UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
District 4
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
(SURFACE AREA OF UNDERGROUND COAL MINE)
FATAL ELECTRICAL ACCIDENT
A & B Thomas Mine # 1 (ID No. 46-06713)
A & B Thomas, Inc.
Canon Coal Haulers, Inc. (ID No. IAJ)
Fenwick, Nicholas County, West Virginia
March 18, 1997
by
Jerry E. Sumpter
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
Ernie Ross, Jr.
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
Originating Office - Mine Safety and Health Administration
100 Bluestone Road, Mount Hope, West Virginia 25880
Earnest C. Teaster, Jr., District Manager
Release Date: June 18, 1997
GENERAL INFORMATION
Background
Canon Coal Haulers, Inc.'s main corporate office is located at
Bluefield (Mercer County), West Virginia. Canon is an
independent contractor, providing coal haulage services for A & B
Thomas, Inc. Canon Coal Haulers, Inc., provides employment for
31 truck drivers, 7 of which haul coal from the A & B Thomas Mine
#1.
Canon Coal Haulers, Inc., has hauled coal for this underground
mine since November 14, 1996. Canon Coal Haulers, Inc.'s truck
terminal is located at Lansing, Fayette County, West Virginia.
Coal is loaded by A & B Thomas, Inc., employees with an endloader
at the surface stockpile. The coal is then hauled from Fenwick,
Nicholas County, West Virginia, to Mossy Eagle Preparation Plant,
Kingston, Fayette County, West Virginia. The round-trip travel
distance is approximately 120 miles.
Three loads of coal are hauled during a normal shift, with an
average of 40 tons per truckload. This coal is processed and
shipped as pea coal from the preparation plant to different
locations.
The principal officers of Canon Coal Haulers, Inc., are: Clovis
D. Cox, President/Treasurer; Sherman Nester, Jr., Secretary; Mike
Taylor, General Truck Manager; and George Lockhart, Truck
Operations Foreman.
The A & B Thomas Mine #1 is located at Fenwick, Nicholas County,
West Virginia. This mine began mining operations on October 7,
1996. The mine provides employment for 20 employees, with 16
working underground on one continuous-haulage section and 4
working on the surface. Coal is produced 5 and 6 days a week on
the day and evening shifts.
Four drift openings are entered into the Sewell coal seam which
averages 42 inches in height. After the coal is mined from the
underground mine, it is loaded from the surface coal stockpile
into coal trucks owned by Canon Coal Haulers, Inc., and is
transported to the Mossy Eagle Preparation Plant at Kingston,
West Virginia.
The principal officers of A & B Thomas, Inc., are: Teddy
Alderman, Superintendent, and Emery Smallman, Safety Director and
Underground Mine Foreman. The last regular AAA Inspection at
this mine site by the Mine Safety and Health Administration
(MSHA) was completed on February 18, 1997.
STORY OF EVENT
On Tuesday, March 18, 1997, approximately 5:30 a.m., James Carte,
a truck driver, began his regularly scheduled shift. A
preoperational inspection of the 1989 Mack Denedyne
tractor-trailer truck was conducted by Carte. Carte had
transported one load of coal from mine property before the accident, according to the other truck drivers interviewed. The average truck hauls
approximately 40 tons of coal. It takes about 3 hours to
complete the round-trip haulage to the preparation plant.
After Carte hauled one load of coal from the A & B Thomas Mine #1
to the Mossy Eagle Preparation Plant, his wife came to the main
truck's terminal office at Lansing, West Virginia, and advised
Carte that they were scheduled to attend Magistrate Court for
some personal business. After attending the meeting at
Magistrate Court, Carte reported to the truck shop and resumed
the operation of his assigned coal haulage truck.
Carte drove his truck to the A & B Thomas Mine #1, where it was
loaded at the coal stockpile. He then proceeded along the
haulroad toward the main highway. Carte had driven approximately
0.3 of a mile along the haulroad, when he met another coal truck
being operated by Donnie Legg. Legg was traveling toward the A &
B Thomas Mine #1 to load his last load of coal for the day.
Carte pulled over at the first haulroad passing area from the
mine, which is known to the truck drivers as the high-voltage
pullover area, to allow the oncoming coal truck to pass.
According to Legg, he and Carte spoke briefly on the CB radio.
Legg then went to the mine site.
