U. S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR } OFFICE OF STANDARDS, REGULATIONS AND VARIANCES } MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION } Pages: 1 through 51 Place: Lexington, KY Date: May 1, 2003 Before the Department of Labor U. S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR } OFFICE OF STANDARDS, REGULATIONS AND VARIANCES } MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION } Holiday Inn 1950 Newton Pike Lexington, KY 40511 Thursday, May 1, 2003 The parties met, pursuant to the notice, at 9:00 a.m. BEFORE: ED SEXAUER Moderator P R O C E E D I N G S (9:00 a.m.) MR. SEXAUER: Good morning. My name is Ed Sexauer. I'm the acting Deputy Director in the Office of Standard Regulations Variances for the interim. I will be the moderator for this public hearing on the proposed belt air rule for underground coal mines titled underground coal mine ventilation standards for the use of a belt entry as an intake air force to ventilate working sections and areas where mechanized mining equipment is being installed or removed; otherwise referred to as belt air. On behalf of David Risky, the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Mine Safety and Health, I want to welcome all of you here today. Also here today is several others from MSHA: Bill Francart, on my immediate left, from the Ventilation Division of Pittsburgh Safety Health Technology Center. Next to Bill is Kevin Hedrick of the Electrical Safety Division Approval and Certification Center, MSHA Technical Support, and on the far left is Debra James from our office of Standard Regulations and Variances, and on my immediate right is Mark Eslinger, District 8, Vincenz District Office. This is the last of five hearings on the proposed rule. The other hearings were held on April 3rd in Grand Junction, Colorado; April 8 in Charleston, West Virginia; April 10, Washington, Pennsylvania; and April 29 in Birmingham, Alabama. The initial announcement of these rule making hearings was contained in the Notice of Proposed Rule Making published January 27, 2003, in the Federal Register. Copies of the proposed rule are available in the back of the room. Three of these hearings were rescheduled due to conflicts with other hearings the Agency will be holding on plan verification and single sample. A modified hearing location and date notice was published in the Federal Register on March 12, 2003. Many of your organizations were also notified of the change of the date and location by email on March 7th. The purpose of these hearings is to receive information from the public that will help up evaluate our proposed rule. The scope of the issues we are addressing with this proposed rule are well-defined in the rule and the hearing will be limited to soliciting public input on these issues. I'd like to first give you some background that lead us to the proposed rule. Second, review for you the essential elements of the rule, and finally discuss the format of these hearings. For the background: MSHA's proposed rule is based on careful consideration of existing ventilation rules; a review of the belt entry ventilation ordered by the MSHA Assistant Secretary in 1989; a secretarial advisory committee in 1992; and MSHA's experience in granting over 90 petitions for modification where belt air has been used safely in underground coal mines. MSHA published a proposed rule to revise safety standards for ventilation of underground coal mines in January of 1988. Included in that proposed rule were provisions to allow air course through the belt entry to ventilate working places. After considering the public comments and information submitted during six public hearings in June of 1988, the Assistant Secretary called for a thorough review of safety factors associated with the use of belt air to ventilate working faces. That was in March of 1989. MSHA completed this review and concluded in August 1989 in the Belt Entry Ventilation Review Report that directing belt entry air to the face can be at least as safe as other ventilation methods provided carbon monoxide monitors or smoke detectors are installed in the belt entry. After the Belt Entry Ventilation Report was issued, we reopened the ventilation rule-making record and held a 7th public hearing in April 1990 to receive additional public comments on issues raised in the report. All the comments received during and after the 7th public hearing expressed widely divergent views on the recommendations of the belt entry ventilation report. Some commenters said that the use of belt air provides positive ventilation and reduces the possibility of a methane buildup in the belt entry. Other commenters maintained that the use of belt air reduces safety due to increased fire hazards and greater dust levels. MSHA carefully considered all the comments, and, due to these diversion views, when the ventilation rule for underground coal mines was finalized in 1992, it did not include provisions that would have allowed mine operators to use belt air to provide additional intake air to working sections. MSHA's existing standards continued to allow this practice on a mine-specific basis through the petition for modification process. MSHA decided instead that the use of belt air to ventilate working places should continue to be evaluated. As part of this effort, the Secretary of Labor appointed a Federal Advisory Committee in January 1992 and charged it to make recommendations concerning the conditions under which belt air could be safely used in the face areas of underground coal mines. This committee was designated as the Department of Labor's Advisory Committee on the use of air in the belt entry to ventilate the production face areas of underground coal mines and related provisions. This advisory committee held six public meetings over a six-month period. After reviewing an extensive amount of material, the advisory committee concluded that belt air could be safely used to ventilate working places and underground coal mines provided certain provisions and precautions were taken. The precautions included the use of new technology, the atmospheric monitoring system, or AMS. The advisory committee made 12 recommendations to support this conclusion and submitted its report to the secretary of labor in November 1992. It published a December 1992 notice in the Federal Register announcing the availability of the Advisory Committee's final report and stated that we would review its recommendations. In the preamble of the proposed rule, we discussed the recommendations of the belt entry ventilation review report and the advisory committee. The proposed rule also equates MSHA experience with petitions for modification. In instances where we have not followed a recommendation of the belt entry ventilation review or advisory committee reports or a term and condition from the petitions for modification, we provide an explanation in the preamble to the proposed rule. Now I will briefly review what we have proposed. Entry