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UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION

District 4

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
(SURFACE COAL MINE)

FATAL POWERED HAULAGE ACCIDENT

Lady Dunn Preparation Plant (I.D. No. 46-03317)
Cannelton Industries, Inc.
Cannelton, Kanawha County, West Virginia

June 28, 1999

by

William H. Uhl, Jr.
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector

Dennis Ferlich
Mechanical Engineer
Approval and Certification Center

Gharib Ibrahim
Michael L. Schumaker
Civil Engineers
Mine Waste & Geotechnical Engineering Division



Originating Office - Mine Safety and Health Administration
100 Bluestone Road, Mount Hope, West Virginia 25880
Edwin P. Brady, District Manager

Release Date: December 7, 1999

GENERAL INFORMATION

The Lady Dunn Preparation Plant is a coal preparation plant located on Route 60 near Cannelton, Kanawha County, West Virginia. The plant is operated by Cannelton Industries, Inc., and consists of one main cleaning and sizing facility. Coal is brought into the plant by truck haulage from several strip and underground mines in the area. Coal is also transported directly to the plant via conveyor belt from one underground mine located nearby. Coal haulage from the Cannelton Industries, Inc., Dunn Coal and Dock strip mine, is contracted to Wiggles Trucking, Contractor ID. No. MGZ, a subsidiary of Big G Trucking, Contractor ID. No. 7RW. Wiggles Trucking entered into operational status for Cannelton Industries, Inc., approximately June 19, 1999. Lady Dunn Preparation Plant produces 15,000 clean tons of coal per day with two producing shifts and one maintenance shift. The plant employs a total of 50 miners and entered into operational status October 1, 1974.

The principal officers for Cannelton Industries, Inc. are:

Frank Matras....................................President
Kenneth Brown................................Superintendent
Jack Hatfield....................................Safety Director

The principal officers for Wiggles Trucking are:

William Arthur..................................President
Gregory Holestin...............................Supervisor
Lloyd Arthur......................................Foreman
Curtis W. Halstead............................Foreman

The principal officers for Big G Trucking are:

Dather R. Arthur................................Owner/President
John Spinks........................................Superintendent

The last Mine Safety And Health Administration (MSHA) regular inspection (AAA) was completed April 08, 1999.


DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT

On Monday, June 28, 1999, Roy E. Whitt, victim, reported for duty as a truck driver at approximately 4:00 p.m., at the Cannelton Industries Inc., Lady Dunn Preparation Plant. Whitt was employed by an independent contractor known as Wiggles Trucking. Wiggles Trucking is a subsidiary company of Big G Trucking and entered into contract with Cannelton Industries on June 19, 1999, to haul coal from Cannelton's Dunn Coal and Dock strip mine operation.

On the job site, Whitt received some instructions/experienced miner training from Wiggles Trucking owner, William Arthur, at approximately 4:00 p.m., and was instructed to report to the truck portal where he would find the vehicle he was to operate.

Upon arriving at the truck portal, Whitt received instructions from another Wiggles driver identified as Ron Hunt. Hunt was an experienced driver and had been working at this Cannelton site for approximately 2 weeks. According to William Arthur, the initial training session he was providing was not completed and he instructed Ron Hunt to complete the experienced miners training and task training and to escort the two new truck drivers off the Dunn Hollow haulroad.

Hunt stated that when he arrived at the truck portal, Roy Whitt and Dave Fields were waiting at the trucks they would be driving, and Eddie Arthur, Wiggles' evening shift truck supervisor, was with them. It appeared to Hunt that they were filling out some papers.

Hunt stated that three other newly-employed experienced drivers were called to report to work on the evening shift. He had been instructed by Eddie Arthur to lead the new drivers off of the hill; however, he was only aware of Whitt and Fields in the convoy he led off the mountain.

