AB33-HEAR-4 PUBLIC HEARING ON ) U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR ) MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ) ADMINISTRATION ) ) EMERGENCY EVACUATION ) Pages: 1 through 50 Place: Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania Date: February 13, 2003 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR PUBLIC HEARING ON ) U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR ) MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ) ADMINISTRATION ) ) EMERGENCY EVACUATION ) Hyatt Regency Pittsburgh International Airport 1111 Airport Boulevard Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania Thursday, February 13, 2003 The parties met, pursuant to the notice, at 9:01 a.m. BEFORE: MODERATOR MARVIN J. NICHOLS, JR. Director of the Office of Standards, Regulations and Variances Mine Safety and Health Administration PARTICIPANTS: WILLIAM BAUGHMAN WILLIAM CROCCO JOHN GALLICK JENNIFER HONOR JAMES LAMONT CARL LUNDGREN TIMOTHY HROBLAK HARRY POWELL P R O C E E D I N G S (9:01 a.m.) MR. NICHOLS: Bill, come on up with the sign in sheet. Good morning, everybody. I'm Marvin Nichols. I'm the Director of the Office of Standards, Regulations and Variances for the Mine Safety and Health Administration. I'll be the moderator for today's public meeting. On behalf of our Assistant Secretary, Dave Lauriski, I want to welcome all of you here today. Let me introduce my other colleagues here. Carl Lundgren, Carl is an economist in my office Arlington. Bill Crocco, Bill is the Chief of the Accident Investigations, he's the program manager for Coal Mine Safety and Health. Bill Baughman is a reg specialist in my office Arlington and Jennifer Honor is our solicitor. This is the last of four public hearings we've had scheduled on this rule. The previous hearings were last week in Lexington, Kentucky; Grand Junction, Colorado. On Tuesday of this week we were in Charleston, West Virginia, and as I said this is the last of four. The purpose of these hearings is to obtain comments from interested members of the mining community on the proposed rule for emergency evacuations. We will use these comments to determine the best way to assure that underground coal miners will be protected during mine emergencies. The initial announcement of these four rule making hearings was published in the Federal Register on December 12, 2002, and there's copy of that Federal Register notice on the desk in the back if you'd like to pick up a copy. The proposed rule that is the subject of these hearings is identical to the emergency temporary standard published on December 12, 2002. The proposed rule would establish requirements for mine evacuations in response to mine fires, explosions and gas or water inundation emergencies. Let me give you some background on what led us here today. Under Section 101(b) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, the secretary has authority to issue an emergency temporary standard if it is determined that miners are exposed to grave danger from exposure to substances or agents determined to be toxic or physically harmful or to other hazards and that such emergency standard is necessary to protect miners from such danger. On December 12, 2002, MSHA issued an emergency temporary standard in response to the grave dangers which miners are exposed to during mine fires, explosions and gas and water inundation emergencies. The recent deaths of 14 miners at two underground coal mines punctuates the need for MSHA to address proper training and mine emergency evacuation procedures. The emergency temporary standard was effective immediately upon publication and is effective until superseded. Under the Mine Act the secretary shall have nine months from date of publication of the emergency standards to promulgate a mandatory health or safety standard which will supersede the emergency temporary standard. By law the emergency temporary standard also operates as a proposed rule. That proposed rule is the subject of this rule making. We're here today to receive comments on MSHA's proposed rule for emergency evacuations and to get your impressions on how the regulations have worked since it was issued on December 12, 2002. The major provisions of the proposed rule would require: 1) Operators of underground coal mines would designate for each shift that miners were working underground a responsible person in attendance at the mine to take charge during mine fire, explosion, and gas or water inundation emergencies. 2) The designated responsible person must have current knowledge of various mine systems that protect the safety and health of miners. 3) The responsible person must initiate and conduct an immediate mine evacuation where there is a mine emergency which presents an imminent danger to miners due to fire, explosion or gas or water inundations. 4) Only properly trained and equipped persons who are necessary to respond to a mine emergency may remain underground. 5) The existing requirements for a program of instruction for fire fighting and evacuation would be expanded to address not only fires, but also explosions and gas or water inundation emergencies. 6) Part 48 training requirements would be revised to reflect that the annual refresher training includes a review of mine fire, explosion and gas or water inundation emergency evacuation and fire fighting plans in effect at the mine. Prior to the start of the public hearings MSHA received several comments on the proposed rule. One commenter recommended that we expand coverage of the rule to include metal and nonmetal mines. Another commenter supported portions of the rule, but felt that some portions were ambiguous and allowed MSHA too much leeway to second guess operator decisions on whether to evacuate. Finally, the commenter felt that the proposed rule fosters the idea that the first step in a mine emergency is always to evacuate the mine. The remaining two commenters offered a series of suggestions on how to improve the proposed rule. We've posted all of these earlier comments on the website and we intend to publish the transcript of these four public hearings on the website. In fact, the hearing in Lexington, Kentucky was posted on the website yesterday. The issues surrounding safety and health for miners are important to MSHA. We'll use the information provided by you and all the commenters to help us decide how best to proceed through this rule making. These four hearings will give mine operators, miners and their representatives and other interested parties an opportunity to present their views on the proposed rule. The format for this public hearing will be as follows: Formal rules of evidence will not apply and this hearing will be conducted in an informal manner. Those of you who have signed up to speak today will make your presentations first. After all the scheduled speakers have finished others can request to speak. When the last speaker is finished we will conclude the public hearing. If you wish to present any written statements or information today, please clearly identify your material. When you give it to me, I'll identify the material by the title submitted. You may also submit comments following the meeting. If you choose to do that, submit them to MSHA by February 28, 2003, which is the close of the posthearing comment period. Comments may be submitted to MSHA by electronic mail at comments@MSHA.gov or by fax at 202-693-9441 or by regular mail or hand delivery to MSHA, Office of Standards, Regulations and Variances, 1100 Wilson Boulevard, Room 2352, Arlington, Virginia. A verbatim transcript of this public hearing will be available upon request. If you want a personal copy of the meeting transcript please make arrangements with the court reporter or you may view it on MSHA's website as soon as we get it posted. The procedures, well, since this is