UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
Southeastern District
Metal and Nonmetal Mine Safety and Health
Accident Investigation Report
Surface Nonmetal Mine
Fatal Fall of Face/Highwall Accident
I.D. 31-02002
Altapass Quarry
B & W Stone Company
Micaville, Yancey County, North Carolina
May 28, 1996
By
M. E. Slaton
Supervisory Mine Inspector
and
E. L. Killian
Mine Safety and Health Inspector
Originating Office
Mine Safety and Health Administration
135 Gemini Circle, Suite 212
Birmingham, Alabama 35209
Martin Rosta
District Manager
GENERAL INFORMATION
James S. Boone, vice president, age 25, was fatally injured on May 28, 1996,
at approximately 1:30 p.m. when he was struck by loose material that fell from
a highwall. The victim had a total of 7 years mining experience, all at this
mine.
The MSHA Knoxville, Tennessee, field office was notified of the accident by
a telephone call from James Woody, vice president of
B & W stone Company, at 3:55 p.m., May 28, 1996. An investigation was
started the next day.
The Altapass Quarry was a surface open pit mining operation, owned and
operated by B & W Stone Company and located adjacent to Highway 19 at
Micaville, Yancey County, North Carolina. The senior operating official was
Timothy Boone, president. The mine normally operated one, 8-hour shift a
day, 5 days a week on an intermittent basis. A total of 10 people was
employed.
The company mined building stone which was obtained through lease
agreements or royalty and extracted from various locations throughout the
area.
The stone was drilled, blasted, and placed by hand in the bucket of a front-end
loader then taken to a truck to be transported to the main yard where it was
cut, sized and stored for customer sales. The finished product was sold for use
in landscaping and veneer building stone.
The victim had not received training in accordance with 30 CFR Part 48.
The last regular inspection of this operation was conducted February 13-15,
1996.
PHYSICAL FACTORS INVOLVED
The accident occurred in what was called the Orchid Quarry which was about
47 miles north of the company main yard. The quarry was 25 feet wide at the
base with vertical highwalls of 20 to 25 feet on each side. The material was
drilled with an Atlas Copco jackhammer drill powered by a 150 CFM
Ingersoll-Rand air compressor. One and one-half inch diameter holes were
drilled on a 5 foot center to a depth of 6 feet and blasted with Anfo jell and
electric caps, leaving benches which measured 6 feet wide and 6 feet high and
went the length of the quarry. As mining continued, these benches were
blasted, leaving 20 to 25 foot vertical walls. An 8-foot long by 1-1/2 inch
diameter drill steel was used for scaling loose material. A 1968, HD6-G Allis-Chalmers track
front-end loader equipped with a 1-1/4 yard bucket was used
to mine the material.
The size or amount of rock fall could not be determined due to the fact no one
actually saw the material fall. The size of rocks on the quarry floor following
the accident ranged from small stone size up to boulders 3 feet long by 1 foot
wide by 1 foot thick.
DESCRIPTION of ACCIDENT
On the day of the accident, James S. Boone, victim, reported to work at 7:00
a.m., his regular starting time. He along with his brother, Timothy Boone,
president, and his father, Homer Boone, loader operator, went to the Orchid
Quarry to mine boulders which would be transported to the company main yard
to be sold for landscaping.
They drilled a round of 5 or 6 holes at the top of the quarry which were loaded
and shot. Timothy and Homer Boone both stated that they scaled down the
loose before going to the quarry floor to hand-load stone into the loader
bucket.
At about 1:30 p.m., while the front-end loader was removing some waste
material, James (victim) and Timothy Boone were standing near the quarry
wall, when loose material fell, hitting both men. Timothy Boone was struck
on the head and turned to see James Boone on the ground with a severe head
injury. The victim was still breathing and they carried him to a pick up truck
parked nearby and transported him to the Charles A. Connon Memorial
Hospital in Banner Elk, North Carolina, where he was pronounced dead on
arrival as a result of massive head trauma.
CONCLUSION
The primary cause of the accident was the failure to properly scale loose
material from the highwall. Contributing to the possible severity of the injury
was the failure to use hard hats where there was a danger of falling material.
VIOLATIONS
Citation No. 3880201
Issued on June 10, 1996, under the provisions of
Section 104(a) for a violation of Standard 56.3200:
On May 28, 1996, a fatal accident occurred at the Orchid Quarry
side at approximately 1:30 p.m. The company president and vice
president(victim) was standing near the 20 to 25 foot left highwall,
when loose material fell, striking both men. The vice president
was killed from massive head wounds, while the president received
only superficial injuries. The highwall had not been properly
scaled.
This citation was terminated on June 12, 1996. The company stated they
were not going to work in this quarry site anymore and if they do they
will scale the highwall and notify MSHA. All equipment has been
removed from this quarry.
Citation No. 3880202
Issued on June 10, 1996, under the provisions of
Section 104(a) for a violation of Standard 56.15002:
On May 28, 1996, a fatal accident occurred at the Orchid Quarry site at
approximately 1:30 p.m. The company president and vice president
(victim) was standing near the 20 to 25 foot left highwall, when loose
material fell, striking both men. The vice president was killed while the
president received only superficial injuries (Citation No. 3880201).
Neither of the men were wearing their provided hard hats.
This citation was terminated June 10, 1996. The standard and hazard
was discussed with the company and the wearing of hard hats will be
enforced at all hazardous areas.
/s/ M. E. Slaton
M. E. Slaton
Supervisory Mine Inspector
/s/ E. L. Killian
E. L. Killian
Mine Safety and Health Inspector
Approved by: Martin Rosta, District Manager
Related Fatal Alert Bulletin: [FAB96M23]
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