has included definitions for appropriate personnel, atmospheric monitoring system, AMS operator, belt air force, carbon monoxide ambient level, and point feeding in the proposed rule. Proposed Section 75-350 prohibits the belt air course from being used as a return air course and requires that the intake and return entry be separated with permanent ventilation controls. It would allow the use of belt air to ventilate sections so long as certain requirements are met. These conditions include the installation, operation, examination and maintenance of an atmospheric monitoring system, training requirements, the establishment of designated areas for dust monitoring, and monitoring the primary escape way for carbon monoxide or smoke. When belt air is used to ventilate the working section, point feeding wouldn't be allowed or only under limited conditions. Section 70-351 of the proposed rule includes provisions for the following: Requirements for the AMS operator and a designated surface location, minimum operating requirements for the AMS, location and installation of AMS censors, establishment of alert and alarm levels, establishment of CO ambient levels, installation and maintenance requirements for the AMS, sensors, time delays, training, and communication. Section 75-352 of the proposed rule specifies actions by the AMS operator and miners in the case of alerts, alarms, malfunction, and insufficient air velocity. Section 75-371 would add six new elements necessary for ventilation plan approval including designated areas, location of point feed regulators, additional CO censors and the belt air force, if required, time delays, reduced alert and alarm settings, and alert and alarm levels for monitoring. The proposed rule in Section 75-372 would require the location and type of all required AMS sensors be included in the mine ventilation map. Section 75-380, escape ways, would be modified to address the use of point feeding. The issues surrounding the use of belt air are important to MSHA. We welcome comments on any of these issues and on the following issues in particular: One, the benefits of integration of slippage switch monitoring into AMSs for belt air mines, the cost and any difficulty operators may experience in using AMSs to monitor slippage switches; second, whether or not lifelines and escapeways are needed and, if so, what are the associated costs and maintenance issues? These two issues were discussed in the January 27th Federal Register document. We will use the information provided by you to help us decide how best to proceed in this rule-making. These five hearings will give manufacturers, mine operators, miners and their representatives, and other interested parties an opportunity to present their views on this proposed rule. Today we have received four written comments on this proposed rule. You can view these comments on our web site at www.msha.gov. The last item I'll discuss will be the format that we will follow this morning. First, formal rules of evidence will not apply, and this hearing will be conducted in an informal manner. Those of you who have notified MSHA in advance or have signed up to speak will be invited to make your presentations first. After all scheduled speakers are finished, others can request to speak, and you'll have time to do so. If you wish to present any written statements or information today, please clearly identify your material. When you give it to me, I will identify the material by the title as submitted for identification purposes. You may also submit comments following this public hearing. If you do, please submit them to MSHA by June 30th, 2003, which is the close of the post-hearing comment period. Comments may be submitted to MSHA by electronic mail at: comments@msha.gov; by fax at (202) 693-9441; or by regular mail or hand-delivery to MSHA Office of Standards, Regulations and Variances, 1100 Royalton Boulevard, Room 2352, Arlington, Virginia, 22209. A verbatim transcript of this public hearing will be available on request. If you want a personal copy of the hearing transcript, please make arrangements with the court reporter. These are the same procedures we followed at the other public hearings. We will post the verbatim transcripts of all these hearings on our web site. Each transcript should be posted there approximately one week after the completion of the hearing. We will now begin with persons who have requested to speak. Please begin by clearly stating your name and organization for the record to make sure we have this information accurately recorded. So our first speaker today will be Joe Urban with United Mine Workers. Joe, would you come up, please? MR. URBAN: Thank you, Ed. I apologize. I don't have a copy to give the Committee of my comments I'm going to make, but I'll be sure and provide them with copies so they can have them for the court reporter. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. My name is Joe Urban, U-R-B-A-N. I'm with the United Mine Workers of America, the International. I am a Deputy Regional Director for United Mine Workers, Region 3 of the midwest. I appreciate the opportunity to address this panel today and to discuss the proposed rule. I feel it's important to provide you with some degree of my background and my expertise. I'm an underground coal miner. I have approximately 31 years total experience in both underground and surface mining applications. I was employed underground for 13 consecutive years prior to going to work for the United Mine Workers in 1985 as a coal mine safety inspector. In addition, I'm a qualified MSHA instructor for most all applications of Part 48. I am a qualified OSHA instructor for the construction industry and general industry for both the 10-R and 30-R course requirements. I have underground mining certification for the states of Illinois and Indiana. I am an MSHA-qualified mine rescue trainer and have been involved extensively in underground coal mine disasters. The latest is the disaster that occurred on September the 23rd, 2001, at the Jim Walter Resource number five mine located in Brookwood, Alabama, where my primary responsibilities were step-by-step plan development and key-decision making within the command center for the rescue and recovery operations on behalf of the United Mine Workers of America, Local Union 2368, during that disaster. I hold current MSHA qualifications for both surface and underground. First of all, I know just about the entire panel. I've worked with you from one time or another with the exception of Debra. I appreciate working with you Debra. You have a double-edged sword today and that is a good side of the sword is this is your last hearing. The bad side is you're going to hear a lot of information you've already heard. Bear with us. The United Mine Workers feels that it's pertinent that we have this information brought to you. You have to realize that the actions that you as a committee do affect thousands of lives. Allow me to begin by saying