the last hearing I won't go into the procedures for the previous three. We'll begin by the persons who have requested to speak. When you come up to speak, please clearly state your name and spell it for the court reporter and tell us who you're affiliated with. Our first speaker today is John Gallick with RAG Emerald Resources. MR. GALLICK: Ready, Marvin? MR. NICHOLS: Yes, I'm ready. MR. GALLICK: Okay. First, my name is John Gallick, G-A-L-L-I-C-K. I'm the safety manager for RAG Emerald Resources LP, and affiliate of RAG American Coal Holding, Inc. I refer to RAG Coal Holding's written comments to the standard for my company's overall position on this standard. I am here to speak about this rule as it impacts RAG's Pennsylvania operations, the Emerald and Cumberland mines. Emerald Mine No. 1 is a Pittsburgh Coal seamed long wall mine employing approximately 540 people. The operation produces approximately six and a half million clean tons of coal per year and the Cumberland Mine, basically, it mirrors Emerald in both employment and production. I have approximately 25 years of safety experience in the underground mining industry with involvement in several mine emergencies. I've also studied in detail numerous other emergencies as part of my safety job. With this background in mind I truly support the goal of more training of mine personnel in handling mine emergencies and the desire to improve the handling mine emergencies at the mine site. I regret to say, however, that my analysis of these rules is that they are flawed to the extent that I do not believe they will accomplish these intended goals. In fact, I believe the flaws are so severe that much of the impact of 30 CFR 75.1500 would be in citation arguments and litigation without any appreciable improvement in safety for the miners. This is surely not the intent of these standards. My reason for this opinion are as follows: First, the use of words and phrases throughout the standard without clear definitions is a concern of mine. The first word phrase is responsible person, the regulation implies that the responsible person is to be identified by the actual name of the person yet the question and answers provided by the agency states that this can be handled by job title. At Emerald we have designated the shift foreman, his designee if he is off work, and the outby foreman if the shift foreman cannot be immediately contacted as a responsible person. I believe this is a logical progression, well understood and in line with the intent of these regulations. I don't know at this point, however, if this plan is in compliance with the regulations as presently written. First, the name of the responsible person, per se, is not important. Miners will act on the information given to them by whomever delivers that information. For example, we operate with a surface computer room operator and a shift foreman for all three shifts. We have some workers who due to early starts and after shift overtime actually spend a portion of their time underground with all three different shifts. It is impractical to expect us to notify each of these workers when a change has been made in the name of the shift foreman or responsible person. Surely the intent of the rule is that the responsible person knows his responsibilities and the communication conduit. In our case, a computer room operator knows his responsibilities. It's not the name that's important to the workers, it's the actions that person takes. The standard, in my opinion, is misdirected. It's not really as important that each worker know who the responsible person is, it's that the surface attendant, regardless of whether he's a CO room operator or warehouseman, knows who that responsible person is. Second, the preamble notes that the responsible person needs to be at the mine to take charge. In principle I agree that this is a correct procedure. However, the responsible person's actions can and should be augmented by many other people. For example, the responsible person does not need to initiate an evacuation. Other persons, in our case the computer room operator, can begin an evacuation to a safe area based upon the information available to him. Further, other management people either at the mine or at home can add to that responsible person's decision making power. Remember, in today's operations it is not unusual to have almost instant contact with other management people. These people have an obligation to involve themselves in an emergency which may include taking control of some aspects of that emergency. It's important for the regulation to clearly account for the fact that other persons besides the responsible person can give orders for evacuation. Third, the regulation notes that the responsible person will have current knowledge of the assigned locations and expected movements of miners underground. The agency must further define this statement or it will become a bone of contention between inspectors and operators. Mines the size of Emerald employ up to 100 people underground per shift, excluding people working on overlapping shifts. The responsible person will at the preshift meeting have a clear layout of where people are being initially assigned to work. However, some mechanics, general laborers, beltman and certified people will move around. The responsible person may well know where their expected movements are, but not necessarily anything more exact. It's important to note here that the responsible person will clearly have the exact locations of the large majority of the shift and certainly will have their initially assigned locations. Fourth, 75.1501 states that the responsible person will have current knowledge. What exactly does the agency mean by knowledge? The responsible person should know the basic ventilation system direction of air, for instance, but he cannot be expected to know all the nuances of the elaborate ventilation system. This holds true for the remainder of the terms that the responsible person is charged with knowing. It would be more accurate to use the phrase generally knowledgeable. This is particularly valid since many, if not most, mines in today's mining business have employees underground working 365 days per year. That means there are several support persons that will be the responsible person. The responsible person and the substitute responsible persons will certainly be generally knowledgeable, but not to the levels of the experts in each of those areas stated in 75.1501(a). Fifth, I'd like to critique 75.1501(b) in it's entirety. The terms used in this regulation will certainly lead to misunderstandings and disagreements as to what is intended in this section of the regulation. I'm quoting, "An immediate mine evacuation is to be conducted when there is a mine emergency which presents an imminent danger." That's a quote from 1501(b). In a discussion about mine emergencies this phrase seems to be logical, but applied to a real mine emergency this phrase, in my opinion, is flawed. For example, in a training session I asked almost every foreman at the mine to consider what actions they would take if they were the responsible person and a fire was reported on the section belt line. Would they consider the situation to be an imminent danger? Almost to a person, they said the section crew and anyone working in by that fire were in imminent danger and needed to be alerted to get out by the fire site immediately. Once out by the fire site, the foreman said the imminent danger to that crew would then dissipate and they could then begin fire fighting activities with that crew and that would be their primary concern at that point. Other people throughout the mine would need to be alerted by them and then either begin adding to the fire fighting effort, handle supplies that were needed for any emergency or evacuated if