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U.S. Department of Labor Mine Safety and Health Administration Protecting Miners' Safety and Health Since 1978 |
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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION Rocky Mountain District Metal and Nonmetal Mine Safety and Health Accident Investigation Report Surface Metal/Nonmetal Mine Fatal Powered Haulage Accident S.T.S. Gravel (mine) I.D. No. 24-01501 S.T.S. Gravel (company) Livingston, Park County, Montana October 9, 1996 By Richard R. Laufenberg Supervisory Mine Safety and Health Inspector Lyle K. Marti Mine Safety and Health Inspector Rocky Mountain District Mine Safety & Health Administration P.O. Box 25367 DFC Denver, CO 80225-0367 Robert M. Friend District Manager |
| Speeds | 1st | 2nd | 3rd | 4th |
| Forward, mph | 4.1 | 7.3 | 13.3 | 26.7 |
| Reverse, mph | 5.3 | 9.4 | 17.0 | ---- |
The loader had air-actuated drum/shoe service brakes. It was equipped with an air-actuated service brake mechanism and a spring-actuated emergency parking brake mechanism in each brake chamber. There were six air brake chambers, four on the front axle (two per wheel) and two on the rear axle (one per wheel). The brake system automatically provided positive braking at all four wheels when the system air pressure dropped to approximately 40 pounds per square inch (psi). The spring-actuated mechanism could also be applied manually with a dash-mounted control valve when setting parking brakes.
As a part of this investigation, measurements were taken of the distance that each air chamber push rod traveled upon brake application. The four front rods each traveled 2.5 inches, the left rear push rod traveled 2.75 inches, and the right rear push rod traveled 3 inches. The manufacturer's service manual states that brake adjustment is needed when travel of a brake chamber rod exceeds a maximum of two inches.
An air pressure gauge and a low air pressure warning device were located on the instrument panel. The low pressure warning device was designed to provide a visual and audible warning when the brake system air pressure drops below 77 psi. During the accident investigation the braking system on the loader was tested and the low air pressure warning device did not function.
An air leak in the right rear brake chamber was detected and the chamber was disassembled. A hole (slit) approximately one quarter inch long existed in the diaphragm. As a result, one brake application depleted the system air pressure. The defective diaphragm was replaced and the brakes were adjusted in accordance with the manufacturer's specifications. The service and park brake were capable of stopping and holding the loader with its typical load on the 25% grade after the repair and adjustments.
There were no other defects affecting safety found on the loader relative to the accident. A means of communication was not provided on the loader.
On the day of the accident, John R. Beagle (victim), reported for work at 7:30 a.m., his regular starting time. Beagle met with Larry J. Stands, owner, and discussed replacing the fuel filter on the Caterpillar 980B front-end loader. Beagle replaced the fuel filter and performed other routine services on the loader. It could not be determined if Beagle had performed a complete pre-operational check on the loader.
At 8:00 a.m., he began his usual task of hauling gravel with the loader from the bottom bench of the pit to the crushing plant. Crushing activity was normal with no communication between Stands and Beagle.
About 12:45 p.m., as Stands was hauling crushed gravel from the crusher to the stockpiles with another front-end loader, he noticed the crusher feeder hopper had run empty. He thought Beagle's loader had broken down and went to check on him. He saw the Caterpillar front-end loader on its left side at the bottom of the steep roadway next to the north pit wall. Stands parked his loader and ran down the road to the accident site. He found Beagle partially out of the left door opening of the cab. His body was wedged between the left gravel bank and the loader's hand grabrail with his knees pressed against his chest. He found the loader in first gear forward with the engine running. Stands shook the victim's arm and called his name but there was no response. He ran back up the road and drove his loader to the scale house. He told Sandra M. Johnson, scale house operator, to call the local 911, emergency assistance number.
The local ambulance service arrived six minutes after receiving the call and emergency medical technicians checked the victim's vital signs. They found he was not breathing, had no pulse, and his pupils were dilated.
The Park County deputy coroner, pronounced the victim dead at the scene. Extrication of the victim's body only required unbolting and removing the loader's hand grabrail. He was transported to Bozeman, Montana, where an autopsy was performed. The victim had no internal or external injuries. The official cause of death was mechanical asphyxiation.
Failure to maintain the front-end loader service and park brakes was the primary cause of the accident. Operating the loader on steep road gradients with defective brakes contributed to the severity of the accident.
While there were no witnesses to the accident, it is apparent that the victim was unable to stop the loader as it traveled bucket first down the steep grade because of inadequate brakes. (The only brake that could have worked at all was the left rear. Single left rear brake activation on an articulating loader would cause the loader to veer right, as it did in this accident.) The loader struck the north pit wall with the right front tire causing it to ride up on one side and overturn.
Because there were no internal or external injuries, it was concluded that the victim unbuckled the seat belt after the loader rolled over and while exiting the loader fell between the hand grabrail and gravel bank. Apparently the victim's left foot slipped as he stepped onto the hand grabrail and his right foot was caught inside the cab by the loader's door frame. He became wedged between the loader and the 4-foot bank, with his knees against his chest and was not able to free himself. The seat belt was clean and found hanging across the operator's seat. On days prior to the accident, individuals on the mine property had observed the victim wearing the seat belt.
Order number 7900351
Citation number 7921013
Citation number 7921014
Citation number 7921015
Citation number 7921016
Communication systems should be provided for mine haulage equipment. The victim may have been able to alert others to the emergency and help could have been requested.
Mine haul roads should be designed to minimize steep road grades.
/s/ Richard R. Laufenberg
Supervisory Mine Safety & Health
/s/ Lyle K. Marti
Mine Safety & Health Inspector
Approved by: Robert M. Friend, District Manager
Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
[FAB96M40]
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