UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
DISTRICT 6
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT
(SURFACE MINE)
FATAL POWERED HAULAGE ACCIDENT
P20 (I.D. 15-15845)
P & P, INC. OF KENTUCKY
AT
MARTIKI SURFACE MINE (I.D. 15-07295)
MARTIKI COAL CORPORATION
LOVELY, MARTIN COUNTY, KENTUCKY
SEPTEMBER 19, 1997
BY
MARK V. BARTLEY
ELECTRICAL ENGINEER
BUSTER STEWART
ROOF CONTROL SPECIALIST
JOSEPH F. JUDEIKIS
MECHANICAL ENGINEER
Originating Office - Mine Safety and Health Administration
100 Ratliff Creek Road, Pikeville, Kentucky 41501
Carl E. Boone, II, District Manager
ABSTRACT
On Friday, September 19, 1997, Faye Edward Meek (victim), an
employee of P & P, Inc. of Kentucky, was operating a 170-ton capacity
Mark 36 Lectra Haul Truck, hauling coal from the No. 17 coal pit to
the raw coal-dump at the Martiki Coal Corporation, Martiki Surface
Mine (Preparation Plant). While traveling down an inclined roadway
near the dump site, the truck was observed operating at an abnormally
high rate of speed. The truck proceeded down the inclined portion
of the roadway onto the near-level (2 percent grade) portion of the
roadway approaching the preparation plant hopper site. The truck
proceeded through the raw coal dump site guard rails, struck a
concrete abutment and overturned, dropping approximately 65 feet
in elevation. The truck came to rest upside-down on the raw coal
crusher and belt conveyor structure. The victim was ejected from
the operator's compartment resulting in fatal injuries. Evidence
indicates the cause of the accident to be an inoperative retarding
system (dynamic braking system) and diminished service brakes.
GENERAL INFORMATION
The Martiki Surface Mine of Martiki Coal Corporation (Martiki),
is located off Kentucky Route 1714, near Lovely, in Martin
County, Kentucky. The principal company officer is Joe Craft,
President.
The Martiki Surface Mine, consists of: a preparation plant, shop
facility, one slurry impoundment and two fresh water
impoundments. Martiki also operates a dragline and several
electric shovels under the same Mine Safety and Health
Administration (MSHA) mine identification number. Martiki has
ten resident contractors on mine property with approximately 400
employees. Martiki owns most of the equipment used on the
property; provides parts for all equipment, provides partial
maintenance, and all engineering services.
P & P, Inc. of Kentucky (P&P) is a contract operator performing
loading, bulldozer work, coal hauling, and other operational
activities. They operate on Martiki property as the P20 (I.D.
No. 15-15845). The coal is transported primarily in 170-ton
capacity Mark 36, Lectra Haul, off-road trucks. Coal was being
hauled from a pit over a distance of 4.2 miles to the raw coal
dump, located at the preparation plant (I.D. No. 15-07295). P&P
began operations on July 8, 1997, assuming the operation of the
former contract operator, Charles Clearing Inc (I.D. No. 15-16497).
P&P is a Kentucky Corporation whose officers are: Gary
Howard, president; Isaac Pickett, vice-president; and Stan Bray,
secretary/treasurer. The corporation address is 2265 Executive
Drive, Lexington, Kentucky. The principal officer for health and
safety for P & P is Isaac Pickett. The employees of P & P, Inc.
of Kentucky are not represented by any labor organization. The
company maintains a company office on Martiki mine property and
P&P maintains management personnel who conduct on-shift
examinations and direct the on-site workforce.
Bizwil, Inc., Contractor I.D. NO. PT9, performs overburden
removal and J & J Coal Inc., Contractor I.D. NO. 6PE, performs
coal loading operations, under the P & P production operator I.D.
No. 15-15845.
There are numerous other contractors performing various functions
(electricians, welders, blasting contractors, and truck drivers)
unrelated to this accident.