unneeded. I believe these foreman would be acting responsibly, but they as presently written would be in violation of 75.1501(b). It seems apparent that the phrase immediate mine evacuation is driven by the Jim Walter's tragedy. This language does not fit many other types of emergencies. I am unsure actually what the current rule would require. As I read it, the responsible person would be required to conduct a mine-wide evacuation whenever he determines an imminent danger existed regardless of the limited nature in that emergency. Further, if the imminent danger or perceived danger is corrected, for example, the fire is out. I am not sure that this regulation provides for a stopping of an evacuation. A better rule would state that, "People in the affected area of a mine emergency will be evacuated to an outby location. The responsible person will determine based on the facts he receives how to assign people to handle that mine emergency." This or similar language will make it clearer that the evacuation from an affected area should be the first priority and should be initiated by whomever received the initial call of that emergency. Once the people in danger are directed to a safe location then whatever activities are necessary to respond to the mine emergency can be directed by the responsible person. Sixth, the phrase only properly trained and equipped needs to be clarified. I've heard this interpreted as needing a gas detector in event of traveling into an area with a ventilation eruption or being trained in fire fighting to fight a fire. These are logical interpretations, but I am afraid that people will interpret the need for properly trained and equipped to include mine rescue or fire brigade specialists rather than workers who have been trained under fire drills to fight basic fires, et cetera. The agency needs to rewrite 75.1501(b) to reflect that emergencies can be of many different varieties. Fires require escape to out by the fire zone and then a quick immediate fire fighting approach. Explosions or other ventilation interrupting events require a slower more methodical approach. Clearly, the responsible person needs facts to determine the appropriate response to specific emergencies. As presently written 75.1501(b) relies upon a hair splitting determination that a fire may not be an imminent danger. Therefore, an immediate mine-wide evacuation is not called for. Possibly this regulation should state that if the responsible person, when presented with the information of a mine emergency, should first assure the evacuation of people to a safe area. If the responsible person determines that the emergency presents a hazard to the entire mine, then an immediate mine-wide evacuation should be ordered. All nonessential people should be ordered to evacuate during any mine emergency. Nonessential persons must be determined by the information available during that emergency. Seventh, I presented a proposed language change above that evacuation should be initiated. I believe this is clearer than the present language of initiate and conduct. The responsible person can order an area or the entire mine for that matter evacuated. I don't believe you can initiate and conduct an evacuation. The responsible person cannot be expected to contact all employees underground in the event of imminent danger. He'd be one person among many who may be able to make a decision to evacuate the mine or an entire area of the mine. Once a decision to evacuate the mine or a portion thereof has been made the responsible person must be able to delegate the actual notification of all miners to other competent people. Next I wanted to comment on the compliance assistance guide questions and answers. As previously stated, according to the questions and answers a job title is acceptable. This needs to be clarified in the actual regulation. I suggest that the provided service attendant knows the persons name of who is the responsible person then the job title is sufficient for the intent of this regulation. I think it's important to remember that people will react to a call or act by a call to act by whomever notifies them about the emergency. The responsible person designation is important to control actions after the initial alert and/or evacuation. I have a significant problem with the answer to the question concerning the responsible person having "ready access to communications which would be necessary for any responsible person to be able to initiate and conduct an immediate evacuation." This type of answer has already led to inspectors questioning time limits for the surface attendant to make contact with the responsible person. As I stated earlier, the initial orders to evacuate an area does not need to be by the responsible person. Clearly, initial evacuations should begin as part of a mine emergency plan to move people from inby emergency to a point outby emergency. I don't believe the intent of this regulation is to limit a responsible person's duties by distant and time from a telephone, but if that is the agency's intent it surely is not written in the actual regulations. Finally, I'd like to comment on the revision required in our fire fighting and evacuation plan. There were 16 questions put out on the internet concerning this plan. These were put out to consider and as suggestions and guidance. Clearly, the questions can help an operator as a training guide for a table top exercise, et cetera, but these types of open-ended questions should not be used as a benchmark for a plans approval. I submitted a plan for Emerald mine that does not necessarily address each of these questions. In my opinion, the plan does not need these items that I did not address. I have concerns that I will not get my plan approved unless I meet the 16 questions. I don't believe that is an appropriate way to handle a regulation and a plan approval. In the ideal world all plans would be developed and implemented to help an operation perform its tasks safe and more effectively. We all recognize in the real world plans are postincidence, citation catchers and second guessing tools. For example, I'm aware of a fire fighting plan that included the evacuation of unnecessary people in an event of an emergency. Obviously, just about every plan will have language similar to this. Yet, when an emergency turned out to be of a minor nature and the evacuation was halted, questions were raised. Since the plan did not state that the plan could be short stopped the issue became the wording of the plan rather than the proper response taken by the person in charge. That is not what we really want in mine safety. The mine emergency plan checklist should be what is required in the regulations under 75.1501 and 1502, not other items developed after regulations were published. Finally, 75.1502(a)3 requires our plan to include rapid assembly of rescue apparatus. I have questions about this. Does this mean that during drills the equipment assembly must be included? Considering that most mines are covered by off-site mine rescue teams, would these teams need to be activated as a part of a training drill, could they be activated only in a separate plan to ensure that your communication system is accurate. I don't know what that means, but I am concerned that it will cause a problem for plan approval and for emergency drill guidelines. In conclusion, the agency's concern that the operators develop plans and programs to train people to implement them is a lot of bull. I don't believe that the actual regulations as presently written will achieve the goals intended and need to be modified. Thank you. MR. NICHOLS: Thank you, John. Do you have any questions, Bill? MR. CROCCO: John, the way you talk about the responsible person are you recommending that there be one responsible person with one or two alternates and that one of them