UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
South Central District
Metal and Nonmetal Mine Safety and Health
Accident Investigation Report
Surface Nonmetal Mine
(Sand and Gravel)
Fatal Power Haulage Accident
Valley Caliche Products, Inc.
Beck Quarry
Mission, Hidalgo County, Texas
I.D. No. 41-01477
March 24, 1997
By
Ronald M. Mesa, Special Investigator
and
Ralph Rodriguez, Metal Nonmetal Mine Inspector
Originating Office
South Central District Office
1100 Commerce Street, Room 4C50
Dallas, Texas 75242-0499
Doyle D. Fink
District Manager
GENERAL INFORMATION
Rolando Gonzalez, plant operator, age 40, was injured at approximately 9:00 a.m.
on March 24, 1997, when he became entangled in the tail pulley of the number 38
belt feeder. He was pronounced dead at 11:04 a.m. after being transported to
Mission Hospital in Hidalgo County, Texas. Gonzalez had a total of eleven years
six months mining experience all at this operation. He had received training in
accordance with 30 CFR, Part 48.
Bradley Vangsnes, safety director notified the MSHA San Antonio, Texas field office
of the accident at 9:43 a.m. on March 24, 1997. An investigation was started the
same day.
The Beck Quarry, owned and operated by Valley Caliche Products, Inc., was located
on 3 Mile Road, West of Mission, Hidalgo County, Texas. The principal operating
official was Robert H. Thompson, president. The mine normally operated one, ten-hour shift per day, five days a week. Forty persons were employed.
Sand and gravel was transported by haul trucks to the plant for washing and
screening. The material was then transported by conveyors to stockpiles. The
finished product was used in the road building and general construction industry.
The last regular inspection was completed on February 11, 1997.
PHYSICAL FACTORS INVOLVED
The accident occurred at the tail pulley of the number 38 belt feeder. The number
38 belt and number 35 belt feeders were located adjacent to each other and below
the 40 ton surge bin. The surge bin fed materials to the belts which were 15
inches apart. The belt feeders were Kolberg Manufacturing Model 936-8. Both belt
feeders were powered by 7« horsepower, 460 volt 3 phase electrical motors. The
belt feeders were 36 inches wide and 8 feet in length. The conveyor belts were
Georgia Duck Plylock, Model 330-3, and were « inch in thickness. The speed of the
belts was measured at 88 feet per minute using a tachometer.
A large pile of sandy wet material was beneath both belts. This material had fallen
from number 38 belt and had accumulated to within 1 foot 6 inches of the tail
pulley. The distance from the tail pulley to the concrete floor was 4 feet 10
inches.
The tail pulley was a Dodge QD heavy duty wing pulley. The diameter of the tail
pulley was 10 inches. The pulley had 8 wings, which were 38 inches in length, 1
« inches wide and spaced 2 inches apart. The tail pulley assembly had two
adjusting bolts, one on each side of the pulley. The bolts were 1 inch in diameter
and 18 inches in length. There were two wrenches used to adjust the conveyor belt.
One wrench was a home made open end wrench and was 14 inches in length and 1 inch
in width. The other was a 14 inch adjustable pipe wrench. The wrenches were kept
in the area of belt number 38 because the adjusting process was an on going
problem. The adjustments could be made while the belts were running.
The tail pulley had two separate guards. The steel guard on top of the tail pulley
was 4 foot 10 inches in length, 1 foot 10 inches wide at the top and 1 foot 1 inch
in height. There was a 15 inch opening in front of the pulley, which allowed
direct contact with the pinch point.
The guard below the tail pulley was constructed of heavy duty screen. This guard
was 3 feet 10 inches in length and 2 feet 5 inches in width.
DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT
Rolando Gonzalez, victim, reported to work at 6:00 a.m. on March 24, 1997, his
regular starting time. Gonzalez began his usual task of starting the water pumps
for the plant. After Gonzalez started all of the water pumps, Sergio Verastegui,
plant operator started the plant at 6:30 a.m. Gonzalez performed his task of
watching and making sure that all the conveyors were running properly.
Jose Facundo, maintenance man, went to belt number 38 around 7:00 a.m. to check if
everything was running normally. He found a small amount of spillage underneath
the belt. The belt was starting to untrack because of built up material in the
wings of the pulley. He did not adjust the belt at this time.
Facundo left the area and proceeded with his other duties until around 8:45 a.m.
when he returned to adjust the alignment of the belt. He found a large build up
of material underneath the tail pulley and he attempted to adjust the belt on the
West side. At the same time, Gonzalez (victim) arrived and seeing that Facundo was
having a problem adjusting the belt, went underneath the unguarded portion of the
belt to the adjustment bolt on the East side of the tail pulley. Gonzalez got to
the other side and hollered at Facundo to try adjusting the belt one more time.
Facundo stated that Gonzalez started to scream and hollered to stop the belt. There
was not an emergency stop device along side belt 38, so Facundo ran to belt number
40 and tripped the stop cord, which was interlocked with belt 38. Jose also
signaled by waving his hands to the plant operator to shut down the plant.
Verastegui came out of the control room after shutting down the plant, saw Gonzalez
lying on the muck pile and returned to the control room to call for help. After
learning that the loader operator had already informed the foreman of the accident,
Verastegui returned to the accident scene. Verastegui observed the victim sitting
on the muck pile. Gonzalez was unresponsive, and his arm had been amputated.
Verastegui attempted to stop the bleeding with his shirt.
Gonzalez was transported by company truck to the EMT station at Edinburg and was
moved from there to Mission Hospital by ambulance. He was pronounced dead at 11:04
a.m..
CONCLUSIONS
The causes of this accident included: failure to maintain an adequate guard on the
tail pulley to protect persons from contacting the pinch point and failure to
maintain a clean and orderly workplace by allowing the build-up of materials under
a conveyor at a place where work was being performed.
VIOLATIONS
Order Number 4447234
Issued on March 24, 1997, under the provision of Section
103(k):
An accident with a possible fatality has occurred at the plants #35 material
hopper. This order prohibits the use of the plant or any work in or near the
#35 hopper pending an investigation by MSHA, until it is deemed safe for
other miners to use the equipment.
This order was modified on 3/24/97 to read:
The area is to be the 40 ton surge bin and No. 35 and No. 38 feeder
belts.
The Order was terminated on April 9, 1997.
Citation Number 4447248
Issued under the provision of Section 104(a), for
violations of 30 CFR 56.14107(a):
A fatal accident occurred at this mine on 3/24/97. The plant operator became
entangled in the tail pulley of the No. 38 Feeder belt. The tail pulley was
10 inches in diameter. There was a 15 inch opening in front of the pinch
point allowing the operator access to the tail pulley. The guard which was
installed on the tail pulley was not adequate to prevent access to the pinch
point.
Citation Number 4447249
Issued under the provision of Section 104(a), for
violations of 30 CFR 56.20003(a):
A fatal accident occurred at this mine on 3/24/97. The plant operator became
entangled in the tail pulley of the No. 38 feeder belt. Allegedly he was
performing adjustments and maintenance on the conveyor belt. The plant
operator was working on top of material which was built up to within 1 foot
of the conveyor belt. The material was overflow from the 40 ton surge bin
which feeds the no. 38 conveyor belt. The material had not been cleaned up.
The Citation was terminated on April 9, 1997 when the spillage of material
under the tail pulley area of belt #38 had been cleaned to the concrete
slab.
/s/Ronald M. Mesa
/s/Ralph Rodriguez
Approved By: Doyle D. Fink, District Manager
Related Fatal Alert Bulletin: [FAB97M18]
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