UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
District 3
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT
(Underground Coal Mine)
FATAL POWERED HAULAGE ACCIDENT
Mine 1-A (I.D. No. 46-06715)
Carter-ROAG Coal Co.
Helvetia, Randolph County, West Virginia
January 31, 1997
by
John D. Mehaulic, Jr.
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
and
Robert L. Huggins
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
William L. Sperry
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector(Electrical)
Originating Office - Mine Safety and Health Administration
Coal Mine Safety and Health, District 3
5012 Mountaineer Mall
Morgantown, West Virginia 26505
Timothy Thompson, District Manager
GENERAL INFORMATION
The Carter-ROAG Coal Co., Mine 1-A, is located near Helvetia,
West Virginia. The mine has four drift openings into the Sewell
"A" coal seam, and the average coal seam height measures from 38
to 42 inches; however, the seam height on the MMU 002
conventional working section had increased to an average of 54
inches. Employment is provided for 77 persons working
underground and six persons working on the surface.
The mine produces coal on the day and afternoon shifts, while
maintenance work is done on the midnight shift. Production is
performed on the midnight shift after maintenance is completed.
Coal is transported out of the mine by a belt conveyor system. A
track-trolley haulage system is used to transport miners and
supplies to the mouth of each section. Rubber-tired equipment is
then used to transport miners and supplies to the face areas.
The mine currently has three working sections. Two sections
operate remote-controlled continuous miners using extended cut
mining methods with 21 SC shuttle cars as section haulage
equipment. One section is a conventional section using S&S
battery-powered scoop haulage equipment.
During the previous quarter, the mine did not show a liberation
of methane. A regular safety and health inspection was in
progress at the time of this accident.
The last regular safety and health inspection was completed on
December 23, 1996.
The company officials are listed below:
Adrian P. DeMonchy................................President
James D. Panetta......................................Executive Vice President
David L. Stevens......................................Superintendent/Principal Health and
Safety Officer
DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT
On Friday, January 31, 1997, at approximately 4 p.m., the crew of
the 002 section, under the supervision of Mitchell Silman, began
their shift. The crew started underground but had trouble
getting through the track switch on the surface. After getting
the track-mounted mantrip through the switch, the crew proceeded
underground to the mantrip station located at the mouth of the
002 working section.
When the crew arrived at the mantrip station, Silman gave work
instructions and identified where the equipment was located on
the section. Silman told Richard Miller and John "Ed" Wegman,
Roof Bolter Operators, that the roof bolter was in the crosscut
between No. 5 to No. 6 entries, and they were to move it to the
No. 1 entry and begin bolting the No. 1 face. Silman told James
"Ed" Holcomb, Cutting Machine Operator, that the cutting machine
and coal drill were in the No. 9 entry. Silman told Jerry Davis,
Scoop Operator, to start loading coal from the No. 2 face.
While Davis was doing his preoperational examination of the No.
11 battery-powered S&S scoop, he discovered the batteries were
low and reported this to Silman. Silman told Davis to change the
batteries. Davis, Wegman, Miller, and Holcomb changed the
batteries on the No. 11 scoop. After the batteries were changed,
a piece of conveyor belt was attached to the back of the scoop,
and Davis transported the crew members onto the working section.
Gary Gedraitis stayed at the shop located at the mouth of the
section to talk with Bernard Carpenter, Day Shift Mechanic, and
to get fuses to repair the No. 13 scoop. Gedraitis proceeded to
the section, via a 3-wheel battery-powered personal carrier which
he parked outby the No. 13 scoop in the No. 3 entry.
The roof bolters trammed the roof bolting machine to the face of
the No. 1 entry and began bolting operations. Silman informed
Davis of the haulage pattern they would use to haul from the No.
2 face and instructed Holcomb to prepare the No. 9 entry so it
could be cut, drilled, and shot.
Production started with Davis and Silman hauling coal out of the
face of the No. 2 entry and proceeded normally until the time of
the accident. Davis, operating the No. 11 scoop had hauled three
or four scoop loads of coal, and Silman, operating the No. 7
scoop, had hauled two or three loads of coal when the accident
occurred.
