UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION

District 5

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT
(Underground Coal Mine)

FATAL FALL OF ROOF

(Mine) #1 (I.D. No. 44-06227)
Bear Ridge Mining, Inc.
Bandy, Tazewell County, Virginia

MARCH 23, 1998

BY

Luther E. Marrs
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector


Originating Office - Mine Safety and Health Administration
P.O. Box 560, Norton, Va. 24273
Ray McKinney, District Manager

ABSTRACT

On Monday, March 23, 1998, at approximately 4:30 p.m., Bruce Michael Bandy, a 40-year-old section foreman, received fatal injuries from a fall of mine roof material. Bandy removed 3 cribs, from along the left rib of the No.6 entry, on the 001-0 MMU, using a battery-powered, rubber-tired scoop. Bandy then positioned himself between the scoop and the left coal rib, to load the loose crib blocks in the area into the scoop bucket. Suddenly, a 58 inch long by 44 inch wide by 0 to 8 inches thick, section of roof material fell from between the coal rib and left rib pattern bolts, striking Bandy causing fatal injuries.

GENERAL INFORMATION

Bear Ridge Mining, Inc., #1 (mine), is located on Greasy Creek approximately three miles Northwest of Bandy, Virginia post office. The mining height ranges from 41 to 65 inches. The mine liberates approximately 318,000 cubic feet of methane in 24 hours. The immediate mine roof typically consists of approximately ten to fifteen feet of gray shale, periodically interbedded with sandstone. The main roof consists of sandstone and shale with a maximum overburden of 500 feet.

Thirty-one underground miners and three surface personnel are employed at the mine. The mine operates three, eight hour shifts per day, five days a week. Coal is produced on one advancing continuous mining section (001-0 MMU) on the day and evening shifts. Maintenance is performed on the midnight shift. The mine produces an average of 1,000 clean tons of coal daily.

A room-and-pillar system of mining is employed utilizing continuous mining machines, shuttle cars, and roof bolting machines. Employees and supplies are transported to the section via battery-powered, rubber-tired equipment. At the time of the accident, the 001-0 MMU section had been developed approximately 10,100 feet inby the portals.

The Roof Control Plan in effect was approved on June 11, 1992 by the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). The Roof Control Plan requires, as a minimum the installation of four foot, resin-grouted roof bolts on a four foot by four foot pattern. Maximum entry and crosscut widths are 20 feet. The maximum cut depth is limited to 20 feet. Entry and crosscut centers from 60 to 80 feet are permitted with extended entry centers of 90 to 200 feet permitted in areas of adverse roof conditions. Roof test holes, drilled twelve inches deeper than the longest roof bolts being installed, are required at 20-foot intervals and ten-foot test holes are to be drilled in each intersection.

The training plan was approved by the MSHA District Manager on July 24, 1985. The plan includes provisions requiring training on the Roof Control Plan.

Principal officials for Bear Ridge Mining, Inc., at the time of the accident were:

President:	Estil Stilwell
Treasurer:	Larry Davis
Mine Superintendent:	Tim Lowe
Miner's Representative:	Ron Anders (UMWA)

An MSHA Safety and Health Inspection (AAA) was completed on March 23, 1998. MSHA completed their last on site activity, March 20, 1998.

The first quarter fiscal year 1998 incidence rate for the mining industry averaged 7.61, compared to 25.75 for this mine.

DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT

Monday, March 23, 1998, the evening shift crew, under the supervision of Bruce Michael Bandy, Section Foreman, entered the mine at 3:00 p.m. The crew arrived on the section (001-0 MMU) at approximately 3:30 p.m. and began normal mining activities.

The day shift crew had left the continuous mining machine in a partial cut, in the No.5 entry, second right crosscut. Bandy examined the section and assigned duties to the crew. Glenn Harris, Continuous Mining Machine Operator, began mining in the No.5 entry, second right crosscut. Bandy continued across the section conducting smoking material searches and held a safety talk with Jimmy Johnson and Ronnie Blankenship, Roof Bolting Machine Operators.

The day shift crew had left the continuous mining machine in a partial cut, in the No.5 entry, second right crosscut. Bandy examined the section and assigned duties to the crew. Glenn Harris, Continuous Mining Machine Operator, began mining in the No.5 entry, second right crosscut. Bandy continued across the section conducting smoking material searches and held a safety talk with Jimmy Johnson and Ronnie Blankenship, Roof Bolting Machine Operators.

McGlothlin and Harris, located in the intersection approximately 70 feet outby the location of the cribs, observed Bandy, who was operating the scoop, enter the No.6 entry and remove the first crib with the scoop. After removing the crib, Bandy sat in the scoop and observed the mine roof, before removing the next crib. Bandy followed the same sequence until all three cribs were removed from the left side of the No.6 entry.

Bandy was still seated in the operator's deck of the scoop observing the mine roof, when McGlothlin informed Harris he was going to help Bandy load the loose crib blocks into the scoop bucket. McGlothlin went to the rear of the scoop and also observed the mine roof. After observing the mine roof, McGlothlin continued along the right side of the entry to the front of the scoop, and started loading crib blocks into the scoop bucket.