Hunt stated that he communicated with the new drivers by way of CB radio. He instructed Whitt and Fields to place their trucks in first gear at the approach to the steep portion of the grade because they were hauling dirty coal or about 45 tons. He said that he never specifically gave any other instructions or mentioned the escape ramps and straddle berms located on the steep portion of the grade because they were clearly visible.

Whitt completed his first trip off the Dunn Hollow haulroad without incident. The truck he was driving at this time was identified as a Mack 800 series, powered by a 350 hp engine and is commonly referred to as a Mack 350, company truck No. 119.

Randy H. Halstead, day-shift mechanic, stated that he was asked by Eddie Arthur to haul coal on the evening shift until newly-hired drivers arrived for work. Halstead stated that he followed Whitt off the mountain and was the fourth driver in the convoy led by Ron Hunt. Halstead was driving the Mack, model RD-854-SX, company truck No. 118.

After completing the first trip off the Dunn Hollow haulroad, Whitt was stopped by William Arthur, Wiggles Trucking owner, and notified that the tailgate of his truck was not latched. Whitt was parked along the side of the main highway, according to mechanic/driver, Randy Halstead. Halstead stopped to check on Whitt and noticed that a fuel tank support was loose and needed repair on the Mack 350 that Whitt was driving. Halstead gave the Mack RD-854-SX , company truck No. 118, to Whitt and took the Mack 350, company truck No. 119 Whitt was driving, back to the maintenance yard located on the mountain near the truck portal where Whitt began his assignment.

Company truck No. 118 is a Mack 800 series also, but is powered by a 425 hp engine and is referred to as a Mack 425. The Mack 425 is very similar except for the engine size. One major difference is that the Mack 425 has what is referred to as a retarder which operates through the transmission and is used in conjunction with the engine (Jacobs or jake) brake to maintain lower speed on steep grades rather than to use the service brake.

Halstead stated that after exchanging trucks he talked to Whitt again on the mountain near the truck fuel tanks. During this conversation, Whitt questioned Halstead on how to operate the retarder on the Mack 425. Halstead stated that he was concerned for Whitt's safety and his ability to operate the Mack 425 and cautioned him to drive the truck around for awhile to become familiar with the truck and its operational features.

Several persons observed Whitt operating the Mack 425 prior to the accident. Statements taken from the endloader operator at the pit area indicated that Whitt had difficulty backing the Mack 425 under the endloader just prior to making his second and final run. John H. Harless, a truck driver, stated that he followed Whitt out of the pit area and lost visual contact with Whitt before reaching the "S" curve near the steep grade. Harless said that he was again able to see Whitt's truck as he (Harless) was rounding a curve on a higher elevated portion of the haulage road and that he saw Whitt in a runaway condition on the steep grade.

The investigation revealed that:

  • The distance from the area referred to as the "S" curve on the Dunn Hollow haulroad to the main highway is 0.9 miles.

  • The main highway can be seen from the top of the grade where the runaway condition apparently began.

  • The distance from the "S" curve to where the Mack 425, company truck No. 118 came to rest was about 925 feet. The percentage of the grade in this area ranged from 10.6% to 17.4%.

  • The distance from the top of the "S" curve to the No. 1 emergency escape ramp measured 350 feet with the grades ranging from 10.6% to 13.7 %.

  • The distance from the No. 1 emergency escape ramp to the No. 2 emergency escape ramp measured approximately 180 feet with grades ranging from 14.8% to 17.4%.

  • The distance from the No. 2 emergency escape ramp to where the victim was found measured approximately 200 feet with grades ranging from 12.3% to 16.6%.

  • The distance from where the victim was found to where the Mack 425 came to rest in the No. 3 escape ramp measured approximately 170 feet with grades ranging from 12.3% to 12.7%.
  • According to John Harless, truck driver, he and Tom Duncan, a Cannelton security guard, were among the first to arrive at the scene of the accident. It was determined that the engine of the Mack 425 was not running and the transmission was found to be in neutral position. Dave Giannini, of the Smithers Fire and Rescue Dept., stated that the victim was found lying in a fetal position on his left side and was not breathing, nor could a pulse be found. Whitt was transported to the Montgomery General Hospital by the Cedar Grove Ambulance Service and pronounced dead upon arrival.

