UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
District 4
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
(UNDERGROUND COAL MINE
FATAL POWERED-HAULAGE ACCIDENT
Meadow River No. 1 Mine (I.D. No. 46-03467)
Meadow River Coal Company
Lookout, Fayette County, West Virginia
April 23, 1997
by
Jerry E. Sumpter
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
Norman D. Elswick
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector (Electrical)
Originating Office - Mine Safety and Health Administration
100 Bluestone Road, Mount Hope, West Virginia 25880
Earnest C. Teaster, Jr., District Manager
Release Date: July 14, 1997
BACKGROUND
The Meadow River No. 1 mine of Meadow River Coal Company is
located near Lookout, Fayette County, West Virginia. The mine is
developed into the Sewell coalbed from the surface by three drift
openings, three shafts, and a slope. The Sewell coalbed averages
39 inches in height. The mine began production on August 16,
1988. Employment is provided for 129 persons on 3 production
shifts. The mine produces an average of 2,900 tons of clean coal
daily from 3 continuous-mining sections. Coal is transported
from the working sections to the surface via belt conveyors. The
immediate roof is comprised of shale and sandstone and is
primarily supported with 48-inch resin bolts. Supplemental
supports are posts, cribs, and combination bolts. Ventilation is
induced into the mine by a Joy 10-foot blowing fan which produces
275,000 cubic feet of air per minute. The mine liberates about
130,000 cubic feet of methane in a 24-hour period. Personnel and
supplies are transported by a mine track and trolley wire system.
Retreat type mining (pillaring) is being conducted on the 1st
Right section (006-0 MMU) where the accident occurred. Meadow
River Coal Company is a subsidiary of Pittston Coal Company. The
principal officers of Meadow River Coal Company are James Lively,
Superintendent; Teddy Sharp, Mine Foreman; and Ken Perdue, Safety
Manager. The principal officers of Pittston Coal Company are
Karl K. Kindig, President; James I. Campbell, Executive Vice
President of Operations; Austin F. Reed, Secretary; and Benita K.
Bare, Assistant Treasurer.
The last Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) complete
Safety and Health Inspection was completed on January 18, 1997.
A Safety and Health Inspection was ongoing at the time of the
accident.
STORY OF EVENT
The day-shift 1st Right section crew attended a safety meeting
and entered the mine at 7:40 a.m. on April 23, 1997. The 1st
Right crew was supervised by Carlos Ward, section foreman. The
crew arrived on the section around 8:00 a.m. The midnight crew
mined coal on this section the previous shift.
Ward examined the pillar line in all seven entries while the
equipment operators went to their assigned duties. James Ramsey,
continuous-miner operator, started mining coal from a pillar lift
in the No. 5 entry face shortly after 8:00 a.m. He was assisted
on the continuous miner by Dennis Brown whose normal duties
included operating the roof-bolting machine. All three shuttle-car operators began hauling coal from the No. 5 entry. Harley
Harris and Dewey Stickler, shuttle-car operators, were hauling
coal down the No. 4 entry and dumping straight into the section
Stamler feeder. The shuttle-car operators were having difficulty
getting rock to crush in the coal feeder. They used a remote
reset control switch to restart the coal feeder several times.
The remote reset control switch power cable was hung on
insulators on roof bolt plates installed against the mine roof
and extended across the side dumping area.
Around 8:30 a.m., the cable to the remote reset switch was
accidentally severed as Taylor was dumping a loaded shuttle car
of coal. Taylor removed the damaged cable from the side dump
area and placed it beside the coal feeder. The two power cable
conductors had been severed next to a splice, and both of the
bare power conductors were exposed. The power cable remained
energized with power connected to the coal feeder electrical
power box. The shuttle cars continued hauling coal as mining
in the pillar lift was near completion.
Harris told Ward that the face crew would soon need half headers
to set timbers. Samuel Haynes, scoop operator, brought some
hydraulic oil to the section dumping point. Ward instructed
Haynes and James Skaggs to get half headers for the continuous-miner crew. Haynes and Skaggs took the track-mounted man trip to
get half headers that were stored alongside the 1st Right section
belt haulage system.
Roscoe Adkins, section electrician, told Ward that the coal
feeder was operating hotter than normal, and the reset switch
power cable needed repaired. Adkins also informed Ward that the coal feeder water sprays needed changed out or cleaned. Ward told Adkins that he could work on the coal feeder when the
continuous-miner crew completed the mining cycle in the No. 5
face. He informed Adkins that they would timber while he
performed maintenance on the coal feeder. The pillar lift that
had been started at the beginning of the shift was completed at
8:35 a.m., and timbers were in the process of being set.