Maintenance on the trucks used by P&P on Martiki property is
performed by Martiki mechanics and electricians and/or mechanics
employed by Ganote Enterprises Inc. (Contractor I.D. No. P5Y), a
contractor for Martiki. Ganote Enterprises performs the primary
field-mechanic work on equipment except for the dragline and
shovels on the Martiki property. Ganote also has shop mechanics
performing work in the Martiki shop building. Martiki performs
some field-mechanic work and shop-work utilizing the Martiki shop
building. Martiki-employed electricians perform electric wheel
motor, dynamic retarder and associated control circuit and
hardware repair work. Martiki personnel troubleshoot electrical
problems on the Mark 36, Lectra Haul trucks used by P&P.
The Martiki Mining Complex extracts coal from primarily two coal
seams: the Coalburg and Stockton seams. Martiki Coal Corporation
currently employs 69 persons and P&P employs 110 persons on three
production shifts and maintenance is performed throughout the day
on the three shifts. The mine normally operates seven days per
week and produces an average of 14,000 tons per day. The Martiki
complex has approximately 400 contract employees working on the
property.
The last complete health and safety inspection by the MSHA of the
Martiki Surface (I.D. NO. 15-07295) was completed on August 6,
1997. A complete health and safety inspection had not been
conducted at P & P, Inc. of Kentucky, P20 (I.D. No. 15-15845), by
the MSHA. (Note: P & P, Inc. Of Kentucky started mining at the
Martiki Mine on July 8, 1997.)
DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT
On Friday, September 19, 1997, at approximately 2:30 p.m., Fay
Edward Meek, truck driver, arrived on mine property and reported
to P&P's mine office to deliver insurance papers. He left the
office site traveling to the nearby parking lot where the Mark
36, Lectra Haul trucks were parked. At 3:00 p.m., Meek began
work under the supervision of Herbert L. Musick, P&P foreman. He
was assigned to operate a 170-ton capacity, Mark 36, Lectra Haul
truck, hauling coal from the No. 17 coal pit, to the raw coal
hoppers at the Martiki preparation plant.
At approximately 7:30 p.m., Meek encountered problems getting the
#078 truck to propel. Herbert Musick contacted Martiki
Electrician's, Arthur William Audas and David Boyd, and informed
them of the problem with the truck. Audas and Boyd responded to
the truck, but could find no problems with the propel circuitry.
After the examination, the truck began to operate in the propel
mode. Meek then proceeded to haul coal from the No. 17 Pit to
the raw coal hoppers at the preparation plant.
At approximately 8:15 p.m., Meek was informed by Scottie Joe
Howard, truck driver, that his headlights were not operating
properly. Herbert Musick informed Mike Haney, Martiki foreman,
and he requested a mechanic to service the #078 truck. Rick
Staniford, mechanic of Ganote Enterprises, met Meek near the raw
coal hoppers, and found a bad control switch and replaced the
switch. Meek then proceeded back to the No. 17 Pit.
Meek had completed four trips to the raw coal hoppers (as
indicated by the counter located in the truck cab) and was
returning to the raw coal hoppers via a 4.2 mile haulage road.
Meek reached the top of an approximately 8 percent inclined
roadway, approximately 3,160 feet from the raw coal hoppers, when
according to eyewitnesses, they saw the truck accelerating down
the incline at an excessively high rate of speed with fire coming
from both rear wheel units.
Mike Dalton, a truck driver for P&P, stated that at the time of
the accident he was hauling reject material from the filter
building, located within sight of the 8 percent inclined roadway.
He was traveling toward the inclined roadway when he noticed a
Mark 36, Lectra Haul truck coming down the roadway at an
abnormally high rate of speed. Dalton stated that he saw flames
coming from the rear tire area of the truck as it passed his
location and went out-of-sight. Within seconds, Dalton heard a
loud noise.