be at all time available to the surface communications operator, is that what you're recommending? MR. GALLICK: No. I'm saying that there needs to be a responsible person depending on the size of the operation. For instance, our size people need to know that they have duties in a mine emergency even though they aren't the directly designated responsible person. In our case, we term people shift foreman in charge of the whole shift and an outby person is in charge of the workings, the haulage, et cetera, he's our backup. What I'm saying is both of them need to understand their duties would be that if the responsible person is away from, that the shift foreman isn't going to return or whatever, that the next person then begins to take charge and handle things. What I'm clearly saying though and this is where I think we're going backwards, it doesn't matter who the responsible person is designated for the initial evacuation. The immediate evacuation from inby in an emergency should be initiated by whomever gets the call. They don't need to contact the responsible person to make that first step. The responsible person or his designees core job will be to develop the secondary plans. What are you going to do, is this a fire, am I going to fight the fire, do I have equipment coming, that type of thinking, but the initial evacuations using my example of the belt fire in a section, whoever would call out that we have a fire on the belt, the outside surface person or whoever gets that call whether it be a warehouseman or a CO monitor, room monitor needs to get a hold of the inby people and get them evacuated. They're the people in critical risk. The responsible person needs to assure that that has happened, but after that his goals are broader and I think when I read the rule and I look at the actual plans of a large mine I see that it's written as if this one person is going to make all the decisions. When, in fact, I see the decision making tree of a large mine to be in the hands of multiple people. More difficult than a smaller operation in some respects, yes, but clearly that's just the way it has to be. MR. NICHOLS: I don't know how you can read that into that rule. We tried to make it clear that anybody could initiate an evacuation. MR. GALLICK: Marvin, I agree with 1501(d) that it says that anyone can initiate the evacuation. What I'm concerned about is the subtleties after that initial call. We tell our people that the inby area is obviously the affected area and they need to be moved out of there, but the subtleties after that initial call seem to me to go to the responsible person by your rule. Where, in fact, a lot of the next decisions can be preplanned and moving forward without his direct involvement. I guess that's where I am concerned. MR. NICHOLS: You had a fire fighting escape and evacuation plan in effect for 30 years probably. MR. GALLICK: Yes, sir. MR. NICHOLS: Have you had any trouble with MSHA with that? MR. GALLICK: Frankly, only on, well fortunately, at Emerald not on postreview of an incident, fortunately, we haven't had any, but postreview of complaints the words then become twisted around the axle. Things you think are clear become less clear and that's my concern about any plan I write. MR. NICHOLS: Okay. You're looking very deep into this reg. Let me tell you what the reg was intended to do. MR. GALLICK: That's what I was hoping I'd hear. MR. NICHOLS: The reg was intended to cause people to evacuate a mine, not stay too long to try to fight a fire or to also include explosions or gas and water inundations in your evacuation plan. I mean people are getting killed after the initial explosion. You need to evacuate the mine. It never was intended to change current practice and I don't know how you read that you have to evacuate the mine any time there's an imminent danger. I think we clearly said an imminent danger was fire, explosions, gas or water inundations. Now, if you have not had trouble with your fire fighting plan, you shouldn't have any trouble under this rule with the example you used. All we intended to do was update the current fire fighting and evacuation plan to include those other situations/explosions. We had assumed all along that people would understand that fire fighting and evacuation plans meant explosions, gas or water inundations, but we keep getting examples of where people just stay in the mine too long. MR. GALLICK: Well, my concern, let me start from the beginning. I hear what you're saying and I appreciate as two people, if you and I were sitting in a room discussing a plan I believe we'd reach the same conclusion. We have a mutual understanding of what the plan means. I'm afraid once it gets into postaccident review that the hair splitting then becomes my concern. I've got a lot of scars over my years in this business. The other part, getting to your first part, I don't like the language that says, and I can quote it here and pull it out, but the mine evacuation in an imminent danger, I believe, that the layman would declare and rightly so, would declare any belt fire and anybody inby the fire to be in imminent danger until there outby it. Our CO plans always have said that because, as you know, our CO monitoring plans always say that if you have an alarm you evacuate to outby the alarm. With the understanding then that you can become a fire fighting team or whatever the issues are. I think that language just needs to be cleaned up to say that you evacuate from the area of the imminent danger and then secondarily you make an analysis of that issue whether it's a fire, let's say now, and then from that point either you continue evacuating, you fire fight or do other things, whatever actions that's where a responsible person earns his title is that second step. That's all I'm saying. The first step is to get everybody out by that zone where the responsible person comes into play, he or his designate, is that second stage which is we're going to fight this, we're going to retreat from this, we're going to do whatever we're going to do. That's what I'd like to see the language say in some way or another. MR. NICHOLS: I think you would agree though if you've had an explosion you ought to evacuate the mine. MR. GALLICK: Yes. MR. NICHOLS: That's something that has affected the ventilation. MR. GALLICK: That's what I said. I tried to make that clear that I look at ventilation eruptions as slow methodical approaches. By that I mean this, I don't want to use actual. I'll make for example, if you have an explosion in which overcasts are damaged, ventilation controls are damaged, clearly, you need to get the power off, you need to get people evacuated, but if you're missing people you may make a decision that I need to go in to do certain things. Now that needs to be done under somebodies direction and in a slow methodical manner. That is high risk business, just like mine rescue is high risk business. We know that, but that's my only caveat there. Under most circumstances any time you have ventilation disruptions the unknowns overwhelm the knowns I guess is all I'm saying. So I guess I agree with you, just with the caveat that if I'm missing people that responsible person has to have some flexibility to decide what he needs to do and frankly it may be to do nothing other than evacuate. MR. NICHOLS: Well, the standard was intended to be a simple common sense approach to including these other issues in your current plans, have somebody make a decision early in the game as to whether to evacuate the mine. MR. GALLICK: I don't disagree with the concept. I will say this that, well, as you said we've all had fire fighting plans. We've all had explosions. Well, I shouldn't say everybody, but most places certainly have had explosion plans relative to pulling power and evacuating and setting up command centers, et cetera. Obviously, when