that it appears that the agency extensively cited two reports in the preamble to the proposed rule as a basis for making many of their determinations of which I think Ed has already alluded to. In that regard, the Union is extremely disappointed with the amount of validity given to the belt entry ventilation review or what we commonly refer to as the BEVR report despite the lengthy objections we offered to many of its findings during the hearings on the ventilation rule. The UMWA is disturbed by the method that MSHA used to give the appearance that they were complying with the recommendations of the advisory committee on the use of belt air to ventilate the production areas of underground coal mines and related provisions or the advisory committee. In the Federal Register, Volume 68, Number 17, Page 3937, the Agency states, "commenters from labor, on the other hand, maintained that the use of belt air in the belt entry reduces safety due to increased fire hazards and greater dust levels," of which Ed has already alluded to. Due to the divergent view, and I'm talking about the operator's views, academia, and also labor, when a ventilation rule for underground coal mines was finalized in 1992, it did not include the provisions that would allow mine operators to use belt air to provide additional intake air for the working sections. The position expressed by the UMWA during that round of hearings was based on extensive investigations and research. That position, gentlemen and lady, has not changed. The position we took in 1989 and stand by today is that we feel that this particular document is irrelevant and should not be used as a basis to go forward with rulemaking. There's to be no doubt that while belt air petitions have been approved on a mine-by-mine basis and are in place at many mining operations, the use of belt air to ventilate work areas does introduce additional and dynamic hazards that would otherwise not be present. And fortunate or unfortunate, Mark and I have had quite a bit experience of working on a proposed decision and orders for the 101-C petition process. These hazards can be mitigated by incorporating specific safety controls into the mining plans at the specific operation. It must be understood that the union is not taking a position that these hazards are eliminated by additional safety precautions. Rather, the recognized hazardous conditions created by the use of belt air may be adequately controlled by utilizing site-specific safety enhancements. I personally feel that the proposed rule ignores the safety benefits provided by the PDOs, or Proposed Decision and Orders, currently enforced at various mines throughout the nation and is attempting to apply a one-size fits all philosophy in their place. This approach, I feel, will significantly diminish the level of safety for miners at these operations of which they currently enjoy. I do question why the agency chose to only review the latest PDOs in their review. I can understand why they would not include the two entry PDOs because of their unique application. However, if the Agency would have included all the past PDOs approved, i.e., being three entries or more, and the list and chart used by the Agency, I feel that it would have showed more additional safety precautions that were required whenever the PDO approval process first began for belt air utilization to the working faces when they had originated. The union would argue that a PDO currently approved for use at a mining operation has the full force and weight of a statutory regulation. The conditions they put forward are requirements the offeree must meet in order to utilize belt air to ventilate a working area. The Agency recognizes these mandatory requirements for purposes of compliance and enforcement. The simple fact is the conditions outlined in the PDO becomes the mandatory standard at the particular operation to which they are prescribed. Raw changes in the writing and application of the rule as is proposed here will eliminate protections miners have and place the Agency in the position contrary to their Congressional mandate. Section 101(c)(9) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, the Act states, "no mandatory health or safety standard promulgated under this title shall reduce the protections forwarded miners by an existing mandatory health or safety standard." Congress strictly forbid the Agency from enacting any rule that would offer a lesser protection than miners currently enjoy. The union believes the application of the proposed rule in its current form would undercut the health and safety of miners. The Agency has offered the findings of the belt entry ventilation review report as a significant basis for their decision to propose this rule. In a background statement for the rule, the Agency cites the belt entry ventilation review reports findings that "directing belt entry air to the face can be at least as safe as other ventilation methods provided carbon monoxide monitors or smoke detectors are installed in the belt entry." The Agency appears to be summing up the report and using that as justification for moving this rule forward. The UMWA would suggest that it appears the Agency is focusing on a single aspect of the problem that is created by utilizing belt air in order to make its case. Monitoring the mine atmosphere for carbon monoxide or using smoke detectors may play a critical role in improving the safer use of belt air. However, far from the Agency's implication here, it does not begin to adequately address complexities of the issues. The UMWA was not alone in its scrutinization of the belt entry ventilation review report and MSHA's use of it. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, NIOSH, was also deeply critical of the reviewer's findings. NIOSH noted, "the practice of ventilating with belt air at any velocity is unsafe and unhealthy." Further, "the use of high velocities would increase foreign explosion hazards from coal dust." NIOSH concluded that "the use of belt air to ventilate the working faces was not a safe practice." The allowance and use of belt air to ventilate the working areas of the mine is a diminution of the protections of the miner's safety and health as provided by the Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977. The Union has again reviewed the recommendations of the belt entry ventilation review committee and determined the report does not adequately address the conditions the use of belt air will create. The authors of the report even acknowledged the need for additional research as well as a different approach in maintenance of the mine. This is addressed in the recommendations in the belt ventilation review report and reads as follows: Number one, increased emphasis should be placed on belt maintenance, belt entry clean-up, and rock dusting. Historically, belt converter entries have posed significant hazards to miners. Despite this fact, poorly maintained belt converter entries do not receive