    Fayette County Office of Emergency Services' incident report revealed that the accident notification was received at 5:50 p.m., and that West Virginia State Police and Kanawha Metro Emergency Medical Services were immediately dispatched and arrived on the scene at 5:58 p.m.


    INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCIDENTMSHA was notified of the accident by Wiggles Trucking truck foreman, Curtis Halstead, at 6:30 p.m., Monday, June 28, 1999. MSHA personnel arrived at the accident scene at 7:30 p.m. MSHA personnel and representatives of the West Virginia Office of Miners' Health, Safety and Training jointly conducted the preliminary investigation. A 103(k) closure order was issued to ensure the safety of all persons until the investigation could be completed.

    Photographs, sketches, audio/video recordings, and an engineering survey of the area of the accident were made. On June 29, 1999, the 103(k) order was modified and the coal haulage truck moved to a safe location to continue the investigation. Interviews were conducted in the conference room of the Lady Dunn Preparation Plant's main office building. Statements were taken from persons considered to have knowledge of the facts surrounding the accident. The on-site portion of the investigation was completed on July 2, 1999, and the 103(k) order was terminated.


    DISCUSSION

  • The investigation and examination of records and interviews with the miners and management personnel revealed that training was not provided in accordance with 30 CFR, Part 48.

  • Testimony and the lack of records provided indicated that the victim was not familiar with the type of equipment he was assigned to operate.

  • Further testimony revealed that the victim was not trained in the specific hazards associated with the environment in which he was expected to operate the equipment, nor was he familiar with the safety provisions provided on the haulage road.

  • Certified MSHA-approved instructors were not utilized to provide the prerequisite training.

  • Equipment
  • The inspection of the vehicle, examination of records, and interviews with the miners and management personnel revealed that the vehicle was not maintained in accordance with 30 CFR, Part 77.

  • The braking system for the vehicle was not maintained in a safe manner for operation.

  • PHYSICAL FACTORS

    1. There is a stop area approximately 2 miles from where the haul trucks were being loaded at the strip pit. This area is marked with a sign which indicates that the haulage-truck drivers are supposed to stop and check their brakes. The road continues from the stop area to what is referred to as the "S" curve. The road from the stop area to the first curve in the "S" is about 200 feet in length at a grade of 4%. The road is about 300 feet in length from the first to the second curve in the "S", and is at adverse grades ranging from 10.6% to 13.7%. At the end of the "S" curve and for a distance of approximately 550 feet, the road is nearly straight to the point where the haulage truck came to rest on its side in the mouth of the No. 3 escape ramp. Several sketches of the accident area, showing locations of escape ramps and grades of the haulroad, are included in this report.

    2. John H. Harless was the only eyewitness to the accident.

    3. The weather on the day of the accident was clear and dry.

    4. The truck involved in the accident was a Mack 425. This truck is an off- road type vehicle. The company truck number was 118.

    5. The accident occurred on the victim's second trip on the haulroad. It was the victim's first trip in the Mack 425.

    6. At the second curve in the "S" there is an escape ramp (Escape Ramp No.1). Escape Ramp No. 2 was located approximately 200 feet from Escape Ramp No. 1. Escape Ramp No. 3 was located about 350 feet from Escape Ramp No. 2. Both Ramp No. 2 and Ramp No. 3 were on the right side of the haulroad.

    7. There was a berm approximately 4 feet in height constructed of soil and gravel-sized rock between escape ramp Nos. 2 and 3.

    8. The haulage road was constructed with a crushed gravel surface over a rock base.

    9. The victim was found approximately 200 feet down the road from the No. 2 Escape Ramp.

    10. The haul truck involved in the accident was found in the entrance to the No. 3 Escape Ramp, approximately 170 feet down grade from where the victim was found.