rules come out like this it forces you to go back and look harder at what you're doing and adjust it. Like I said, from a training aspect I don't disagree at all from a training aspect. My concern is, as I said earlier in my testimony, citation grabbers. I don't want to get into arguments over words, battles over minutes, where I believe the intent of the agency and the intent of the operator is to have people trained and work with a working plan to do the best they can to protect employees and the property of the mine. I guess just too many years, I guess, maybe I'm getting too cynical, but I've seen too many of these things just turn into regulatory battles, I mean litigation battles. I don't want any more of them if I can avoid it. MR. NICHOLS: I understand that, but looking back I think the agency, the industry, the whole community has done a good job with mine rescue. Where there seems to be a failure is in the initial decision making. Once you get people out of the mine you'll have more well-trained, well-equipped people show up to participate in the emergency, but just staying underground too long is what's causing the problem. MR. GALLICK: I guess that's where I'm saying that training of the responsible persons and others is a real positive thing. You know I think we all tend to make some assumptions sometime that people know more about things than they do and I use the term table top exercise for those 16 questions. When we did some of those it gets people thinking and asking questions and will make them a better, I'll say better responsible person, but a better supervisor is really what they are and you know I don't have a problem with that part of it. I just wish I could think of better words to make my issues and yours blend together. MR. NICHOLS: Well, that's our job. We'll take your comments, but the way this rule making works is for the emergency temporary standard is the writers of the statutes doesn't expect that every question would be answered when you issue the initial rules. That's why they put in the nine month rule making process and the emergency temporary standard would serve as that proposed rule. Now what we'll do is take all the comments we get from all four public meetings and the additional comments we get and we will address all of those. You know we've got a number of comments that deal with transportation and communication. We've got a series of comments from you. We'll either adopt those or adopt them in part or reject them, but we'll explain in the preamble what we meant. You know maybe an example is you were talking about imminent dangers. MR. GALLICK: Yes. MR. NICHOLS: We'll need to explain further what we're talking about and we'll do that. So we appreciate your comments, John. Any more questions, Bill? MR. CROCCO: Yes, I'd like to ask you about a couple of other things. You didn't talk about, but just whether you have an opinion on them. One is a secondary communication system such as a PED. Do you think that that's something that ought to be a requirement as part of a safety rule. MR. GALLICK: I don't know a lot about a PED. I know what I've read and strictly start with that. You know I have to qualify that. I know how they are supposed to work. What I don't know is how effective they are relative to time and distance and dead spots, et cetera. I do think that if, I'm just telling you not to write more regulations, but I'll throw in that I'm going to tell you that if you want to get into communications, I guess you really need to look at 1600 and redo 1600, you know, rather than putting it in under 1500. We happen to have two communication systems plus a CO monitoring system at the mine, but the secondary system is not available to everybody, the walkie-talkie radio type things. There are dead spots. There are areas that you can't hear from. You know all those qualifiers go into any thought of it. I guess I look at it from a safety guy with a risk analysis. To some extent we minimize the risk of somebody not being in touch. For instance, our responsible person, his back up, carry a radio. If the radio system is working, in other words, you know it's in play than that adds more chance that they will be able to be contacted, but there's no guarantee of that. If they're in a return or belt line there's dead spots or you know like any other system. The PED has an advantage, I guess, that I've heard anyway from other people that it has a better track record of being able to work, you know, throughout a larger area of the mine, but I understand if there's an interference problem one of the vendors told me that, for instance, the system we use is incompatible with a PED. We use a leaky feeder cable for communications and he tells me that the antenna has something to do with frequencies and he lost me about half way through that conversation, but that there would be interference problems. Secondly, obviously the PED is a one way communications. It's a plus that you let people know that they have a problem, but you don't know whether they are doing anything. You don't know whether they're evacuating via the intake escape way, whether they're planning on fighting this fire, you know, in other words you can make the assumption that they got the message, but you're still stuck with that terrible feeling in the pit of your stomach is are they, in fact, doing what they need to do. I know it's a long answer to a short question, but I would say that if we want to look at multiple communication systems we need to go back at 1600 and look at revising those regulations through a normal proposed rule process. MR. CROCCO: We had some earlier comments saying it's very difficult, almost impossible, to evacuate a large mine unless there's transportation maintained up on the working sections while miners are up there working and that ought to be a part of this rule, is that man trips or means of transportation ought to be maintained. Would you have any thoughts on that. MR. GALLICK: I guess just as a general matter I think it's a good rule of thumb to have transportation available in the section somewhere. Our normal, at the mine for instance, the normal, I'll say normal policy is to have a man trip available when people are on the coal producing sections and normally at the end of the track. When I say, I used normally a couple of times for reasons that we're a three entry system. When they bring supplies up to the end of the track they have to take the man trip, pull it down and park it in some other switch. That switch could be 10, 20 blocks away from the face. From my perspective that's still okay, but if that was, you know, if there was a regulation or something to that effect that type of flexibility would have to be blended in. You know, so I guess a rule of thumb is that there is typically there is community, I would suspect in most mines typically there is some type of haulage transportation at the section or near the section, as just a rule of thumb. I don't know which mines someone is referring to or their specific circumstances, but the mines I've been around typically you have a vehicle in the section somewhere. Any other questions? MR. CROCCO: That's all I have. MR. NICHOLS: Well, you raised a good point about the rule making process. You know this rule was designed to deal with a designated person updating escape evacuation plans and also updating training plans. We'll have to decide if some of this other stuff fits in the scope of this rule making or it does or does not. The lawyers will help us with that, but I think I'll go back and tell Lauriski that you recommend further rule makings, that's a first from industry. MR. GALLICK: I figured I was saying that I would take a beating in the next meeting on that, but I just like if you're are going to deal with communications deal with the whole 1600 if you're going to