adequate or routine maintenance. A review of the MSHA statistics reveals that chronic problem as much a problem today as it was at the time the report was first issued. Coal spillage, float coal dust, and accumulations of combustible materials, i.e., paper, wood, and etcetera, are continually cited by the Agency's inspection personnel. For the Agency to offer this recommendation as a solution continues to create problems that have existed in the mining industry for years without putting additional force of law behind it is disingenuous. Operators who have never found it necessary to improve belt conveyor clean-up will not be inclined to reconsider their maintenance programs simply because the Agency suggests it when using belt air to ventilate working areas. Number two, emphasis should be placed on proper construction and maintenance of soffets separating intake escape ways from intake entries. The Agency never has shown institutional will to hold operators accountable for poorly constructed and inadequate stoppage. This rule will have no effect on stoppings that meet the minimum requirements of the law. Those do not provide adequate protections to prevent the quick propagation of a burn-through. The Agency has for far too long accepted the status quo, and the recommendations to improve stopping construction and maintenance will not be introduced by mine operators. Number three, a section should be designed by entry location, number of entries, the pressure differential, to enhance the protection of intake escapeways from contamination by fires in adjacent entries. The UMWA would suggest the major motivating factor for removing this rule is tied to the number of entries operators are seeking to drive in the development section. Unfortunately, driving additional entries to address the problem of insufficient face ventilation, which is the position the Union believes to be the proper solution is not the goal of this proposed rule or the motive of the operators. Instead, they seek to maintain three entry systems that leave sections starving for ventilation and solve the problem by pushing additional air to through the most hazardous entry in the mine. Clearly, the desire to increase face ventilation in this manner is not inspired by a need to increase safety, but by a will to reduce cost. In the comments submitted during the ventilation rule hearing, NIOSH made this point clear when they stated, "belt air usage represents the less expensive method of increasing ventilation to the face, not the best worker health and safety." Maintaining the intake escapeway at a higher pressure than the belt entry and entries in common with the belt is not an absolute requirement in the rule. The MWA believes such a requirement is necessary to ensure the health and safety of miners. Further this must be accomplished through natural pressurization or by the air entering the intake escapeway is always maintained at a higher velocity than air entering the conveyor belt entry. The MWA would caution against establishing a system of false pressurization by means of restricting or regulating the amount of air flowing from the intake escapeway to the working face. Number four, intake escapeways should be maintained free of potential fire sources unless such sources are protected by fire suppression or other acceptable devices. The Union is disturbed that such a recommendation has made its way into this document. It is the position of the UMWA that maintaining intake escapeways as free as possible from potential fire sources should be the current practices at all mines and should not be contingent on the use of belt air for face ventilation. Number five, directing the air through the belt entry and to the return through a restrictive regulator or pipe overcast does not comply with Section 75.333 and should be discontinued. To my knowledge, this practice is no longer accepted. Number six, training should include drills and communication and evacuation techniques and include precautions that should be taken for escape through smoke. Training on new and existing plans or regulations is an extremely important element in ensuring the health and safety of miners. Much emphasis is placed on training miners for new tasks, new inexperienced miners, first aid and other issues. The MWA is on record as supporting training on a much broader scale than is currently the practice. Based on that fact and the changes in the mining industry, the union is concerned that there is insufficient time allotted for such training. If I may, for the committee, being an individual that is qualified through to Agency for conducting training on Part 48, gentlemen and lady, you have to stop and consider the fact that coal miners right now receive eight hours of annual refresher training. You can only put so much information in that eight hours. And for them to be able to grasp and accept new or revised, additional protections that would be required under the use of belt air, you're going to have to look at broadening that time span for annual refresher because you just can't get all that material in. You can get in, but you're not going to do justice for the material. Continuing to add training subjects without requiring additional time to adequately educate the miners does not obtain the desired result. Far too many subjects in the current training regime overburdens the system and important issues do not get the attention they desire. Support for this and other training must be contingent upon a requirement that specific additional training time must be required. Belt entries used to ventilate the working places should be equipped with carbon monoxide monitoring systems or smoke detectors. The MSHA and the Bureau of Mines should encourage development and testing of improved smoke detectors. MSHA should initiate the performance of performance standards for CO monitors and smoke detectors. MSHA should continue to stress maintenance of CO monitoring systems. The agency continues to hold the position that the use of CO monitors for smoke detectors in the conveyor belt entry is sufficient protection for miners in the sections using belt air to ventilate the face. The MWA, on the other hand, believes the use of CO monitors and smoke detectors should be utilized in these entries to maximize the protection miners receive. The available technology and new technology driven by such a requirement would ensure state-of-the-art fire detection systems. The union also abuse entries in common, but with the conveyor belt entry is an area that requires special attention. The MWA has often argued that the safety method of controlling the hazards associated with the belt entry is to have it isolated from all others. This position has not changed. However, the agency has approved mining plans that allows for multiple entries in common with the conveyor belt entry. Because of that the union believes carbon monoxide monitors and smoke detectors should be required in each of these entries