Silman, on his last load of coal, left the designated haulage
pattern and hauled down the No. 3 entry to the second line of
crosscuts. He stopped in the intersection with the scoop
articulated, causing the operator's compartment to be the
farthest projection out into the No. 3 entry, which was the
designated haulroad. Silman summoned Gedraitis to check the No.
7 scoop. Silman told Gedraitis that he thought a jack pin was
broken at the scoop's bucket. Gedraitis went over to the scoop
and stood next to the right-front tire and asked Silman to move
the bucket up and down so he could see if the pin was broken.
While Gedraitis was checking the scoop bucket, Davis came through
the check curtain installed between the No. 2 and No. 3 entries,
running bucket first, and trammed into the No. 7 scoop. The
bucket of Davis' scoop went into the operator's compartment of
Silman's scoop, causing chest injuries to Silman. Davis, after
realizing the impact, backed up and got off the No. 11 scoop to
see what he had hit.
Gedraitis, who is also an Emergency Medical Technician (EMT),
communicated with Silman about his injuries immediately following
the accident. Gedraitis, with assistance from Davis, got Silman
out of the scoop. Shortly after being removed from the scoop
Silman lost consciousness. No response or vital signs were
detected and Cardio Pulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) was started
immediately. Davis went to the section telephone and called
outside for assistance. Silman was transported to the surface as
CPR was being administered.
The Randolph County Emergency Services, Valley Unit, arrived at
the mine shortly after Silman had arrived on the surface. The
emergency services personnel examined Silman and detected no sign
of life. The emergency service continued CPR and transported
Silman to an area where they could meet HealthNet 1 Aeromedical
Services Inc. The HealthNet 1 arrived at 6:11 p.m. and began
resuscitation techniques on Silman. At 6:24 p.m. Dr. Jonathan
Newman and Dr. John Prescott, via radio from the West Virginia
University Hospital Medical Command Center, pronounced Silman
dead and instructed the crew to stop resuscitation measures on
the victim. Silman was transported to Davis Memorial Hospital by
ambulance and at approximately 7:30 p.m., Dr. Tim Sears confirmed
Silman's death.
PHYSICAL FACTORS INVOLVED
- Mitchell Silman, section foreman, also operated a battery-powered
scoop and hauled coal.
- The battery-powered scoops are operated bucket first with
the operator in a reclining position.
- The scoops were hauling through a ventilation control device
(check curtain), when traveling through the crosscut from
the No. 2 entry to the No. 3 entry, with their buckets
loaded and in the raised position.
- A blind spot was created on the left front side of the scoop
when the bucket was loaded and in a raised position. As
Davis traveled through the check curtain, he stated that he
was watching the right coal rib because he knew Gedraitis
was working on a disabled scoop located in that area.
- At the beginning of the shift, Silman instructed Davis to
use a circle coal haulage pattern.
- Gedraitis stated he heard a warning device (bell) just prior
to the accident.
- No defects were found on the No. 11 scoop when it was
inspected after the accident. The No. 7 scoop could not be
operated due to the operating controls being damaged as a
result of the accident.
- The coal seam measured approximately 54 inches at the
accident site.
CONCLUSION
The accident and resultant fatality occurred when the victim
stopped his battery-powered scoop for a maintenance evaluation in
an intersection that was located in the pre-determined haulage
pattern. The scoop had stopped as it was negotiating the turn
through the intersection and the operator's compartment was
exposed to oncoming vehicles. The visibility of the tramming
scoop operator was very limited by traveling bucket first with
the bucket in the raised position loaded with coal.
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
- A 103(k) Order No. 3496010 was issued to assure the safety
of any person in the affected area, inby the No. 7 belt
conveyor drive unit, including the entire MMU 002 section
and equipment.
- A Safeguard, No.3719483 was issued under 30 CFR 75.1403,
requiring all employees involved in scoop haulage to be
trained in proper proceedures to perform their jobs safely.
Respectfully submitted by:
John D. Mehaulic
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
Robert L. Huggins
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
William L. Sperry
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector(Electrical)
Approved by:
Robert L.Crumrine
Assistant District Manager for Inspection Programs
Timothy J. Thompson
District Manager
Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
 FAB97C02
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