UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
DISTRICT 6
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT
(UNDERGROUND COAL MINE)
FATAL ROOF FALL ACCIDENT
NO. 3 MINE (I. D. NO. 15-16993)
KIAH CREEK MINING CO.
VIRGIE, PIKE COUNTY, KENTUCKY
OCTOBER 29, 1996
BY
BUSTER STEWART
COAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH INSPECTOR (ROOF CONTROL)
ORIGINATING OFFICE - MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
100 RATLIFF CREEK ROAD, PIKEVILLE, KENTUCKY 41501
CARL E. BOONE, II - DISTRICT MANAGER
ABSTRACT
On Tuesday, October 29, 1996, at approximately 1:50 p.m., a roof
fall accident occurred on the active pillar section (002-0 MMU)
of Kiah Creek Mining Co., No. 3 Mine. Darren Keith Bartley, a 25
year old miner with seven years mining experience, was fatally
injured in the accident. Bartley had been employed at this
operation for three years as a shuttle car operator.
The accident occurred while Bartley was tramming a Joy 21SC
shuttle car to the continuous miner located at the right pillar
block in the No. 5 entry. A rock measuring approximately 50"
wide by 60" long, and 2 3/4" - 4" thick, fell from the mine roof
striking Bartley in the abdomen which resulted in fatal injuries.
The accident occurred because management failed to adequately
support the mine roof in the No. 5 Entry. Two resin-grouted
bolts with missing plates and heads were located in the area
where the roof fell on the victim.
GENERAL INFORMATION
The Kiah Creek Mining Co., No. 3 Mine, is located approximately
two miles off U.S. 23 on Rob Fork near Virgie, Pike County,
Kentucky. The principal officers are Todd Kiscaden- president
and person in charge of health and safety , Doug Mullins -
manager of mines, and Alfred Hopkins -superintendent. The mine
is developed into the No. 2 Elkhorn Coalbed by three drift
openings. The active "supersection" consisting of the 001-0 and
002-0 mechanized mining unit (MMU), is located approximately 1500
feet inby the mine portals.
The mine employs 46 persons, (42 underground and 4 on the
surface), six days per week on two production and one maintenance
shift, and produces approximately 1400 tons daily. The coal
ranges in height from 40 to 50 inches. The mine has two
producing MMU's on one "supersection" using two continuous mining
machines and five shuttle cars. The immediate roof strata
consists of laminated shale up to 17 inches in thickness. The
main roof consists of sandstone in excess of 10 feet in
thickness. The mine roof was supported during advance mining
using 42-inch resin-grouted roof bolts. Wooden posts were used
as supplementary supports exclusively during retreat mining.
Coal is transported from the section dumping point to the surface
via belt conveyors, and then loaded into trucks for
transportation to a rail loading facility.
The last Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) health and
safety inspection was completed August 16, 1996.
DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT
On the day of the accident, the production crew entered the mine
at 6:00 a.m. Work proceeded normally with pillar mining on the
002-0 MMU under the supervision of Reginald Bates, section
foreman, until about noon when Bates left the mine due to a
doctor's appointment. At that time, Donald Pauley, section
foreman for the adjacent 001-0 MMU, assumed supervision of both
MMUs. Four 40-foot x 40-foot pillar blocks had been mined during
the shift and the first cut was being mined in the fifth pillar
block. At approximately 1:50 p.m., Mark Tackett, continuous
miner helper, noticed that the shuttle car operated by Darren
Bartley was stopped in the No. 5 entry one crosscut outby the
continuous miner. Tackett went to see if there was a problem and
upon arrival at the shuttle car, observed Bartley pinned in the
operator's compartment by a roof fall. Bartley was conscious and
asked Tackett to back the shuttle car up and get the rock off of
him. The rock was too large for Tackett to lift alone and he
signaled for help. Barry Barnette, Sr., Preston Cantrell, and
Ricky Potter arrived at the scene and assisted Tackett in lifting
the rock off of Bartley. The men lifted Bartley out of the
operator's compartment and placed him on the mine floor. Donnie
Branham, an Emergency Medical Technician (EMT), who was on the
adjacent 001-0 MMU, was called to the accident site. Branham
arrived at the scene and immediately began first-aid. One of the
men called the surface informing Alfred Hopkins, mine
superintendent, of the accident. Hopkins called for an ambulance
and instructed Michael Cantrell, EMT, to go underground to the
accident site. Cantrell traveled to the accident site and
assisted Branham in administering first-aid. The victim was
placed on a stretcher and transported to the surface in the Mac-8
personnel carrier, accompanied by Cantrell and Branham. Near the
surface, Cantrell stated that he could not detect the victim's
pulse. One-man Cardio Pulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) was started.