at intervals no greater than those in the conveyor belt entry. Entries in common with the conveyor belt entry should be deemed part of the coal-hauling system and protections should be applied as if they were. Number eight, MSHA should consider requiring improvements to or replacement of point-type heat sensors. Much has been accomplished through various research efforts by Labor, industry and government. These efforts have been extremely beneficial in improving fire detection and monitoring. There is no need at this point in time for any operation to be using point-type heat sensors. Because of these advances the union believes all mines should be equipped with CO monitoring systems and smoke detectors regardless of the use of belt air to ventilate working areas. As stated previously, such systems should be required in all entries that are in common with conveyor belt entries. Number nine, where belt air is directed outside from the section, water lines should be relocated from the belt to a separate intake entry to facilitate firefighting activities. The recommendation offered here is not germane to the subject. Belt air traveling outside cannot be used to ventilate working faces in a mine. However, the need to protect the integrity of firefighting equipment, including water lines, is important. This is true regardless of the direction of the air flow. Mining designs and plans should be reviewed to ensure this equipment is placed in locations that will ensure their availability and immediate access in the event they are needed. Number ten, further research should be conducted to evaluate the impact of variable velocities on underground mine firefighting and to provide information on the growth and spread of mine fires involving materials other than conveyor belts. The MWA supports further evaluation of firefighting in underground mining. The union does not see this as a subject that should be limited to the implementation of any particular rule. A better understanding of the hazards that may be encountered during such operations would benefit miners and the operators. The belt entry ventilation review report is no more relevant today than it was when it was first published in July of 1989. The belt entry ventilation review report contains nothing new that would convince the MWA that there would be any reason to recognize its validity today. The union's position that the committee assigned to conduct this review did nothing more than condone the position the agency has taken as being based on sound judgment. A narrowly focused, incomplete, misleading report that did not support its own conclusions, does not mature and become better with age. It is, as it was when it was first introduced, an irrelevant document that should not be the basis for formulating any changes in mine health and safety standards. The union strenuously objects to the agency dragging this document off of the shelf after all these years and billing it as more than what the facts show it to be. Implementation of a rule based on the belt entry ventilation review report, in my opinion, would result in the diminution of miners health and safety. In closing, let us not forget the mine for our problems which have occurred, not only this year, but last year, PB No. 8, 84 mine. And let us not dare forget the leverage mine, which is still on fire and burning as we speak here today. In addition, last year in April the Blue Diamond mine and in September the Fairfax mine. These fires alone should lend validity to the vital importance of abolishing this proposed rule and require you to go back to the drawing board to rewrite the proposed rule. Let's find out all we can about these disasters before we implement something we all will not be able to live with. Thank you for your attention and your patience. If you have any questions, I'll try to respond. MR. SEXAUER: Joe, you covered a lot of ground. Those were very thoughtful comments. We appreciate them. Does anyone on the panel here have a question? I just have a couple. You reference a NIOSH document. Could you provide us a cite for that reference. MR. URBAN: I don't have it with me, Ed, but we'll get that on the record. We'll send that in to you. MR. SEXAUER: Okay, in your discussion of petitions for modification, each petition is unique for a particular mine. I'd be interested about, perhaps, a criteria you might use when looking at these petitions in determining which provisions should be extracted and applied to this rulemaking, assuming this rulemaking is going forward. MR. URBAN: Ed, we have some people that are going to give you some specifics from the PDOs that they have at their operations. They will give you some insight as to some of the areas that we feel need to be address. MR. SEXAUER: Okay, thank you. Our next speaker is Butch Oldham. MR. OLDHAM: My name is Edgar Butch Oldham, O-L-D-H-A-M, Jr. And first I'd like to take the opportunity to thank the panel for sitting and listening to us and taking our comments. And hopefully, and I'm sure you will, take them serious, because there are some things in this rulemaking that we don't agree with and don't feel like it goes far enough. So, at least, I appreciate the opportunity. And as Joe mentioned, I'm going to talk a little bit about some specific petitions for modifications that I have in my area. Things that we've negotiated through the petition process that we feel is really going to be a loss and a safety factor for the guys if this rule goes through as proposed. Because like the rule says, all petitions will be eliminated once this has went through the process and is passed. So like I said, I want to talk a little bit about these. One of them is at the Camp 11 mine where we have a belt air petition. That mine has been shut down now, but at least we had the petition there. It was active and some of these are the things that were negotiated in the petition. As I understand the rulemaking, you know, you're sticking with 10 and 15 parts per million for the alert and alarm levels. At the Camp 11 mine, we had our levels set at 2 parts per million over ambient for the alert. So we had a lower setting that worked. We had provisions in that petition that allowed for the diesel equipment, the time delays and such. So we had something better than what you're proposing at that mine through the petition process. Also, intake entry, the primary intake escape entry had to be maintained at a higher pressure over any other entry that was common with it, I mean, the other entries, the neutral entries and the belt entry. And in that petition it had to be at least 10 percent higher in the primary intake escapeway to keep it pressurized so we wouldn't get smoke or hopefully wouldn't get smoke into the primary intake escape. Also, it's stated in our petition that the intake escape entries had to be maintained free of fire hazards, you know, to the extent practical. You know, you've got to have pumps and things in there that's necessary, but any unnecessary