    11. The haulroad has an adverse slope ranging from 17.4% to 12.3% between Escape Ramp No. 1 and Escape Ramp No. 3.

    12. Signs, measuring one foot high by eighteen inches wide identifying the escape ramps, were located at the entrance of each escape ramp. There were no signs posted to provide advance warning to the truck drivers that they were approaching an escape ramp.

    13. There were no signs posted beyond the stop area to identify potentially dangerous road conditions such as steep grades and curves.

    14. Little damage was sustained to the cab of the truck.

    15. The brake system on the Mack 425 (No. 118) involved in the accident was examined and then all the brakes were disassembled, visually inspected, and measured. The following results were obtained: (The pushrod travel on all brake chambers was measured with approximately 100PSI of air pressure supplied to the air chambers.)

      1. The pushrod stroke for the left front steering-axle brake could not be measured because the front axle was torn off the frame of the truck and the air chamber and adjuster was damaged. The pushrod stroke for the right front steering-axle brake was within the maximum specified limit of 2.5 inches for Type 24L air chambers.

      2. The pushrod stroke for the right rearward-drive axle brake exceeded the maximum specified pushrod stroke of 2 inches for Type 30 chambers. The pushrod stroke measured 2-1/4 inches.

      3. The pushrod stroke for the left forward-drive axle, right forward drive axle, and the left rearward-drive axle service brakes and the spring- applied brakes were within the specified limits of 2 inches for the Type 30 air chambers.

      4. Right front steering-axle brake: The brake drum diameter exceeded the maximum wear allowance of 16.620 inches stamped on the drum. The brake drum measured 16.643 inches diameter at the largest dimension or 0.023 inches diameter oversize. The braking force generated by this brake was compromised by the oversize drum.

      5. Left front steering-axle brake: The brake drum diameter exceeded the maximum wear allowance of 16.620 inches stamped on the drum. The brake drum measured 16.635 inches diameter at the largest dimension, or 0.015 inches oversize. The braking force generated by this brake was compromised by the oversize drum.

      6. Right forward drive-axle brake: The brake drum diameter exceeded the maximum wear allowance of 18.120 inches stamped on the drum. The brake drum measured 18.173 inches diameter at the largest dimension, or 0.053 inches diameter oversize. A piece of the drum, 2-1/4 inches x 5/8 inches, was broken out of the edge of the drum. The braking force generated by this brake was compromised by the oversize drum.

      7. Right rear drive-axle brake: The brake drum diameter exceeded the maximum wear allowance of 18.120 inches stamped on the drum. The brake drum measured 18.139 inches diameter at the largest dimension, or 0.019 inches diameter oversize. The pushrod stroke measured 2-1/4 inches, exceeding the maximum allowable stroke of 2 inches. The braking force generated by the brake was compromised by the oversized drum and the excessive pushrod stroke.

      8. Left forward drive-axle brake: The brake drum diameter exceeded the maximum wear allowance of 18.120 inches stamped on the drum. The brake drum measured 18.146 inches diameter at the largest dimension, or 0.026 inches oversize. The braking force generated by this brake was compromised by the oversize drum.

      9. Left rear drive-axle brake: The brake drum diameter exceeded the maximum wear allowance of 18.120 inches stamped on the drum. The drum measured 18.153 inches diameter at the largest dimension, or 0.033 inches diameter oversize. The braking force generated by this brake was compromised by the oversize drum.

    Findings

    1. All of the brake drums were oversize, resulting in compromised braking force. The pushrod stroke for the right rear drive-axle brake exceeded the maximum allowable limit, additionally compromising the braking force generated by this brake. All of the brake drum wear surfaces were discolored from overheating.

    2. The transmission gear was in neutral position after the accident. Inspection of the gears revealed no major visible damage.

    3. The steering gear rotated freely throughout its normal range of motion when the steering shaft was turned by hand. Inspection of the gears revealed no visible damage.