Harris parked his shuttle car in front of the coal feeder, with
the motors still running, and started putting hydraulic oil in
his shuttle car with the pump motor running. He observed the
coal feeder and observed Adkins beside the coal feeder getting
the required tools to perform maintenance on the coal feeder and
power cable.
Ward sent Stickler to tell Adkins to begin repairs on the coal
feeder. Taylor observed Adkins walking in the confines of the
cargo space of the coal feeder. Taylor then drove his shuttle
car from the dump to the No. 5 entry face and began to help set
timbers.
Around 8:45 a.m. as Stickler was approaching the section coal
feeder to tell Adkins he could make repairs to the coal feeder,
he observed Adkins already performing work on the coal feeder
near the pick breakers inside the confines of the feeder.
Stickler continued walking toward the coal feeder, and when he
was alongside the shuttle car that Harris was pumping oil into,
he observed the coal feeder start up. Stickler responded
immediately by running to the off side of the coal feeder and
disengaging the circuit breaker switch handle. Harris looked up
from his shuttle car and observed a mine cap light turning in the
pick breakers of the coal feeder throat.
Harris went to the mine telephone near the coal feeder and called
outside for help and also informed Ward that an accident had
occurred. Brown was with Ward, Ramsey, and Taylor setting
timbers. Brown ran to the section belt tailpiece and used the
belt stoppage switch to deenergize the belt haulage system.
Brown found the victim inside the pick breakers and checked for a
pulse, but did not find one.
Ward ran to the section power center and tripped the circuit
breaker, and locked and tagged out the cat head at 9:15 a.m.
Keith Cook, day-shift foreman, and Bobby Naylor, motorman, came
to the section to assist the section crew with removing the
victim from the confines of the pick breakers. The victim was
wrapped in blankets and transported by the track-mounted trolley
man-trip bus to the surface around 9:50 a.m. Jan-Care Ambulance
Service was waiting and transported the victim to Tyree Funeral
Home, where the victim was pronounced dead on arrival by Dr.
Newell.
INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCIDENT
The Mine Safety and Health Administration was notified at 9:00
a.m. on April 23, 1997, that a fatal accident had occurred. MSHA
personnel arrived at the mine at 9:40 a.m. A 103(k) Order was
issued to ensure the safety of the miners.
MSHA and the West Virginia Office of Miners' Health, Safety and
Training jointly conducted an investigation with the assistance
of mine management personnel, the miners, and representatives of
the miners.
All parties were briefed by mine personnel as to the
circumstances surrounding the accident. A preliminary discussion
was held with 10 miners concerning the powered-haulage accident.
Representatives of all parties traveled to the accident scene,
where a thorough examination was conducted. Photographs, video,
and relevant measurements were taken and sketches were made of
the accident scene. Interviews of individuals known to have
direct knowledge of the facts surrounding the accident were
conducted at the Nuttall Fire Department training room on
April 24, 1997, beginning at 9:00 a.m.
There was little loose coal accumulation inside the coal cargo
space. According to witnesses interviewed, there were piles of
coal on both sides of the Stamler coal feeder.
During testing conducted on the feeder electrical control
circuit, it was revealed that when the 120-volt bare power wires
of the remote reset switch were joined together, the coal feeder
and pick breakers in the throat of the feeder would activate.
These power wires do have a ground wire and short-circuit
protection, which were tested and were working.
During the testing of the electrical systems of the Stamler coal
feeder, all panic switches and restart buttons were functioning
properly.
The electrical remote control switch had been severed by the off-side shuttle car when the boom was raised to dump a load of coal.
The power cable had exposed copper wires with approximately
three-quarters of an inch on each power conductor exposed.
According to the shuttle-car operator, he moved the power cable,
to the remote control switch, out of the path of the shuttle car
so that contact would not be made by the shuttle car. The remote
control power cable was placed alongside the off side of the coal
feeder on a pile of coal.
The physical portion of the investigation was completed on April
25, 1997, and the 103(k) Order was terminated.
DISCUSSION
Training
Records indicated that all required training had been conducted
in accordance with Part 48, Title 30 CFR. Annual refresher
training had been conducted at this mine on August 3, 1996.
Newly employed miner training was given on March 3, 1990,
electrical retraining during December 1996, and task training on
March 16, 1997.
Examinations
Records indicated that the required electrical, preshift, on-shift, and daily examinations were being conducted in accordance
with Part 75, Title 30 CFR.