stuff just couldn't be allowed in the intake escapeway. One thing that Joe talked about is training requirements. And I also sit on the mining board for the State of Kentucky and that has been a concern of ours. In Kentucky, instead of the 8 hours, we've got the 16 hours of annual retraining, but still, we look at things that the agency puts on every time a petition is approved, every time a new rule is approved, we say, include it in the training program. But there is never any additional time allotted. So if you've got a full-rounded training program now and you're teaching everything you're suppose to in your 16 hours with Kentucky or 8 anywhere else, then what do you take away to provide the training that's required for these petitions and for the new rules. So that's something we've got to look at. Like I've always said, if we have a full-rounded program, then we're taking away from something. Because if it was necessary to talk about in the annual retraining and felt like people needed that training, then what part do you take away? Do you take first aid away and don't teach it to get the other parts in or what do you take away? I'm having a hard time figuring that out because I don't know. CO sensor location. That's one I don't want to talk about, all right. The use of time delays, like I said, we had that. It was the three-minute time delay at the Camp 11 mine because they did have multiple pieces of diesel equipment there. So to avoid any nuisance alarms and things, we had the three-minute time delay in that petition. Also, I don't read anything in the proposed rule that limits the amount of air that can be used in the belt entry. At the Camp 11 mine, of course, the velocity had to be at least 50-foot a minute in the belt entry, but no more than 500-foot measured over any 500-foot distance. So there's something that I guess you're going to be able to put unlimited velocities in the belt entries. There's nothing in the rulemaking that prohibits that as a continuation of the belt conveyor halter system and the belt takeup and belt conveyor tail piece on the same split of air. They had one CO sensor to be used at this location, but they had requirements. They had to be installed near the center and in the upper right third of the entry at least 25 feet down wind, not more than 100 feet in by the drive belt, the belt takeup and the tail piece on the same belt. I don't read that in the proposal that there's any requirement that makes them do anything. If an alarm occurs at shift change, it was in their petition no one was permitted in the mine except qualified persons designated to investigate the source of the alarm. Also, in the proposed rule, the designated surface location, an AMS operator. And I know it allows the AMS operator to designate a surface location at the mine. What was a little bit of a concern to me in the proposed rule, you've got "or another location." We don't know where that location is. Could that be off mine property in another city? You know, we find that's a problem because then if you have a mine fire, have a storm or something, phone lines -- that's what we're relying on is the phone system to contact those people -- and you have the mine fire in a mine and that person can't warn them, you know, they need to be at that mine. That location needs to be at the mine where they're monitoring those systems. Those are the ones at Camp 11. Another one is the Ohio 11 mine. Where we had a belt fire there and I helped investigate that. As a matter of fact, I helped assist with the firefighting efforts. And the CO system in what you presently have is not necessarily anything designated to exactly where they have to put a sensor where there's smoke tests have to be done to make sure that, that sensor is going to pick up all the air that's in that belt entry. MR. SEXAUER: Excuse me, just so I understand this correctly. The Ohio 11 mine there was belt fire, was that before or after you had a petition in place? MR. OLDHAM: It was during. They had a petition in place at the time. MR. SEXAUER: Okay. MR. OLDHAM: That's what I'm going to speak on because it was just right out by a header. And during that fire, the sensor and the header never picked it up because we had common entries with the belt entry and had fresh air coming in from the roadway into the header and the sensor was hanging on a post, on the backside of a post. It never picked up the fire. The sensor a thousand feet away picked it up. So you know, there was no requirement in that petition that said where you had to put it, if a smoke test had to be done to determine the direction of the air or exactly where to put it. And everybody felt so comfortable that the CO sensor was so great that they could just hang it on a post and it would pick it up, but it didn't. After the fire, and we could get in there, we moved that sensor two feet, pick it up -- it was hanging off the post, moved it two feet and it started picking it up. So that's how critical sensor location is. And you know, we learned a valuable lesson in that fire because we should have had early warning detection, but we didn't because of that. Also, in the petition for the Ohio 11 mine, the administrator controls or required to minimum the number and types of pieces of diesel equipment in the mine and to notify miners on the working sections when any diesel equipment was operating in those air currents, affecting the sections being ventilated with the belt air. And that was because of the nuisance alarms and we didn't have the three-minute time delay in that petition because that was an older petition. We've learned as we went through time. It's in the proposed rule that in the petition also the concentrations of aspirable dust and intake air forced through the belt entry couldn't exceed 1 milligram per cubit meter. And also, in the Ohio 11 petition, the operator was required at all time in the sections of the mine to maintain a higher air pressure in its primary intake escapeways over that maintained and adjacent entries. And at Ohio 11, we had 150-foot per minute ceiling on the air flow levels in the belt entry in working sections. So 150-feet per minute was all they were allowed to have in that petition on the sections. The most recent petition that we just had approved was the Highland 9 mine. It was the Peabody mine. In that petition, sensors were required to be installed 50 and 100 feet downwind of each belt drive takeup and at each tail piece and that intervals not to exceed 1000 feet. The CO system is required and shall activate alert and alarms signals at a location on the surface on the mine. It doesn't say "or another location." It's at the mine when miners are underground. Ambient levels in that petition can be anywhere from 2 to 10 parts per million, not the 10 and 15 parts per million that's proposed. It's depending on the quantity of air in the belt entry. This makes sense. The higher the quantity of air, the lower the setting on the alert and alarm levels. And