At approximately 8:45 p.m., the truck passed Ruben Jones, driver
for J.B. & A Trucking, who was traveling to the scale house.
Jones stated the truck passed him at a high rate of speed and was
traveling toward the raw coal hoppers. Jones stated that the
wheels were glowing like a sun ball. He stated the truck
disappeared over the raw coal hopper wall. Jones then began
transmitting over his Citizens Band radio for assistance without
a reply. Jones observed a white Jeep Cherokee being driven by
John Buurman of Columbia Natural Resources traveling near the raw
coal hoppers. Buurman stopped, and Jones asked him if he had
seen a truck go over the hopper wall. Buurman said he didn't,
but he did see a large truck passing him at an excessive speed.
Jones then told Buurman to go get help. Jones went to the raw
hopper wall to determine the location of the truck and driver.
Buurman drove a few hundred feet down the raw coal dump road and
saw Michael Dalton operating an endloader and informed him of the
accident. Dalton then got on the company radio and called for
help. Mike Haney, a Martiki foreman, was contacted by Johnny
Messer, a Ganote foreman, via company radio and informed him that
a truck had run off the haul road near the raw coal hopper area.
Haney and Glen Porter, another Martiki foreman, then proceeded to
the raw coal hopper area. Johnny Messer had already arrived at
the accident scene and informed Haney, upon his arrival, that the
truck had gone over the raw coal hopper wall and fell onto the
crushers and beltlines below.
Haney and Porter proceeded down the access road. Upon arrival at
the crushers, located below the raw coal hoppers, the two men
found the truck laying upside down on the beltline and crushers.
Glen Jones, the second shift preparation plant foreman, had
become aware of the accident and had traveled to the accident
site. Jones was on the scene when Haney and Porter arrived. He
informed the two men that he had checked the cab of the truck and
could not locate the driver. The three men then began to search
the area for the driver. A few minutes later, Meek was located
laying on the crusher walkway. The truck had ripped out the area
lighting provided in the raw coal hopper area. The preparation
plant electrician contacted the three men and informed them that
he needed to de-energize the electricity in the accident area.
The three men momentarily retreated from the immediate accident
area and waited for the electricity to be disconnected. After
the electricity had been disconnected, the three men crossed over
metal and debris and checked Meek for a pulse. Jones found no
pulse or respiration. During his examination of Meek, Jones
noted a severe head wound and immediately requested an ambulance.
Meek was then moved to a safer location away from the accident
scene due to the presence of overhanging metal, diesel fuel, and
other obstructions where the truck had gone over the raw coal
hopper structure.
Martin County Ambulance Service arrived at the scene and the
Martin County coroner was called to the scene. Rex Endicott,
Martin County Coroner, pronounced Faye Edward Meek dead at 10:13
p.m.
Russell Wilson, a representative of P&P, called Donnie Johnson,
MSHA supervisor at 10:10 p.m. and informed him of the accident.
Johnson contacted, Hobert Webb, MSHA inspector and the two
proceeded to the accident site.
Company personnel informed the Kentucky Department of Mines and
Minerals, and the Kentucky State Police of the accident.
INVESTIGATION OF ACCIDENT
A preliminary examination of the accident scene was conducted.
Results from this examination indicated that an extensive
investigation would be needed to determine the cause(s) of the
accident. Due to initial indications, a request was made to MSHA
Technical Support for expertise in the area of truck braking
systems. Joseph Judeikis, mechanical engineer, was dispatched to
the scene for evaluation and testing of the braking system on the
truck involved in the accident (#078).
Due to the location of the accident site and the extent of damage
to the #078 truck, a determination was made to recover the truck
and relocate it to a site more suitable for testing. Cranes were
used to recover the truck from the accident site. A lowboy truck
was then used to transport the truck to a designated area for
further investigation.
Once the truck had been relocated, a complete examination was
conducted on the truck's braking and electrical systems.