At 2:20 p.m., Carte drove his truck from the pullover area for a
distance of approximately 50 feet onto the haulroad. The truck
was stopped underneath the 23,000 VAC Allegheny Power Company
transmission lines, which cross the haulroad at this area. It is
not known if Carte realized that he was stopping underneath the
high-voltage transmission lines. Carte apparently traveled to
the passenger side of the truck bed and released the chain hooks
that retain the tarping device. He then walked to the front end
of the bed where the tarping framework release mechanism was
located. Carte pulled the tarping device clutch brake to release
the automatic tarping device that distributes the tarp cover over
the coal in the truck bed. The tarping device is a
spring-actuated assembly.
When the tarping device release mechanism was actuated, the
framework that stores the tarping material traveled in an upward,
arcing direction toward the rear of the truck bed. The aluminum
framework mast came in contact with one phase of the 23,000 VAC
high-voltage transmission line as it was ascending from the front
end of the truck bed.
Carte's hand was apparently touching the release clutch brake
handle when the tarping frame-work mast contacted the high-voltage
line. Carte was electrocuted and thrown about 11 feet
from the truck.
Approximately 2:30 p.m., Glen Abbott, a vendor employed by Abbott
Brothers Mine Sales and Service, left the A & B Thomas Mine #1
and arrived at the area of the haulroad where Carte's truck was
located. According to Abbott, the victim was observed lying in a
drainage ditch next to the haulroad, approximately 11 feet from
the truck. Abbott also observed the tarping framework in contact
with the high-voltage transmission line.
Abbott returned to the mine site and notified Legg that Carte was
hurt. Abbott also informed Emory Smallman, superintendent of the
mine, and Ray Tincher, coal miner (EMT). Both men are employees
of the A & B Thomas Mine #1. Tincher instructed Smallman to call
the rescue squad. Emory Smallman stated that mine power had been
lost minutes before Abbott returned to the mine. Legg drove his
coal truck up the haulroad, followed by Tincher in the front-end
loader.
After arrival at the accident site, Tincher examined Carte for
vital signs and found none. Tincher instructed Legg to travel
back to the mine site and telephone Michael Taylor, general
manager and superintendent, and George Lockhart, a supervisor for
Canon Coal Haulers, Inc., at Lansing, West Virginia, to inform
them of the accident.
At 2:36 p.m., Smallman notified Redi-Care Ambulance Service of
Nettie, West Virginia. They dispatched an ambulance to the
accident site at 2:37 p.m. and arrived at 2:46 p.m. The
paramedics administered first aid. They started CPR, without any
response from the victim. At 3:00 p.m., the ambulance
transported the victim to Richwood Area Medical Center in
Richwood, West Virginia. The victim was pronounced dead on
arrival at 3:25 p.m., by Dr. John Beard.
INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCIDENT
The Mine Safety and Health Administration was notified of the
accident at 2:50 p.m. on March 18, 1997, that a fatal accident
had occurred. Mine Safety and Health Administration personnel
began to arrive at the mine at 3:30 p.m. A 103(k) Order was
issued to ensure the safety of the miners until the accident
investigation could be completed.
The Mine Safety and Health Administration and the West Virginia
Office of Miners' Health, Safety and Training jointly conducted
an investigation, with the assistance of management personnel and
miners from A & B Thomas, Inc.
The Mine Safety and Health Administration and the West Virginia
Office of Miners' Health, Safety and Training conducted
interviews of individuals known to have direct knowledge of the
facts surrounding the accident. The interviews were conducted at
the Mine Safety and Health Administration's Summersville Field
Office conference room at Summersville, West Virginia, on March
19, 1997, at 10:00 a.m.
The physical portion of the investigation was completed on March
19, 1997, and the 103(k) Order was terminated.
DISCUSSION
Training
Records and interviews with the miners and management indicated
that requisite training had been provided for the miners employed
at this mine; however, it was revealed that neither A & B Thomas,
Inc., nor Canon Coal Haulers, Inc., gave the required hazard
training to the truck drivers hauling from this job site. Newly
employed experienced miner training was given to all Canon
employees, but this training did not include any hazard training
for any specific mine site. The training provided did not
address the hazards of high-voltage lines.
Background of Coal Haulage Road
The first bond permitted for this mine by the West Virginia
Department of Natural Resources was on July 5, 1983, to West
Ridge Coal Company.
WestVaco owns the mine property. Laurel Smokeless Coal Company
leased the property from A & B Thomas, Inc., until March 21,
1997. On March 21, 1997, A & B Thomas, Inc., resumed
responsibility and maintenance rights to the coal haulage road.
A & B Thomas, Inc., owns all mineral rights to the mine property.