they've got a table in that petition, depending on the amount of air that you have in an entry. And if it's more, then the alarm and alert levels go down. And you know, that makes sense to me. Also, the petition allows for a study to be conducted where two or more entries are common. So it recognizes the common entries with the belt entry regarding the effects of diffusion and/or dilution of CO to determine appropriate alert and alarm levels. Until the study is complete and the Board has finalized air quantities in the belt and common entries, shall not exceed 134,000 cfm. Once the study is complete and the CO alert and alarm and ambient levels are determined, they shall be submitted to the district manager for verification and it shall be included in the ventilation plan. And I don't read anything in the proposed rule that allows anything like this to be put in a bid plan and for the district manager to be able to require it. The CO monitoring person and the responsible person designated at the mine are not the same. And the CO person is required to notify the responsible person on duty of any alert and alarms. It's in their petition. If the CO system become inoperative, a sufficient number of trained persons shall patrol and monitor the affected entries so that they are traveled once each hour in their entirety. Primary escapeways shall be protected during mine layout and design and areas of the mine developed after the effective date of the petition, the system shall be designed such that an air course containment of air, the conveyor belt, carries less than half of the air for section ventilation. And to the extent practical, the pressure differential shall be maintained from the primary escapeway to the belt entry. So even in that recent petition, they've seen that, you know, we've got to maintain our primary intake escapeway as smoke-free as possible. What I'd like to say is, how can the agency pass a rule that eliminates all the protections that miners presently have in their petitions that were negotiated between the miners, the miner's reps and the mining companies? This rule does not guarantee the same protections that currently exist and it doesn't allow for mine-specific situations that exist at their mining operations. I don't believe this is what Congress intended when it created the Mine Act and this rule lessens the benefits miners currently enjoy. This rule is not in the best interest of working miners and should be repealed. I appreciate it. MR. SEXAUER: Butch, thank you, those are helpful comments. Just for the record, could you tell us approximately when these petitioners were granted. Do you recall? MR. OLDHAM: Well, the Highland mine, I know it was just approved in March of this year. The Camp 11, it's been several years. I'd have to look it up. I think about '93 for the Camp 11 mine. The Ohio 11 is about -- I want to say somewhere around 1990, but I'd have to look to be positive. MR. SEXAUER: Does anyone else have a question? MR. FRANCORT: Yes, Butch, Bill Francort. Just to clarify a couple of points you made. On the Camp 11 petition, you mentioned that you maintain a higher pressure in the primary escapeway because you have a 10 percent higher pressure or quantity pressure? MR. OLDHAM: Pressure. MR. FRANCORT: It's a 10-percent pressure required in the petition? MR. OLDHAM: Yes, sir. MR. FRANCORT: And on the Ohio 11 fire, except for the sensor being mispositioned, did you find that the system performed effectively? MR. OLDHAM: Yes, but like I said, you know, like we all say in mine fire, time is of the essence. So if that sensor had been required, you know, to have a test and be placed in the right position and had a smoke test done. You know, something as simple as a smoke test to know where the air was going, it would have been several minutes earlier. But, yes, the sensor did pick it up. MR. FRANCORT: And do you have a report that MWA did on the Ohio 11 fire? MR. OLDHAM: Yes. MR. FRANCORT: Could you provide this for us? MR. OLDHAM: I'll try and find it. MR. FRANCORT: One last question on the Highland mine. I think you said the ambient was 2 to 10 parts per million. You meant the alert arm levels? MR. OLDHAM: Yeah, the ambient was set at zero at that mine because it's a new mine and it hadn't been really determined yet. So it was set at zero until a study could be done to determine exactly what the ambient was. MR. FRANCORT: Thank you. MR. SEXAUER: Anyone else? Okay, thank you, Butch. The next speaker will be Tom Sweeten. MR. SWEETEN: Good morning, my name is Tom Sweeten, S-W-E-E-T-E-N. I'm a representative of miners for Local Union 1545, District 12 of Southern Illinois. I had some comments. I'm going to read from two or three different things here and I have some personal comments I'd also like to make. We want to strongly disagree with doing away with the petition process under 101(C) in regard to use of belt air in our nation's mines. I would like to hear comments in regard to this proposed rule. The UMWA has never fully endorsed the recommendations offered by the belt air advisory committee. The union believes that their report should be the starting point for discussions on what additional health and safety protections may be necessary to mitigate the hazards introduced in the use of belt air. The report of the advisory committee, coupled with the 90 petitions which you mention in your preamble, I believe that should be used as a basis for the formation or formulation of these laws in this new rule. As I said before, we don't wholeheartedly endorse the committee, but we do think that they did have some good ideas and they had some good recommendations in there. The advisory committee offered 12 recommendations to the agency to consideration for the use of belt air to ventilate the working areas. I would like to address some of these. The agency and the advisory committee agree on the use of field monitors or smoke detectors. I and the union would feel that, that should be monitoring and detection systems should be used. In addition, I would like to also, or we would like to also point out that we feel that the methane should also be monitored because most of the mines that is going to be using the belt air will be longwall mines. They mine on the solid or in Consolidation Coal Company's case, their belt line is on the solid, there is a great increase of deliberation of methane. That would push it into the face area of the mine. The higher your velocity, the quicker the methane will get there. In cases of our mine, Highland mine, it hasn't been diluted. We still have higher methane levels up to 1 percent higher at the face when we have a big proliferation of methane outlay on the belt line. In the responsible person, which has been hit on by Mr. Urban, he's in charge of monitoring the safety of the coal mine, monitoring all of the system. I believe he should receive more training than just what was required under Part 48. The responsible person could even be off the mine