    4. The engine brake electrical solenoids were found to function properly.

    5. The rear axles were found intact and no evidence of damage was found.

    6. The empty truck weight was 43,840 pounds scale weight, as weighed on June 28, 1999, and the total allowable gross vehicle weight is 83,260 pounds, per Mack specifications. This allows a payload capacity of 39,780 pounds or approximately 20 tons. The two loads hauled on June 28, 1999, prior to the accident were payload capacities of 45.03 tons and 45.50 tons, or approximately 25 tons overloaded. Overloading the truck beyond its design capacity reduces the effectiveness of the brakes, contributing to longer stopping distance, potential brake fade from excessive heating of the linings and drums, and potential loss of the braking on a descending grade. The discoloration of the drum wear surfaces indicated that excessive heat was generated.

    CONCLUSION

    It is the consensus of the investigation team that the accident occurred due to several contributing factors, which collectively created conditions where the victim was unable to slow or stop the vehicle. These contributing factors are listed as follows:

    1. This was the victim's first day on the job and his second trip down the mountain. The victim drove a Mack 350 on his first trip. He was operating a Mac 425 on his second trip when the accident occurred.

    2. The victim was not familiar with the vehicle and did not receive task training on the vehicle he was operating.

    3. The victim was not familiar with the terrain on which he was required to haul, as evidenced by testimony. The victim was not provided a tour of the work site before commencing his duties, as required for new employees under experienced miner training. Also, no reference was ever made concerning specific hazards regarding runaways and the locations of emergency provisions on the haulage road, such as emergency escape ramps and straddle berms.

    4. The driver/victim relied on the operator to provide him with a safely maintained haulage vehicle and this was not provided. The investigation revealed that the braking system for the Mack truck contained several safety defects which collectively reduced the braking ability of the vehicle.

    5. Based on the truck haulage log, Mack truck specifications data, and testimony from the owner and from other drivers obtained during this investigation, the payload capacity for the truck was routinely exceeded from 100 to 125% or otherwise overloaded by 20 to 25 tons.

    6. The gravity of these conditions was greatly increased due to the adverse slope of the haulage road in the area where the accident occurred. The survey of this portion of the haulage road revealed the grade ranged from 10.6% to 17.4% for a distance of approximately 1000 feet.


    ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

    ISSUED TO: Cannelton Industries, Inc.

    1. A 103(k) order No. 7168338 was issued stating in part, "A fatal powered-haulage accident has occurred at this mine. Only those persons necessary to assist in investigating this accident is permitted in the accident area. Representatives from the WV Office of Miners' Health, Safety and Training, representatives of the miners, representatives of the mine operator, representatives of Wiggles Trucking Company (MGZ) and representatives of MSHA."

    2. A 104(a) citation No. 7157394, Section 48.26, Title 30 CFR, was issued stating in part, "Based upon testimony and records obtained during this accident investigation, adequate experienced miner training was not provided to Roy Whitt, driver and victim of the powered-haulage accident which occurred June 28, 1999. The training he received did not provide adequate information and instruction about the recognition and avoidance of hazards he would encounter at the mine, more specifically on the haulroad where he was assigned to drive. This inadequate training was determined to be a factor contributing to the accident which resulted in fatal injuries to the driver."

    3. A 104(a) citation No. 7157395, Section 48.27, Title 30 CFR, was issued stating in part, "Based on the testimony obtained and the failure to provide records of task training for operating the Mack RD-854-SX coal haulage truck, it is determined that task training was not provided for Roy Whitt, driver and victim of the fatal powered-haulage accident which occurred on June 28, 1999. This was the victim's first day of employment at this mine site and his first trip on the haulroad with this particular type vehicle. He was operating it in the production process and was not under direct supervision. This failure to provide training was determined to be a factor contributing to the accident which resulted in fatal injuries to the driver."