Martiki Coal Corporation contracted several technical consultants
to be present during the examination of the accident truck and to
assist with MSHA's investigation.
PHYSICAL FACTORS
The investigation revealed the following factors relevant to the
occurrence of the accident:
- The truck (Company #078) involved in the haulage accident of
September 19,1997, was a 170-ton Mark 36, Lectra Haul Truck
manufactured by Unit Rig & Equipment Company (Serial #312,
manufactured in 1978).
- The truck flipped upon impact with the steel reinforced
concrete hopper retaining wall and dropped approximately 65
feet onto the No. 2 raw coal crusher and beltline.
- The truck was not designed with roll-over protection (ROP).
Rollover protection was not required on this truck.
- The operator's cab was found to be intact after the
accident.
- The front windshield of the truck was dislodged from the
vehicle during the accident.
- The victim was not wearing a seatbelt at the time of the
accident. Interviews with other Mark 36, Lectra Haul truck
drivers revealed that seatbelts were seldom used while
vehicles were in use.
- The victim was found laying on the elevated walkway at the
No. 2 raw coal crusher, approximately 12 feet from the
operators compartment of the overturned truck.
- The roadway on which the victim was traveling at the time of
the accident had an initial incline of approximately 8
percent for approximately 2,135 feet. The remainder of the
roadway near the raw coal hoppers was at approximately 2
percent for approximately 1,025 feet.
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
- The primary means of slowing Mark 36, Lectra Haul trucks on
inclined roads is by activating the electrical retarding
system, to slow the vehicle down to approximately three
miles-per-hour.
- Examination of the truck indicated that the armature circuit
of the blower-exciter on the truck was open due to improper
maintenance of the brushes. The brushes for the blower-
exciter rotor circuit were as follows: Brushes in the set
that were within specifications measured 1.1", 1.4", 1.3"
and 0.95". Brushes in the set that were inadequate or not
making contact measured .55", 0.7", 0.7", and the brush that
was not making contact with the commutator was 1.8". One
brush that was 0.7" long showed indications of making some
recent contact with the exciter's commutator. The other
0.7" long brush and the brush that was 0.55" long showed no
indications of recent contact with the commutator. The
manufacturer states that the nominal minimum working length
of brushes on the exciter is 1".
- The length of the brushes on the blower-exciter unit fell
significantly below the manufacturers designated operational
length. The resultant lack of current sent from the blower-
exciter to the motor fields prevented a flux field from
being created. A lack of motor field current prevented
electrical wheel units from acting as generators, thus no
retarding action was present.
- All power relays on the truck were tested after the accident
and found to be operative.
- The control relays on the truck were destroyed to such a
degree that testing was not possible.
- All programmable logic controller (PLC) cards on the truck
were tested and found to be operative.
- The resistive grid packages provided on the truck for
retarding purposes were tested and found to be intact and
within the manufacturers specified values.
- The air pressure activation switch for the retarding system
was tested and found to be operative.
- The wheel unit drive motor brushes were checked and found to
be maintained at an operative length and condition.
- External power cabling was examined and found to be intact,
except for some damage which occurred during the accident.
- There was no damage to the exciter during the accident.
BRAKING SYSTEM
- According to the manufacturer, the service brakes on Mark
36, Lectra Haul trucks are designed to stop a fully loaded
truck during an emergency situation with the designed
maximum load without the use of the retarder.
- The front brakes were determined to be inoperative at the
time of the accident. The right front brake assembly had
seal damage which resulted in zero braking capacity for this
brake assembly. Pressure tests conducted on the left front
brake calipers indicated that zero braking effort was
available at the left front wheel. Inspection of the left
front actuator revealed seal failure similar to that found
of the right front actuator.
- Pressure tests performed on four air-over-hydraulic
actuators on the rear of the truck revealed that the brakes
were capable of developing 78% of the braking force designed
by the manufacturer. All four air-over-hydraulic actuator-
return breathers were open to allow air passage, as tested
after the accident.
