed Wolford to call outside for an ambulance and to get transportation at the end of the track. The first-aid box and stretcher were taken to the accident site by Wolford. Steele began to administer first aid to Duncan. Ray Mickey, continuous-mining-machine operator, arrived at the scene and assisted Steele in administering first aid and securing Duncan to the stretcher. Duncan was loaded onto the Mac 8 personnel carrier and transported to the end of the track. They then transported him to the surface via a track-mounted personnel carrier operated by Nicky Browning, belt man. Mickey and Thomas Duncan, superintendent and father of the victim, attended to the victim during the ride to the surface. The Mingo County Ambulance Service arrived at the mine site at 2:12 p.m. Emergency treatment was administered, and at 2:50 p.m. Duncan was transported to the Matewan High School football field and transferred to a Medivac helicopter. He was then flown to St. Mary's Hospital, Huntington, West Virginia. Duncan arrived at St. Mary's Hospital at 3:49 p.m. and was pronounced dead at 4:18 p.m. by Dr. John Frame, M.D.

INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCIDENT

The Mine Safety and Health Administration was notified at 2:50 p.m. on September 30, 1996, that a serious accident had occurred. MSHA personnel arrived at the mine about 3:45 p.m. A 103(k) Order was issued to ensure the safety of the miners.

MSHA and the West Virginia Office of Miners' Health, Safety and Training jointly conducted an investigation with the assistance of mine management personnel and the miners. The investigation team requested assistance from MSHA's Technical Support Group. This assistance was provided by members of the Approval and Certification Center, Mine Equipment Branch and Electrical Equipment Branch, Triadelphia, West Virginia.

All parties were briefed by mine personnel as to the circumstances surrounding the accident. Representatives of all parties traveled to the accident scene, where a thorough examination was conducted. Photographs and relevant measurements were taken and sketches were made at the accident site. Interviews of individuals known to have direct knowledge of the facts surrounding the accident were conducted at the Logan Field Office conference room on October 2, 1996, at 9:00 a.m.

The physical portion of the investigation was completed on October 4, 1996, and the 103(k) Order was terminated.

DISCUSSION

Training

Records indicated that all required training had been conducted in accordance with Part 48, Title 30 CFR.

Examination

Records indicated that the required examinations were being performed. The weekly examinations and all maintenance performed on mine equipment is performed by Cedar Point Mining, Inc., employees.

Physical Factors

One common haul road was utilized to the mechanical coal feeder. The shuttle car switch-out point was at the second crosscut intersection outby the face in No. 4 entry. The coal feeder was approximately 70 feet outby the switch-out point.

Norman had hauled one load of coal to the coal feeder while operating the No. 1 right-drive shuttle car. While hauling the second load, he was delayed at the No. 3 entry intersection. The No. 1 right-drive shuttle car's trailing cable had to be moved out of the haul road.

Duncan was in the process of hauling his second consecutive load from the continuous miner while Norman was moving the No. 1 right-drive shuttle car's trailing cable out of the roadway.

Wolford assisted Norman in moving the trailing cable out of the roadway and observed Norman tramming the No. 1 right-drive shuttle car through the crosscut from No. 3 to No. 4 entry at the time of the collision.

Norman stated that the tram lever on the No. 1 right-drive shuttle car stuck in high tram as he began to make the turn outby in the No. 4 entry. He then struck the panic bar on the No. 1 right-drive shuttle car.

Examination of the No. 1 right-drive and No. 2 left-drive shuttle cars revealed that the emergency park brake systems would not activate immediately. On the No. 1 right-drive shuttle car, an examination determined that the vertical tram lever centering spring was missing, and the tram switch centering spring was broken. On the No. 2 left-drive shuttle car, an examination determined that the tram switch centering spring was broken, and the external spring was stretched to the point that it was ineffective.

It was determined that both shuttle-car operators were seated in the operator decks facing inby and were operating the shuttle cars by looking over their shoulders while tramming outby. Tramming the shuttle cars in this manner restricts visibility of the operator's side of the shuttle car and causes the operator to have his back turned to the operator's side coal rib.

Utilizing only one seat of the shuttle car at this mine appears to be a practice.

Both shuttle cars were loaded at the time of the collision. The coal height was from 48 to 55 inches at the scene of the accident. The section was developing entries and crosscuts on 65-foot centers.

Cedar Point Mining, Inc., has overall responsibility to make weekly examinations and to perform maintenance on all mining equipment.

CONCLUSION

The accident and resultant fatal injury occurred when the No. 2 left-drive shuttle car was struck by the No. 1 right-drive shuttle car as it entered the intersection of the No. 4 entry.

Contributing factors were:

1. The shuttle-car operators had limited visibility because of the manner in which the operators were seated.
   
   
2. Both shuttle cars were not maintained in a safe operating condition, in that the parking brake and tram were not operating properly.

CONTRIBUTING VIOLATIONS

The following safeguard was issued to Cedar Point Mining, Inc., as required by Part 45, Title 30 CFR:

In accordance with Section 75.1403, Safeguard No. 3748812, was issued because the operators of the Joy 21SC shuttle cars, the No. 1 right-drive (Serial No. ET-12702) and No. 2 left-drive (Serial No. ET-12703), were not facing the direction of travel.

The following citations were issued to Cedar Point Mining, Inc.:

1. 104(a) Citation No. 3748813, which stated in part that the No. 1 right-drive Joy 21SC shuttle car, Serial No. ET-12702, was not being maintained in a safe operating condition. This was a violation of Section 75.1725(a), 30 CFR.
   
   
2. 104(a) Citation No. 3748814, which stated in part that the emergency parking brake system installed on the No. 1 right-drive Joy 21SC shuttle car, Serial No. ET-12702, would not immediately activate when the panic bar was struck. This was a violation of Section 75.523-3(b)(1), 30 CFR.
   
   
3. 104(a) Citation No. 3748815, which stated in part that the No. 2 left-drive Joy 21SC shuttle car, Serial No. ET-12703, was not being maintained in a safe operating condition. This was a violation of Section 75.1725(a), 30 CFR.
   
   
4. 104(a) Citation No. 3748816, which stated in part that the emergency parking brake system installed on the No. 2 left-drive Joy 21SC shuttle car, Serial No. ET-12703, would not immediately activate when the panic bar was struck. This was a violation of Section 75.523-3(b)(1), 30 CFR.

Respectfully submitted by:

Ernie Ross, Jr.
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector

Approved by:

Richard Kline
Assistant District Manager

Earnest Teaster, Jr.
District Manager

Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
FAB96C25