    4. A 104(a) citation No. 7187482, Section 77.404 (a), Title 30 CFR, was issued stating in part, "The Mack RD-854-SX (S.N. 1M2P225C4VM00L090 and Co. No. 118) that was being driven by Roy Whitt to haul coal at the mine on June 28, 1999, was not maintained in a safe operating condition in that: 1. One brake on the drive axles was beyond the maximum allowable adjustment range. 2. The other three brakes on the drive axles were at or near the maximum allowable adjustment range. 3. The brake drums of all four drive-axle brake units and the two front steering-axle brake units were worn beyond the maximum allowable wear limit stamped on the drums by the manufacturer. These conditions decreased the braking capacity of the truck. This reduced braking capacity, in combination with the fact that the truck was operating on a steep grade that ranged from 10.6% to 17.4% over a distance of approximately 1000 feet in the area of the accident site and the fact that the truck was routinely carrying significantly more than its rated capacity, contributed to the accident that resulted in fatal injuries to the driver."

    ISSUED TO: Wiggles Trucking, a subsidiary of Big G Trucking.

    1. A 104(a) citation No. 7157400, Section 48.26, Title 30 CFR, was issued stating in part, "Based on testimony and records obtained during this accident investigation, adequate experienced miner training was not provided to Roy Whitt, driver and victim of the powered-haulage accident which occurred June 28, 1999. The training he received did not provide adequate information and instruction about the recognition and avoidance of hazards he would encounter at the mine, more specifically on the haulroad where he was assigned to drive. This inadequate training was determined to be a factor contributing to the accident which resulted in fatal injuries to the driver."

    2. A 104(a) citation No. 7187481, Section 48.27, Title 30 CFR, was issued stating in part, "Based on the testimony obtained and the failure to provide records of task training for operating the Mack RD-854-SX coal haulage truck, it is determined that task training was not provided for Roy Whitt, driver and victim of the fatal powered-haulage accident which occurred on June 28, 1999. This was the victim's first day of employment at this mine site and his first trip on the haulroad with this particular type vehicle. He was operating it in the production process and was not under direct supervision. This failure to provide training was determined to be a factor contributing to the accident which resulted in fatal injuries to the driver."

    3. A 104(a) citation No. 7187484, Section 77.404 (a), Title 30 CFR, was issued stating in part, "The Mack RD-854-SX (S.N. 1M2P225C4VM00L090 and Co. No. 118) that was being driven by Roy Whitt to haul coal at the mine on June 28, 1999, was not maintained in a safe operating condition in that: 1. One brake on the drive axles was beyond the maximum allowable adjustment range. 2. The other three brakes on the drive axles were at or near the maximum allowable adjustment range. 3. The brake drums of all four drive- axle brake units and the two front steering axle brake units were worn beyond the maximum allowable wear limit stamped on the drums by the manufacturer. These conditions decreased the braking capacity of the truck. This reduced braking capacity, in combination with the fact that the truck was operating on a steep grade that ranged from 10.6% to 17.4% over a distance of approximately 1000 feet in the area of the accident site and the fact that the truck was routinely carrying significantly more than its rated capacity, contributed to the accident that resulted in fatal injuries to the driver."

    ISSUED TO: Big G Trucking.

    1. A 104(a) citation No. 7157397, Section 48.26, Title 30 CFR, was issued stating in part, "Based upon testimony and records obtained during this accident investigation, adequate experienced miner training was not provided to Roy Whitt, driver and victim of the powered-haulage accident which occurred June 28, 1999. The training he received did not provide adequate information and instruction about the recognition and avoidance of hazards he would encounter at the mine, more specifically on the haulroad where he was assigned to drive. This inadequate training was determined to be a factor contributing to the accident which resulted in fatal injuries to the driver."

    2. A 104(a) citation No. 7157398, Section 48.27, Title 30 CFR, was issued stating in part, "Based on the testimony obtained and the failure to provide records of task training for operating the Mack RD-854-SX coal haulage truck, it is determined that task training was not provided for Roy Whitt, driver and victim of the fatal powered-haulage accident which occurred on June 28, 1999. This was the victim's first day of employment at this mine site and his first trip on the haulroad with this particular type vehicle. He was operating it in the production process and was not under direct supervision. This failure to provide training was determined to be a factor contributing to the accident which resulted in fatal injuries to the driver."

