UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
District 5
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT
(UNDERGROUND COAL MINE)
FATAL INJURY ROOF FALL ACCIDENT
Mine #4 (I.D. No. 44-06634)
ParTS Corporation of America
Dewey, Wise County, Virginia
December 9, 1996
(Amended June 9, 1997)
by
Charles Upchurch
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
Gary Roberts
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
Mattie Beaty
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
Originating Office - Mine Safety and Health Administration
P.O. Box 560, Wise County Plaza, Norton, Virginia 24273
Ray McKinney, District Manager
ERRATA
Kimberly Edwards received critical injuries due to a roof fall
accident on December 9, 1996. Mr. Edwards succumbed to his injuries
on June 9, 1997.
Amendment acknowledged:
Ray McKinney
District Manager
GENERAL INFORMATION
Mine #4 of ParTS Corporation of America is located one-tenth mile
east of Route 620, on the south fork of the Pound River. The
mine was opened by four drifts into the Kelly coal seam. The
coal seam averages 40-inches in height.
Coal is mined from the active faces with continuous mining machines
and transported to the belt feeders in shuttle cars. The coal
is then transported to the surface via conveyor belts. Haulage
trucks transport the coal from mine property. The mine operates
three shifts per day, producing coal on the day and evening shifts
and performing maintenance on the owl shift. The mine has 29
underground employees and three surface employees. The mine produces
1,000 tons of coal daily. The mine has two mining sections, one
of which was idle at the time of the accident.
The main mine roof strata consists of ten-feet, or more, of sandstone.
The immediate roof is from zero to ten-feet, or more, of shale.
The mine floor consists of at least ten-feet of shale. The Approved
Roof Control Plan, dated September 19, 1995, provides for full
roof support in all entries, crosscuts, and rooms. The Roof
Control Plan stipulates, at a minimum, the use of 36-inch mechanically
anchored roof bolts, 48-inch fully grouted resin rods, or 60-inch
point anchor/combination anchor bolts. The maximum entry and
crosscut widths are 20-feet, except for the belt entry, which
is allowed to be 22-feet. Entries and crosscuts can be developed
on 60,70, or 80-feet centers. When adverse conditions are encountered,
these centers can be developed from 90 to 125-feet.
On January 23, 1996, a supplement was approved to increase the
minimum entry and crosscut centers, developed during adverse conditions,
to 150-feet. On April 5, 1996, a supplement was approved to extend
development cut depths to 30-feet, utilizing a remote controlled
continuous mining machine. On June 12, 1996, a supplement was
approved for partial pillar extraction during second mining (pillaring),
utilizing a three-cut system. On December 9, 1996, the operator
submitted a supplement for extending the cut depths during second
mining to 30-feet. This supplement had not been approved at the
time of the accident. The Approved Roof Control and Ventilation
Plans provided for bleeder entries established on the left side
of developed headings.
The ParTS Corporation of America Mine #4 is operated as a subsidiary
of Thyssen Mining Construction, Incorporated, Coeburn, Virginia.
Principal officers of ParTS Corporation of America are:
Alfred H. Domjahn.............................. President
Jonathan B. Case.................................Secretary
Ronnie Freeman...................................Superintendent
The last safety and health inspection was completed on September
27, 1996.
DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT
On Monday, December 9, 1996, the evening shift crew, under the
supervision of Claudie Deel, section foreman, entered the mine
at 4:30 P.M., and arrived on the 003 section at approximately
4:55 P.M. The area had been developed with seven entries. Pillar
mining had been started by the day shift. Two pillars, numbers
six and five, had been mined. The number four pillar had a lift
removed from the right side, and the number three pillar had a
partial lift removed from the right side.
Mining began in the partial lift on the right side of the number
three pillar, number four entry, which was left by the day shift.
After this lift was completed, breaker timbers were installed
across the opening. The continuous mining machine, operated by
Jimmy Mullins, was then moved to mine the lift from the left side
of the number four pillar. Kimberly Edwards (victim) and Raymond
Breeding were operating the shuttle cars, hauling the coal to
the section dumping point.
Mining continued until approximately 8:10 P.M., when two sections
of mine roof fell, striking Edwards. The sections of roof material
measured approximately four feet by four feet and four feet by
12 feet. The material was three to six inches in thickness.
Edwards was extricated from beneath the fallen material by Deel,
Mullins, Breeding, and Charles Steffey, mechanic/electrician.
First-aid was administered by Deel, an Emergency Medical Technician.
Edwards was then transported to the surface, arriving outside
at 8:45 P.M. The Pound Rescue Squad had been notified by Mike
Sykes, mine foreman, and arrived at 8:48 P.M. Edwards was transported
to St. Mary's Hospital, Norton, Virginia. Edwards' medical condition
was stabilized at St. Mary's Hospital and he was then transported
to Holston Valley Community Hospital, Kingsport, Tennessee, for
further treatment.
Edward's injuries resulted in permanent partial paralysis. Kimberly
Edwards succumbed to these injuries on June 9, 1997.
PHYSICAL FACTORS INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT
The investigation revealed the following factors relevant to the
investigation:
- The victim had advanced inby permanent roof support while loading
the shuttle car in the left lift of the number four pillar.
- This operation had an approved plan for the second mining of
pillars using a three-cut system with 20 feet cuts. Conditions
observed in the area of the accident indicated the lift removed
from the right side of the number three pillar was approximately
36 feet in depth. The lift removed from the left side of the
number four pillar was cut to a depth of approximately 33 feet.
- Persons performing second mining were not adequately trained
in the plan provisions. Second mining was addressed in a supplement
to the Approved Roof Control Plan, dated June 12, 1996.