deal with it. Frankly, you know, I didn't say this in my testimony, but if we're going to deal with 1500 escape way drills comes under 380 something that it ought to, in my opinion, I understand you made an emergency standard so you don't get into all these side issues. All that would be much better under one training standard whether it be under the 48 part or under the 1500 part instead of having to grab them out of different parts of the rules. You know I look at the rule of you do fire drills, of course, that's now under 1500 under mine emergency drills. I do escape way walks under 380 something or other and that still stands alone where as logically those two ought to be under the same rule. I'm not saying to change the numbers and, you know, the circumstances of them, but if you have a chance to put things under the same rule it sure makes it easier to understand. MR. NICHOLS: I think that's in someone's written comments that we received from someone. MR. GALLICK: I don't think that was in mine. MR. NICHOLS: Okay, John, thanks. MR. GALLICK: You're welcome. MR. NICHOLS: The next presenter will be Jim Lamont with the United Mine Workers. MR. LAMONT: Good morning. MR. NICHOLS: Good morning. MR. LAMONT: My name is James Lamont, L-A-M-O-N-T. I'm an international representative with the United Mine Workers of America. As you are aware the Mine Safety and Health Administration has issued a temporary emergency standard regarding evacuations in the event of a mine emergency. The agency announced this decision on December 11, 2002, in Brookwood, Alabama, in conjunction with the release of the report on Jim Walter Resources No. 5 Mine disaster. The agency made clear the standard was implemented in response to the events of September 23, 2001. The United Mine Workers of America is concerned that this action does not adequately address the problems miners face should an emergency situation arise. Additionally, the emergency rule fails to address improvements in addition to mine emergency response identified during the disaster investigation which are in need of regulatory action. The unions review of the emergency standard and the current language in the appropriate sections of 30 CFR found the following changes have been made: "Part 48.8 Annual refresher training of miners; minimum courses of instruction; hours of instruction" was amended to require a review of roof and ground control plans, procedures for controlling and maintaining ventilation and the mine emergency and evacuation plan as a part of miners training. MSHA's commentary on the rule also indicates that training on the new emergency evacuation procedures under Part 48 does not have to be conducted by an MSHA approved instructor. That, however, conflicts with Part 48.4 which specifies training is to be by approved instructors. Training on the emergency evacuation procedures are not specified for task or hazard training. On training when the act was implemented in 1977 and then Part 48 was starting to be complied with you had eight hours to do your annual retraining in which you have today. Since that time there's been many, many changes in the industry with technology, additional rules. You now have add to it the diesel regs, the HAZCOM rule, add this evacuation rule in place and you still only have eight hours to do all this training. What we have been seeing, and then you know on the heels of what the events that took place at Que Creek additional training should be required to our monitors in this country. Eight hours does not seem to be enough time to cover all this material. You sit down in an eight hour time frame and it's more a brush over for all the material that you have to cover in that time. There's one thing I'd like to add also, I believe the eight hours should be expanded. Part 75.1501 emergency evacuations was added as a new section. Those provisions expand on the provisions contained in Part 75.1601 which requires a responsible person to respond to mine emergencies. The new provision require a responsible person to take charge during mine emergencies. Mine emergencies were narrowly defined as a fire, explosion, or gas or water inundation. The new rule requires the responsible person to have knowledge of the assigned locations and expected movements of miners underground, the operation of the mine ventilation system, location of escape ways, mine communication system, any mine monitoring system used and the mine emergency and fire fighting program of instruction. The new rule requires the responsible person to initiate a mine evacuation when a mine emergency presents an imminent danger to miners from a fire, explosion or gas or water inundations. Only properly trained and equipped persons essential to the emergency response can remain underground. It required that the operator instruct all miners on the emergency rule by December 19, 2002, along with informing miners of the identity of the responsible person for the miners work shift and if changed miners are to be informed of the identity before they start of their work shift. The investigation into the Jim Walter's Resources No. 5 mine disaster found a number of flaws in the fire fighting and evacuation plan and several improvements were made to address those. While this new section contains increased protection for miners, it however fails to meet the needs as identified during the Jim Walter's No. 5 disaster investigation. The standards do not address emergencies during idle shifts, communication and atmospheric systems in place during emergencies defining what a properly trained and equipped person is, the equipment such as methane and carbon monoxide detectors on hand for emergency responders, accurate tracking of miners, designation of a responsible person underground to manage the emergency, training and simulation of the responsible person, expanded training for those responding and availability of emergency transportation. The rule should not limit emergencies to those identified. It should cover any emergency. MSHA has also informed the industry that the responsible person is not required to remain on the surface. That could quickly turn an emergency response into a disaster if the responsible person becomes a victim of the emergency. Parts 75.1101-23 program of instruction, location and use of fire fighting equipment, locations of escape ways, exits and routes of travel, evacuation procedures, fire drills was redesignated as 75.1502 mine emergency evacuation and fire fighting program of instruction. The changes in the revised section address mine emergencies and mine emergency evacuation as opposed to fires and fire drills. The new rule calls for mine emergency evacuation drills instead of fire drills. While increased drills are needed for emergencies, fire drills should still be required and beefed up. The rule does not specify what is required in the emergency drills. They should include improved hands-on fire fighting and self-contained self-rescuer training and simulated emergency evacuations. Drill should also be conducted during fully staffed and partially staffed shifts, which would include idle shifts. Drills must also involve the responsible persons. Problems found with the fire fighting and evacuation plan at the Jim Walter's No. 5 mine likely exist in plans at other mines and the improvements made in the Jim Walter's plan and those recommended should be addressed in all plans to improve safety for miners. The emergency rule should be changed to require those. The emergency evacuation plan improvements and those recommended at the Jim Walter's No. 5 are contained on pages 113 and 114 of the United Mine Workers report on the Jim Walter's No. 5 mine disaster. Other improvements affecting both mine emergencies and prevention are found on pages 112 through 123. Those improvements that should be pursued through the