Bandy remained in the operator's compartment of the scoop during this time and appeared to be observing the mine roof, in the general area where the cribs had been removed. After approximately five minutes, Bandy got out of the scoop, went to the rear of the scoop, stopped, and observed the area. McGlothlin leaned over from his position, in front of the scoop, and looked between the scoop and left rib, to see what Bandy was observing. McGlothlin saw two or three loose crib blocks between the scoop and the left rib. Bandy moved between the scoop and the left coal rib, stopping about halfway the length of the scoop, again appearing to observe the mine roof in the area where the cribs had been removed. McGlothlin resumed the task of loading the crib blocks, when he heard the sound of two crib blocks, thrown by Bandy, landing in the scoop bucket.

Then McGlothlin heard falling rock striking the scoop, in the area he had last seen Bandy (at approximately 4:30 p.m.). McGlothlin turned in the direction of the fall and called Bandy's name, but there was no response. Bandy's cap light was no longer visible. McGlothlin ran around the rear of the scoop calling Bandy's name. When he arrived at the end of the scoop, he saw rock lying on Bandy. He was unable to lift the rock off Bandy and called for help. Harris and Albert Stilwell, Shuttle Car Operator, came to aid McGlothlin in freeing Bandy. They were unable to move the rock, and McGlothlin went for additional help. Roy Honaker, Shuttle Car Operator and Ronnie Blankenship, came and assisted in removing the rock off Bandy.

McGlothlin and Honaker went to get the first aid kit and were joined by Bryon Salyers, Mine Electrician. Salyers returned to the accident site with the kit on a small battery-powered mantrip, while McGlothlin and Honaker prepared the larger mantrip to transport Bandy to the surface. Harris and Blankenship administered first aid, while McGlothlin went to the mine phone and called out to Doug Short, Surface Employee, and instructed him to call a Med-Flight.

Bandy was transported to the surface, in a large battery powered mantrip operated by Donald Kirk, Scoop Operator. On the surface he was transferred to an ambulance, taken to the Bandy Fire Department and from there to Bristol Regional Medical Center, in Bristol, Tennessee, by Med-Flight. Bruce Michael Bandy succumbed to his injuries, at 12:10 a.m., on March 24, 1998. The attending physician was Dr. Burt.

PHYSICAL FACTORS INVOLVED

1. On March 16, 1998, a roof fall occurred, starting in the No.7 entry and continuing into the crosscut between the No.7 and No.6 entry, adjacent to the accident site. Due to the roof fall the mine roof in the No.6 entry was supported with cribs and eight foot point anchor, dome nut bolts, with ten inch by ten inch bearing plates, installed in addition to the four foot, fully grouted resin rods used in the normal roof support pattern. The supplemental support was used beginning at survey station No.2156, and extended inby to the site of the accident.
   
   
2. Record books and statements of miners interviewed, indicated that no hazards were found during pre-shift and on-shift examinations, conducted in No.6 entry prior to the accident.
   
   
3. Statements of miners interviewed, indicated that a visual examination of the accident site was conducted, by a certified foreman, prior to work being conducted in the area.
   
   
4. Observations by the investigators and statements of miners interviewed, indicated that three cribs set along the left rib of the No.6 entry had been removed, with a scoop, just prior to the fall of roof material.
   
   
5. The investigation revealed that a section of mine roof material, located approximately 70 feet inby survey station No.2156, in the No.6 entry, fell between the coal rib and left rib pattern bolts. The fallen rock measured 58 inches in length, 44 inches in width, 0 to 8 inches in thickness, and resulted in fatal injuries to the foreman.
   
   
6. The inby edge of the fall of roof material, was slickensided, joining a slip running across the No. 6 entry at a 90-degree angle.
   
   
7. The left edge of the cavity, created by the fall of roof material, paralleled the left rib line and the right edge of the cavity paralleled the left rib pattern bolts.
   
   
8. The pattern bolts at the accident site measured approximately 43 inches from the left coal rib.
   
   
9. Roof test holes were located at intervals of 20 feet or less throughout the section.
   
   
10. The investigation revealed no training deficiencies that contributed to the occurrence of the accident.
    
    
11. Based on a review of training certificates and interviews with the miners, all miners received mandated training.

CONCLUSION

The accident occurred approximately 70 feet inby survey station No.2156, in the No.6 entry, of the 001-0 MMU. Work was being performed in an area where three wooden cribs had been removed, by means of a rubber-tired, battery-powered scoop. The mine roof in the area was not supported, or otherwise controlled, to protect persons from the hazards related to the falls of mine roof. As a result, a section of mine roof material, (58 inches long by 44 inches wide and 0 to 8 inches thick), broke from its own weight, between the coal rib and left rib pattern bolts, striking the foreman, causing fatal injuries.

VIOLATIONS

• 103-K Order, (No. 4758922), was issued to ensure the safety of all persons in the mine, until the investigation was completed and the area deemed safe to work.
  
  
• A 104-A Citation, (No. 7293918), of 30 CFR, 75.202(a) was issued, for the mine roof in the area of the accident not being supported, or otherwise controlled to protect persons from the hazards, related to the falls of mine roof, resulting in a fall of roof material causing fatal injuries.

Respectfully submitted:

Luther E. Marrs
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector

Approved:

Ray McKinney
District Manager

Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
FAB98C09