- An interview was conducted during the preliminary investigation
and according to statements from the the evening shift section
foreman, the section crew was instructed in the procedures for
setting the posts required for the three-cut pillar plan.
- According to statements from employees, received during interviews
conducted on December 9 and 10, 1996, the day shift crew also
removed lifts from the pillars in depths exceeding the 20 feet
stipulated in the approved plan.
- Ten posts were installed across the opening created by the lift
removed from the right side of the number three pillar. Six of
the ten posts were too short, and were installed on end-sections
of posts rather than on solid footing.
- The ten posts installed across the opening created by the lift
removed from the number three pillar had been installed inby permanent
supports. The approved plan stipulated that such posts would
be installed in areas of permanently supported roof.
- The method of mining reduced the areas of the pillars left after
mining (stumps) to where persons were exposed to hazards created
by roof subsidence and excessive widths. The right lift removed
from the number three pillar was mined to a width of approximately
30 feet. The lift removed from the left side of the number four
pillar had been mined to a width of approximately 32 feet.
- The mining height in the area of the accident was 50 inches.
Due to undulations in the mine roof and floor, canopies were
not being used on the mining equipment. The undulations created
mining heights normally ranging from 36 to 41 inches.
CONCLUSION
The accident was a direct result of the operator's failure to
comply with the Approved Roof Control Plan. By mining pillar
lifts to excessive depths and widths, a shuttle car operator was
placed inby permanently supported roof. This resulted in the shuttle
car operator being struck by a section of roof material causing
severe and permanently disabling injuries. The victim succumbed
from these injuries on June 9, 1997.
VIOLATIONS
The following citations and orders were issued due to conditions
and/or practices revealed during the investigation:
- A 103-k Order, No. 4566702, was issued to ensure the safety
of all persons in the mine until an investigation was completed
and the area deemed safe to work.
- A 104-d-1 Citation, No. 3787055, was issued for a violation
of 30 CFR 75.363-a. The section foreman, Claudie Deel, failed
to correct and record hazardous conditions that had occurred during
the evening shift (4 PM) in the No. 4 entry on the 003 active
pillar section, beginning approximately 143 feet inby survey station
number 964. The hazardous conditions were as follows:
- Left and right pillar splits were mined from 33 to 36 feet deep and 30 feet in width.
- The right pillar split was mined through into the No. 5 entry.
- The inby "pillar stump" was 4 1/2 ft. in length.
- Timbers installed in the left pillar split were not installed
on adequate footing (timbers too short).
- Persons had traveled inby permanent roof supports to install
timbers.
- Shuttle car operator had advanced the operator's deck of the
21SC Joy shuttle car inby permanent roof support in the right
pillar split.
- A 104-d-1 Order, No. 4566704, was issued for a violation of
30 CFR 75.202-b. Kimberly Edwards, shuttle car operator, traveled
inby permanent roof support in the right pillar split of the No.
4 entry on the 003 active pillar section, approximately 166 feet
inby survey station number 964 in the No. 4 entry. Two sections
of mine roof, 1) 4 ft. x 4 ft. x 3 to 6 inches thick, and 2) 4
ft. x 12 ft. x 3 to 6 inches thick, fell pinning Edwards in the
operator's deck of the 21SC Joy shuttle car, resulting in fatal
injuries.
- A 104-d-1 Order, No. 4566705, was issued for a violation of
30 CFR 75.220. The approved Roof Control Plan Pillar Recovery
Supplement, dated June 12, 1996, was not being complied with in
the No. 4 entry on the 003 active pillar section, beginning approximately
143 feet inby survey station number 964, in that the left pillar
split had been mined 36 feet deep. The approved Plan stipulates
that the depths will not exceed 20 feet in depth during retreat
mining.
- A 104-d-1 Order, No. 4566706, was issued for a violation of
30 CFR 75.220. The approved Roof Control Plan Pillar Recovery
Supplement, dated June 12, 1996, was not being complied with in
the No. 4 entry on the 003 active pillar section, beginning approximately
143-feet inby survey station number 964, in that the right pillar
split had been mined a minimum of 33 feet deep. The approved
Roof Control Plan stipulates that the depths will not exceed 20-feet
in depth during retreat mining.
- A 104-d-1 Order, No. 4566708, was issued for a violation of
30 CFR 75.220-d. Statements from six of the employees at the
mine, who work on the 003 active pillar section, revealed that
the employees had not received any training on the approved Roof
Control Plan Supplement (Pillar Plan), dated June 12, 1996, prior
to implementation.
- A 104-d-1 Order, No. 4566709, was issued for a violation of
30 CFR 75.202-b. Evidence indicated that timber-men traveled
inby permanent roof support in the left pillar split of the No.
4 entry on the 003 active pillar section. Nine out of ten timbers
were installed out from under permanent roof supports, six of
the timbers were too short and were not installed on adequate
footing.
- A 104-d-1 Order, No. 4566710, was issued for a violation of
30 CFR 75.203-a. The method of mining that occurred in the No.
4 entry on the 003 active pillar section beginning 143 feet inby
survey station number 964, exposed workmen to the following hazardous
conditions:
- Excessive widths in the No. 4 entry on the right and left pillar splits. The left and right sides measured 30 feet in depth.
- Pillar block dimension located on the inby left pillar split,
was measured at 4 1/2 ft. in width.
Respectfully submitted by:
Charles Upchurch
CMS&H Inspector
Gary Roberts
CMS&H Inspector
Mattie R. Beaty
CMS&H Inspector
Approved:
Ray McKinney
District Manager
Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
FAB96C39
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