emergency rule making include: communication systems as found on page 114; mine-wide atmospheric monitoring which is on page 117; protection of sectional electrical equipment, page 119; improvements in battery design, page 119; quantity, quality and distribution of methane multigas detectors found on page 121. The temporary rule fails to address these problems. I have with me, which I will present, pages 112 through 123 of the United Mine Workers report on Jim Walter's mine disaster. Several of the things that are included in this I'd just like to touch base on them real quick. Found on page 112, for initial health and safety improvements would be to install a leaky feeder phone system, revise the fire fighting and evacuation plan, install a PED emergency communication system, improve the mine-wide monitoring atmospheric monitoring system, develop better protection of sectioned electrical equipment, revise the roof control plan, determine vertical degasification options near underground roof fault areas, improve and revise all examination books, provide additional training of examiners including filling out books, automatic methane monitors at power centers; quantity, quality and distribution of methane detectors, procedures and system for power removal when bad roof is reported, training of miners in each new system, general retraining of miners, better battery design, brattice construction of materials, existing phone system improvements, CO room monitoring training. These are some of the recommendations that the UMWA had put forth for the Jim Walter's report and I believe a lot of these could be implemented into this rule. Following me there will be some UMWA representatives who can speak on specifics of what happened at their respective mines or knowledge of what happened at other mines and the need for this emergency evacuation rule and some additions which I mentioned that would really help benefit this rule. As well as the emphasis that needs to be placed on training of the miners. Like I had touched based on earlier, eight hours, you have so much material you have to cover in that time frame and you don't want your training to be just a brush over. You want to have quality training for these folks. People need to have, and whether it be salaried or hourly folks, a clear distinct understanding of the plans that are in place at the respective operations. Recently, after being involved in a few incidents, it was very obvious that plans are confused in peoples minds. What do you do when the CO monitor system has a low alarm or a high alarm? What's the first thing you should do? How do react? Who do you notify? The procedures to be followed, there is a lot of confusion. You know I'm seeing this after reading the mine worker's report in Jim Walter's that that same type of confusion occurred there. I'm sure it's just not isolated incidents. I would say it's pretty much throughout the industry. People just don't have a clear understanding of what they need to do for specific procedures. That's something that needs to be drilled into their minds. The only way I can see you do that is through training and good quality training, having MSHA approved instructors do the training. That's pretty much it. MR. NICHOLS: Okay, Jim. We have that report in the record. I failed to mention to start with that if you want to leave your notes or any written material with us, John, the same offer to you, be sure to do that. MR. LAMONT: Do you still want this or you say you do have it for the record? MR. NICHOLS: We'll take it again. Let me say something about Jim Walter's. In my time in coal mine safety and health I've seen those mines evacuated safely many times down there. They have a heating problem. They have heating problems in those mines and would occasionally have fires. They would make the decision to evacuate the mines, pretty much uneventful, safely evacuate them. I think the real thing that's missing in some places is just the person to make the decision to evacuate after you've had an explosion. Somebody needs to make the decision to evacuate the mine, regroup and have a plan to deal with the situation. While I've seen it done safely many times, with the disaster it was not managed well. So, I mean for the last 30 years we've had these evacuation plans and they've seemed to have worked okay once the decision was made to evacuate the mine. So I hear a lot of comments about needing to improve training and all that and it may be good comments, but I really can't remember a lot of problems with evacuation. I can remember problems with the decision to evacuate. MR. LAMONT: With that, I find it very difficult to see just one person being in charge especially if that individual is going to be underground. You take, for example, if you have on your off shifts, your afternoon and your midnight shift if that responsible persons underground, you may be running air courses or whatever. How will anybody get in touch with him? How will he respond and be brought up to speed? I think you need a responsible person underground and on the surface, two places, to take control of this. MR. NICHOLS: Well, I think you need to look at situations in their totality or you know a lot of times the evacuation will occur and some miner may call for an evacuation and the mines evacuated without getting, you know, a lot of people involved. I think what we're trying to do here is set up something where nobody will make the decision to evacuate. Somebody has got to take control of the situation. MR. LAMONT: I think Que Creek is a prime example of not waiting for a designated person, a responsible person. MR. NICHOLS: I think that's a wonderful example. MR. LAMONT: But with that too you still have to have somebody who has the knowledge on the surface as well as underground to call shots, to know what questions to ask, to know the ventilation system, to know everything about the mine, the workers, their locations, and have an idea of maybe like where they would be heading to using Que Creek as an example or instruct them to go to a specific area. MR. NICHOLS: But I would go back to using Jim Walter's as an example. I've been told many times if they have a heating problem, they need to evacuate the mine, things worked well with their current evacuation plan. The failure was the decision not to evacuate soon enough, not problems getting out of the mine. MR. LAMONT: And from what I understand too is the failure of communication of what actually happened. People didn't know if there was an ignition of fire, if a stopping blew out, if there was a cave in, there was confusion. MR. NICHOLS: Okay. Thanks, Jim. MS. HONOR: Thank you. MR. LAMONT: Yes. MR. NICHOLS: John, do you want to leave us anything, your written material? MR. GALLICK: No. I can -- MR. NICHOLS: You don't have to. We've got a lot of stuff written from you. MR. GALLICK: Yes, I don't think it's the end of it. I have lived a little bit here and there. MR. NICHOLS: Okay. The next presenter will be Tim. MR. HROBLAK: Yes, that's me. MR. NICHOLS: I don't think you've written your name clear enough for me to pronounce it. MR. HROBLAK: Some how I knew that. MR. NICHOLS: Yes, from the United Mine Workers. MR. HROBLAK: Thank you. MR. NICHOLS: Yes. MR. HROBLAK: My name is Timothy Hroblak. I am chairman of the Safety Committee at the Cumberland Mine, ID No. 36-05018. I wanted to comment on emergency preparedness and evacuation plan. The comments on the plan are the official in charge should be positioned on the outside, where he is not involved in underground emergency. This is where he has access to CO readings, fan readings, work schedules, areas where people are assigned to remote areas, et cetera. At an underground location he has to call outside for some of this information. If an incident arises and the official in charge has to delegate people