The underground A & B Thomas Mine #1 has changed ownership and
company name three times. On March 3, 1992, Wrangler Mining
Company, Inc., opened the mine and closed it on January 11, 1994.
On December 29, 1994, T-He Coal Company, Inc., opened the No. 1
Mine and then closed operations on August 15, 1995.
The power company constructed part of the mine haulage road in
1965. The construction of the haulage road was for service of
the power transmission lines.
Physical Factors
The coal haulage truck involved in the accident was a 1989
Denedyne Mack truck, with a 32-foot Alfab trailer. The height of
the trailer bed from the surface haulage road was 11 feet 7 3/4
inches. The average width of the haulage road was about 21 feet
from the ditch line to the berm.
The victim pulled back onto the haulage road, after another truck
passed him traveling in the opposite direction. The victim drove
the truck about 50 feet before he decided to put the tarp over
the load of coal. This placed him underneath the 23,000-volt
transmission line.
The 23,000-volt transmission line was measured at its lowest
point at 20 feet 1 inch, and at the accident scene, the highest
point from the haulage road was 20 feet 11 inches.
A handwritten, painted sign on the haulage road at the accident
scene, visible while leaving the mine, read, "Danger High-Voltage
Overhead." A sign on the tarp release mechanism reads, "Danger,
Watch Out for Overhead Power Lines."
The high-voltage transmission line is owned by Allegheny Power
Company.
According to information received from the power company, the
power transmission lines were installed sometime in 1965.
Personnel of Allegheny Power Company provided information
indicating that the high-voltage transmission line was supplied
from two locations at 23,000 VAC. Both supplies are protected by
circuit breakers to open at 120 amperes of ground fault current.
Both circuit breakers opened and then locked out on ground fault
on March 18, 1997, at 2:21 p.m.
During the day of the accident, visibility was limited due to fog
and a steady downpour of rain.
The tarping mechanism was manufactured by Mountain Tarp and
Awning Co. located in Middlesboro, Kentucky.
The tarping device crank handle was observed lying on the bumper,
on the driver's side of the truck.
The tarping device, when raised to a vertical position over the
trailer, was approximately 22 feet in height from the ground.
According to interviews conducted after the accident, the
truck drivers were instructed by Mike Taylor, truck manager, to
tarp at the mine stockpile area, but no signs were posted. They
were instructed not to tarp underneath the high-voltage
transmission lines, according to the coal haulage truck drivers,
Legg and Collins. Carte had the only loaded truck at the mine
site that day, previous to Legg passing him to get loaded.
The victim had been hauling from this mine site approximately 1
month and 10 days prior to the accident.
The coal haulage road is approximately 0.6 of a mile long, from
the mine site to the entrance of W.Va. State Route 20. The
accident occurred 0.3 of a mile from the mine site.
CONCLUSION
James F. Carte, truck driver, was fatally injured when he released
the truck's automatic tarping device into one phase of an
overhead 23,000-volt power transmission line.
CONTRIBUTING VIOLATIONS
A 104(a) Citation was issued to A & B Thomas, Inc., for a
violation of Title 30 CFR, Part 48.31(a), stating in part that
the victim was not provided with hazard training. The victim
activated his automatic tarp (mast) within 10 feet of an
energized overhead high-voltage (23,000 volt) transmission line.
The device contacted a power conductor of the transmission line,
resulting in the fatal electrocution of the truck driver.
A 104(a) Citation was issued to Canon Coal Haulers, Inc., for a
violation of Title 30 CFR, Part 48.31(a), stating in part that
the victim was not provided with hazard training. The victim
activated his automatic tarp (mast) within 10 feet of an
energized overhead high-voltage (23,000 volt) transmission line.
The device contacted a power conductor of the transmission line,
resulting in the fatal electrocution of the truck driver.
A 104(a) Citation was issued to Canon Coal Haulers, Inc., for a
violation of Title 30 CFR, Part 77.807-2, stating that during a
fatal investigation, physical evidence revealed that the metal
crossarm (mast) of the automatic tarping device installed on the
1989 Mack coal truck was operated within 10 feet of an energized
overhead high-voltage (23,000 volt) transmission line. The
device contacted a power conductor of the transmission line,
resulting in the fatal electrocution of the truck driver.
Respectfully Submitted by,
Jerry E. Sumpter
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
Ernie Ross, Jr.
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
Approved by,
Richard J. Kline
Assistant District Manager
Earnest C. Teaster, Jr.
District Manager
Related Fatal Alert Bulletin: FAB97C05
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