Physical Factors
- The equipment involved with the accident was a Stamler coal
feeder, Serial No. 12207, which operated at 575-volt a.c.
three-phase power and had a 120-volt a.c. single-phase
control circuit.
- The Stamler coal feeder was started by the following
methods:
- By using the remote reset control switch located
approximately 25 feet in front of the feeder.
- By traveling to the off side of the feeder and pushing
the reset switch on the feeder controller to engage the
power source to the coal feeder.
- The shuttle cars dumping coal straight into the feeder cargo
space utilized the electrical power remote control switch
located approximately 25 feet in front of the coal feeder.
The off-side shuttle-car operator, dumping onto the off side
of the coal feeder, would have to crawl to the off side of
the coal feeder to push the electrical panel button controls
to reenergize the electrical system manually.
- During interviews, it was revealed that the shuttle car
Taylor was operating severed the remote control power cable
while backing onto the side of the coal feeder at the dump
area. The boom located on the back of the shuttle car
pulled the electrical power conductors apart.
- When the remote control reset switch power cable was
severed, Taylor placed it beside the coal feeder in a pile
of coal, with the 120-volt power conductors being exposed.
- The control circuit for the feeder had been rewired in a
rebuild shop.
- The coal feeder was located in the No. 4 entry at survey
station No. 6086. The mining height near the feeder at the
accident scene was 62 inches. The entry width over the
feeder at the accident scene was approximately 24 feet.
- According to Stickler and Taylor, the victim knew the power
conductors were damaged.
- According to Stickler, the circuit breaker switch handle was
not in a downward position to indicate the electrical
circuit of the coal feeder was deenergized.
- The water sprays, located overhead of the pick breakers in
the throat confines of the feeder, were tested during the
investigation. Four of the five sprays did not function
properly.
- It was revealed during interviews of witnesses that the coal
feeder hydraulic system was overheating at a temperature of
150øF due to running rock from the mine roof strata. This
overheating has no effect on the machine's electrical system
and would not result in a machine shutdown or restart.
- The accident occurred around 8:45 a.m. while the victim was
performing maintenance on the coal feeder.
- The victim had 32 years total mining experience, with 20
years mining experience at this mine. The victim had been a
certified mine foreman since 1976 and had approximately 12
years experience as an electrician at this mine.
CONCLUSION
The accident and resultant fatality occurred when the victim
traveled into the cargo area of the Stamler coal feeder on the 1st
Right Section (006-0) to perform maintenance work (on water sprays
and remote control reset cable) without assuring the power supply
was deenergized. The coal feeder inadvertently started, resulting
in the victim being fatally injured by the pick breaker.
A contributory cause was that the feeder remote control reset
cable, that had been hung across the intersection, was severed by
a shuttle car. This resulted in the two 120-volt power wires
becoming bare, exposed, and remaining energized. The energized
portion of the remote cable was placed out of the shuttle-car
roadway but near the feeder and on mounds of loose spillage coal.
It is the consensus of the investigation team that after the victim
stopped the feeder by activating a spring-loaded stop switch, he
went into the feeder to work on the water sprays. While he was
performing this work, the power conductors of the remote control
reset cable contacted each other which caused the feeder to start.
CONTRIBUTING VIOLATIONS
A 104(a) Citation, Section 75.517, Title 30 CFR, was issued,
stating in part that the remote reset control cable for the Stamler
coal feeder, Serial No. 12207, was not insulated adequately where
the power cable had been severed. Between the micro-switch and the
coal feeder controller, about three-quarters of an inch of bare
copper conductor was exposed on both power leads of the cable. The
power cable was lying on loose coal piled beside the coal feeder,
approximately 10 feet inby the controller.
A 104(a) Citation, Section 75.1725(c), Title 30 CFR, was issued,
stating in part that the 575-volt a.c. power to the Stamler coal
feeder, Serial No. 12207, being utilized on the 1st Right section,
was not deenergized while work was being performed on the water
sprays located above the pick-breaker rotary bits.
A 104(a) Citation, Section 75.512, Title 30 CFR, was issued,
stating in part that the Stamler coal feeder, Serial No. 12207,
located on the 1st Right (006-0 MMU) working section, was not
removed from service when the No. 16 A.W.G. remote reset power
cable was found to have been severed between the micro-switch and
the feeder controller.
Respectfully submitted by:
Jerry E. Sumpter
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
Norman D. Elswick
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector(Electrical)
Approved by:
Richard J. Kline
Assistant District Manager
Earnest C. Teaster, Jr.
District Manager
Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
 FAB97C09
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