to notify sections, these people must identify that they are directed to work for the official in charge. They must identify the problem and location as to ensure the proper escape to the surface. There is a lot of directions for people underground who encounter a problem to have to identify what the danger is, the nature of the danger and the extent, et cetera. Likewise, if a danger to the men is encountered on the surface like a fire, fan down, et cetera, this type of information must be given to the people underground to ensure that they use the proper method and directions to ensure a safe escape from the mine. During the time of a mine emergency a lot of confusion can exist. We must try to alleviate as much confusion as possible because confusion costs precious time. Our sections are about three or four miles underground and we are now in the process of driving long wall panels that are 16,000 feet long. So time and avoiding confusion are of the essence. The 30 minute rule on a reportable fire is an antiquated rule. If a fire burns in a coal mine 30 minutes or more, you don't have to worry if the fire is going to be reported. You can read about it in every newspaper in the country that evening. Any experienced miner will agree to that fact. All miners must be properly trained so they know what they must do now. Our people have pretty much been ingrained with the initiative to attack a fire as soon as possible. They now must be retrained to pursue escape first, then let properly trained and properly equipped people, not just SCSRs, fight the fire. Also if an evacuation is initiated and must be followed through, we must not be turned around part way out. The problem must be properly examined before any people are sent back into the mine. Indecision must not jeopardize miner safety. I thought of additional comments, John there helped me out on this. Transportation is very important due to the size of our mine and the distance involved. You must keep a man trip on the section. I think that's very important. Also, the track distance, I think, from the face is very important. The West Virginia State Law is 500 feet and also under West Virginia State Law if evacuation is initiated it must be followed through with. Do you have any questions? MR. NICHOLS: Yes. Did you say you worked at Emerald? MR. HROBLAK: No way. Cumberland. Yes, I work at Cumberland. MR. NICHOLS: Well, you guys have had evacuations at the mine, haven't you? MR. HROBLAK: Yes. MR. NICHOLS: How did it work? MR. HROBLAK: Well, you know, the way I look at it if everybody gets out okay, it worked good. Yes, we've had a few. I think what we need to do is, I know it's impossible, but try to avoid as much confusion as possible because we're getting further and further back and time is always of the essence. Any confusion or any indecision we can avoid is timely to help our people get out. I really think that the official in charge being outside, you know this is the age of computers, you know, computers, electronics. All the pertinent information at that time when it has happened is outside. You got COs, fan readings, everything is there. You know if you just walked out and returned and he gets a phone call, you know, he doesn't have this information at his fingertips. MR. NICHOLS: In reality I bet you could call for a mine evacuation, couldn't you? I mean you see a problem back there and just initiate one. MR. HROBLAK: Oh, yes. I wouldn't hesitate if I believe I have a right. MR. NICHOLS: Yes. MR. HROBLAK: They can holler at me later. I don't really care. MR. NICHOLS: I doubt if they'd holler at you. MR. HROBLAK: No, they wouldn't. MR. NICHOLS: Well, where we've got evacuation plans working well, again, I'll say we were trying to clarify that if you have an explosion you don't hang around underground. MR. HROBLAK: Well, see our people, I'm going to be honest with you, our people are go-getters and it's pretty much, like I said, ingrained into them. If there's a problem, if there's a guy hurt, they're going to go head down straight ahead. I mean that's pretty much been ingrained in us. It's the way we are. It's hard to change that. I mean they're head down straight ahead no matter what, especially in the area of a fire, emergency or somebody is down. You know it's hard to try to say, wait a minute you better think about your own safety. MR. NICHOLS: Yes. MR. HROBLAK: Anything else? MR. NICHOLS: No. I don't have anything else. Thanks. MR. LUNDGREN: Tim, I was wondering if you could spell your last name for the record. MR. HROBLAK: How about pronouncing too? MR. LUNDGREN: Okay. MR. HROBLAK: Okay, it's Hroblak, H-R-O-B-L-A-K. MR. LUNDGREN: Thank you. MR. HROBLAK: In Slovak it means "bothersome insect." MR. NICHOLS: This hearing is going downhill. Okay. Our next present is Harry Powell, UMWA. MR. POWELL: Good morning. My name is Harry Powell, that's P-O-W-E-L-L. I'm on the safety committee at Cumberland Mine. I'm just going to make this real short and sweet since I'm the last speaker and I'm sure everyone wants to go to lunch. First, I would like to thank MSHA for putting so much effort and thought into the preparation of emergency evacuation. Being involved in the fire service for a number of years, I am a strong believer in preplanning. I find great satisfaction and joy that MSHA and the industry at the moment has placed evacuation as a top priority. Preplan and training go hand in hand. Fire drills, escape way walks, I would like to see on a much later scale. I would like to see a total mine evacuation under relaxed conditions as opposed to being stressful. This, of course, would take a great deal of time and a great deal of money, but we must ask ourselves as an industry is how prepared we actually want to really be. We have a tendency in industry to want to close the door after the horse has escaped. Last, I think it would be really wonderful if every miner in the country, at least once in his career, would be able to take a pilgrimage to the National Mine Academy in Beckley, West Virginia, just to see exactly what we have either paid for by the government, the state or the company, whoever. I feel this is essential. That's basically all I have to say. MR. NICHOLS: Okay. Any questions from anyone? Thanks, Harry. Harry is the last person we had signed up to speak. Is there anyone else that would like to come up and speak? Is there anybody that has already been up here want to come to add anything additional? Okay. We'll take a break and we'll stay around here until about 11:00 in case we have some late arrivals. So, we'll break until about 10:30 a.m. (Whereupon, a short recess was taken.) MR. NICHOLS: It's 11:00. Do we have anyone else wanting to speak? Okay. Remember that you have up until February 28th to submit any additional written comments for the record. So if we have no one else wanting to speak, that will conclude the public hearing. Thanks. Thanks to everybody for showing up. (Whereupon, at 11:00 a.m., the hearing in the above-entitled matter was concluded.) // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE DOCKET NO.: -- CASE TITLE: Department of Labor Emergency Evacuation HEARING DATE: February 13, 2002 LOCATION: Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania I hereby certify that the proceedings and evidence are contained fully and accurately on the tapes and notes reported by me at the hearing in the above case before the Date: February 13, 2003 Joel Rosenthal Official Reporter Heritage Reporting Corporation Suite 600 1220 L Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005-4018 ?? TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION Official Reporters 1220 L Street, N.W., Suite 600 Washington, D.C. 20005-4018 (202) 628-4888 hrc@concentric.net 2 Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 50 Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888