    3. A 104(a) citation, No. 7187483, Section 77.404 (a), Title 30 CFR, was issued stating in part, "The Mack RD-854-SX (S.N. 1M2P225C4VM00L090 and Co. No. 118) that was being driven by Roy Whitt to haul coal at the mine on June 28, 1999, was not maintained in a safe operating condition in that: 1. One brake on the drive axles was beyond the maximum allowable adjustment range. 2. The other three brakes on the drive axles were at or near the maximum allowable adjustment range. 3. The brake drums of all four drive-axle brake units and the two front steering axle brake units were worn beyond the maximum allowable wear limit stamped on the drums by the manufacturer. These conditions decreased the braking capacity of the truck. This reduced braking capacity, in combination with the fact that the truck was operating on a steep grade that ranged from 10.6% to 17.4% over a distance of approximately 1000 feet in the area of the accident site and the fact that the truck was routinely carrying significantly more than its rated capacity, contributed to the accident that resulted in fatal injuries to the driver."


    Submitted by:

    William H. Uhl, Jr.
    Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector

    Dennis Ferlich
    Mechanical Engineer

    Gharib Ibrahim
    Civil Engineer

    Michael L. Schumaker
    Civil Engineer


    Approved by:

    Richard J. Kline
    Assistant District Manager

    Edwin P. Brady
    District Manager


    Related Fatal Alert Bulletin: FAB98C16


    APPENDIX
    The following persons were interviewed, provided information, and/or were present during the investigation.
    CANNELTON INDUSTRIES, INC


    Frank Matras ................... President
    Kenneth Brown ................... Supt/Mine Foreman
    Jack Hatfield ................... Safety Director
    William C. Miller, II ................... Attorney-At-Law
    Wiggles Trucking


    William L. Arthur ................... President/Owner
    Curtis W. Halstead ................... Truck Foreman (Day)
    Gregory L. Holestin ................... Truck Supervisor
    Ronnie Jean Hunt ................... Truck Driver
    Randy Hugh Halstead ................... Mechanic/Truck Driver
    John H. Harless ................... Truck Driver

    Big G Trucking


    John Spinks ................... Superintendent

    West Virginia Office of Miner's Health, Safety and Training


    Terry Farley ................... Health and Safety Administrator
    Steve Snyder ................... Assistant Inspector at Large
    Terry Keene ................... Surface Inspector
    Wayne Wingrove ................... Surface Inspector
    Gary Ball ................... Surface Inspector
    Henry M. Armentrout ................... Surface Inspector
    Robert Cozart ................... Surface Inspector

    United Mine Workers of America


    Ted Hapney ................... International Representative
    Gary Young ................... District Representative
    Kenny White ................... District Representative
    William Bolts Willis ................... Safety Committeeman
    Robert VanMeter ................... Safety Committeeman

    Mine Safety and Health Aministration

    Ronald O. Dunbar ................... Assistant District Manager
    Aubrey Skip Castanon ................... Supervisory Mine Safety and Health
    Jim Beha ................... Supervisory Mine Safety and Health Specialist
    Mike Hess ................... Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
    Terry Willis ................... Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
    Robert Hardman ................... Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
    Sherman L. Slaughter ................... Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
    Tom Moore ................... Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
    Ottis Matthews ................... Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
    Ronald Chambers ................... Education and Training
    Kirk Harman ................... Education and Training
    Salwa E. El-Bassioni ................... Safety Division
    William H. Uhl, Jr. ................... Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector

    Pittsburgh Safety and Health Technology Center


    Gharib Ibrahim ................... Civil Engineer
    Michael L. Schumaker ................... Civil Engineer

    Approval and Certification Center


    Dennis Ferlich ................... Mechanical Engineer