Two-man CPR was started upon arrival on the surface at 2:05 p.m.
An Accu-Med Ambulance Service ambulance arrived at the scene at
2:15 p.m., and assisted with CPR functions. Bartley was then
transported to the Pikeville Methodist Hospital located at
Pikeville, Kentucky, where he was pronounced dead at 4:00 p.m.,
by Ray S. Jones, Pike County Deputy Coroner.
The Mine Safety and Health Administration district office at
Pikeville, Kentucky, was notified of the accident at
approximately 2:30 p.m., by Doug Mullins, Mine Manager. MSHA
personnel were dispatched to the mine and arrived at
approximately 3:30 p.m., MSHA personnel met with Kentucky
Department of Mines and Minerals personnel and began an
investigation.
PHYSICAL FACTORS
The investigation revealed the following factors relevant to the
occurrence of the accident:
- There were no eyewitnesses to the accident.
- The accident occurred approximately 1500 feet underground on
the active pillar section (002-0 MMU) in the No. 5 Entry.
There was no evidence that pillar mining had transferred
overriding or excessive weight on the pillar blocks outby
the line of pillar blocks being mined at the time of the
accident on the active section.
- The rock that fell on the victim was approximately 50 inches
wide, 60 inches long, and ranged from 2 3/4 to 4 inches
thick.
- At the area of the accident, two roof bolts were observed
with the roof- bolt heads and bearing plates missing. Two
additional roof bolts and bearing plates were observed
dislodged at the accident scene. The two bolts with no bolt
heads had visible rust where the bolt head was missing.
Mining equipment during advance mining had apparently
sheared the heads of the roof bolts. The undulations in the
mine floor contributed to the dislodging and shearing of the
roof bolts at the accident scene. Sheared-off and dislodged
roof bolts were observed in other areas of the mine outby
the active section. Violations were issued for these areas
outby the section on a separate spot (CAA) inspection.
- The preshift-onshift examination record book did not
indicate that any hazardous conditions in the area. The
record book indicated that the last preshift examination
prior to the accident was conducted between 5:20 a.m. and
5:50 a.m., on the same date by Charles Mullins, maintenance
foreman.
- The shuttle car was not equipped with a canopy. The mining
height ranged from 40 to 50 inches due to undulations in the
mine roof on the section. The mining height at the location
of the accident was 41 inches. The supersection (001-0 and
002-0 MMU) was developed by advanced mining beginning in
June 1996. Canopies were not installed on equipment during
advance mining due to the mining height being under 42
inches.
- The death certificate listed the cause of death as
hemorrhage due to a punctured femoral artery.
CONCLUSION
The accident occurred because management failed to adequately
support the mine roof in the No.5 Entry. Two resin-grouted bolts
with missing plates and heads were located in the area where the
roof fell on the victim.
CITATIONS/ORDERS
- A 103(k) Order of Withdrawal, Number 4006603, was issued on
October 29, 1996, in conjunction with the fatal accident
investigation to assure the safety of the coal miners until
an examination or investigation of the accident scene was
completed.
- A 104(d)(1) Citation, Number 4006604, was issued for a
violation of Title 30 CFR 75.202(a). The mine roof in the
No.5 Entry, one break to the left of spad 3597 was
inadequately supported. Loose draw rock, and two resin-
grouted roof bolts with missing plates and heads were
located in the area where the piece of draw rock involved in
the accident fell.
- A 104(d)(1) Order, Number 4006607, was issued for a
violation of Title 30 CFR 75.360. An adequate pre-shift of
the No.5 Entry on the 002-0 section was not conducted. The
area has visible draw rock (loose) and resin-grouted roof
bolts with missing plates and heads. The bolt heads had
been missing for some time as evidenced by the presence of
extensive rusting on the ends of the broken bolts.
Respectfully submitted by:
Buster Stewart
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector, Roof Control
Approved by:
Carl E. Boone, II
District Manager
Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
 FAB96C30
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