- Acceptable levels of fluid were found in three of four air
-over hydraulic reservoirs (the fourth reservoir, the right
front, was destroyed in the accident).
- Brake lining thickness was acceptable on the four rear
brakes assemblies.
- All brake disc thicknesses were adequate, except the left
front disc which measured 0.077 inches under size.
STEERING
- The auxiliary steering motor and hydraulic pump were tested
and found to be operational and capable of producing
hydraulic pressure up to a 1700 PSI relief pressure setting.
The manufacturer specifies that the minimum pressure
necessary for proper operation is 1500 PSI.
- The auxiliary steering pump activation button in the
operator's cab was observed to be in the initiated (on)
position. Insufficient evidence was available to determine
if the operator activated the button intentionally or if the
button was activated inadvertently.
- During the investigation the power wire to the auxiliary
steering pump was found to be broken. Insufficient evidence
was available to determine if the wire was broken before,
during, or after the accident.
VICTIM
- Rex Endicott, Martin County Coroner, listed the cause of
death as trauma to the back of the head as a result of being
ejected from a vehicle and striking the back of the head on
an object (rock).
- The victim had approximately 22 years of mining experience
as a truck driver.
- The victim had received all required training.
EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE
- Martiki Coal Corporation maintenance program for Mark 36,
Electra Haul trucks was inadequate. This is evident by the
maintenance deficiencies of the truck involved in the
accident and other Mark 36, Electra Haul trucks examined
following this occurrence. Each of the trucks inspected
following the accident was observed to have braking
deficiencies and other mechanical and safety defects. All
violations not contributing directly to this occurrence were
issued on a separate inspection code to both Martiki Coal
Corporation and P & P Inc. of Kentucky.
CONCLUSION
The accident occurred when the electrical retarding system failed
to operate. The inadequately maintained service brakes could not
provide enough braking force to stop the truck after the
retarding system failed.
VIOLATIONS
- A 103(k) Order (No. 4519768) was issued on September 19,
1997, to P & P, Inc. of Kentucky to ensure the safety of the
miners working in the area and to ensure that the area was
not disturbed so that an investigation can be conducted.
- A 103(k) Order (No. 4007054) was issued on September 20,
1997, to Martiki Coal Corporation to ensure the safety of
the miners working in the area and to ensure that the area
was not disturbed so that an investigation can be conducted.
- 104(a) citation (No. 4007060) was issued on October 22,
1997, to P & P, Inc. of Kentucky for failure to provide the
#078 Unit Rig Mark 36 Truck with service brakes that would
stop the truck in an emergency situation, a violation of 30
CFR, Section 77.1605(b).
- A 104(a) Citation (No. 4214403) was issued on October 22,
1997, to Martiki Coal Corporation for failure to provide the
#078 Unit Rig, Mark 36 Truck with service brakes that would
stop the truck in an emergency situation, a violation of 30
CFR, Section 77.1605(b).
- A 104(a) Citation (No. 4490920) was issued on October 22,
1997, to P & P, Inc. of Kentucky for failure to maintain the
#078 Unit Rig Coal Hauler in a safe operating condition, a
violation of 30 CFR, Section 77.404(a). Electrical
components were not maintained as required by the
manufacturers specifications, preventing the retarding
system from functioning.
- A 104(a) Citation (No. 4490918) was issued on October 22,
1997, to Martiki Coal Corporation for failure to maintain
the #078 Unit Rig Coal Hauler in a safe operating condition,
a violation of 30 CFR, Section 77.404(a). Electrical
components were not maintained as required by the
manufacturers specifications, preventing the retarding
system from functioning.
Respectfully submitted:
Mark V. Bartley
Electrical Engineer
Buster Stewart
Roof Control Specialist
Joseph F. Judeikis
Mechanical Engineer
Approved by:
Michael Keene for
Carl E. Boone, II
District Manager
Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
 FAB97C24
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