property, as was mentioned by Mr. Oldham. According the proposed rule, he could be in an office somewhere just monitoring equipment and he doesn't even have to be an employee of the mine. He could be from a vendor, such as Burns Detective Agency. And for a mine, for a little while, Mr. Eslinger will probably remember, we had Burns guards monitoring our equipment that had no idea whatsoever how that coal mine was laid out or who they would call. All they knew how to do was to hit delete on that computer so the alarm would stop. They had no idea what was going on with that. It's things like this that we need to take from petitions to ensure that doesn't happened. They need to be trained because as it stands now and as the rule, as I read it, if you had a certain person worked today that worked for Burns, he might quit in two or three weeks and they'll replace him with another and all they do is show them how to use the computer and that was it. That was in my case and I've talked to other people that had the same problem with this application of monitoring these systems. I feel that the alarm and alert level, and it's been mentioned before, should not be set at a specific level, such as 5 parts or 10 parts or 15 for your alarm and alert because your ambient level is different at each mine according to your diesel application and how it's used. The location of sensors in the belt entry is a matter of debate, based on the agency's writing the proposed rule. The committee stipulates sensors should be located not further than 1000-foot intervals in the belt area. However, the proposed rule leaves that requirement up to interpretation. The agency has stated that if the belt drives takeup and/or tail pieces are installed together in the same air course, they maybe monitored with one sensor located not more than 100 feet downwind of the last component. The union must ask if the agency's intent is to allow a single sensor to be viewed as an adequate protection when a belt is in a single split of air or as it would have to be without regard to the length of the belt in question? That being, the language is sufficient vague to allow several conveyor belts in the section to be monitored with a single sensor provided they're on the same split of air. This is extremely dangerous and certainly not the intent of the advisory committee. The agency must immediately take steps in the rule to determine this problem. I have some other comments that might be covered under the 12 points or they might not be as what I feel should be entered into these rules. You should have a maximum velocity set. As it stands now, you could have 150,000, 200,000 cfm going down your belt line, which I don't think anybody would disagree that's going to cause more dust to get down there in case you would have an ignition or something or smoke and fire is going to get to the face quicker. In the case of Jim Walter No. 5 mine, which I was down there, they have to have so much tremendous velocity going down their belt lines because they fishtail and they have to use the belt line for one intake air down. They have a petition, but it's covered under that. But even on the driving sections, they have to run and mark probably at least -- when I was down there, they counted it. They have to have at least, oh, let's say, 60,000 on their faces at sometimes. It might not be statutory, but just to keep the methane from igniting when they're using the grip holder or when they're using the miners. There should also be a more comprehensive firefighting evacuation plan. The last time I was here in this very room, sat in this same chair, we met on the firefighting evacuation plan and as far as know, that hasn't been enacted yet. If the belt entry is going to be used as an escapeway, there should be life lines in there. As we saw at Jim Walter, the rigid belt structure was null and void. I mean, if you had to use that to get out because of the heat or the explosion, there was no way in the world you could use that belt because it was destroyed completely. You life line would be more flexible and give you a better chance of getting out of there. Of course, I agree with life lines in all escapeways, whether it's return intake or anything. I feel we should have life lines. In the case of an alarm and alert, you should have two forms of communication independent of each other. You should have, of course, your line phone for the responsible person on the surface to get a hold of whoever is below that would evacuate the line. But in case your line phone breaks down, you need something like your pad system, your leaky feeder system or something like that. And here's the point I've been arguing before this came out, and especially when there's belt air now. But I've been on you because we've had belt air. You should have a regularly schedule PQ survey in a coal mine, whether it's every two years or every year or whatever, it should be set. In the case of our mine, and I hate to keep going back to that, but it's the only one I can speak of with any knowledge as all. The PQ survey, pressure quantity survey, was conducted by Consol for their own uses and they used probably 20 engineering students who had no underground experience, none whatsoever. And they would come and they would go and take a PQ and read certain pressures and certain qualities and Consol would draw up their PQ map, which had -- the first thing at our mine, their PQ survey was so far off -- it had no meaning whatsoever to do with the ventilation plan in our coal mine. The pressures were off so bad that we had a lot of our intake air was getting polluted by dirty air out of the return because the pressures were so bad. And I think the way you change the air and the pressures in the mine because it was drawing longwalls and if you're using belt air that you should have a periodic reading of that PQ. And I believe the federal law should do that. I want to thank you for the opportunity to comment on the proposed rule. I'd like to remind you all that the responsibility of mine safety and health administration is for the working coal miner. It's not for the union. It's not for the companies. It's not for themselves. It's for the working coal miners. The only reason we've all got jobs right now and I feel I have the responsibility of the miner, also. Again, I appreciate you guys letting me speak. If you have any questions, I'll be glad to answer them. MR. SEXAUER: Tom, thank you. Anyone have a question? MR. FRANCORT: Tom, one question. At the mine that has the security guards monitoring the system, had they ever detected fires, or did the system ever detect fires that weren't responded to properly because they didn't have proper training? MR. SWEETEN: The instance that brought this to our attention about the security guards, it wasn't a fire. It was an alarm where the system had gone down. And you could see that where all he did was he would hit his delete button or whatever it was to shut the alarm off. He never notified anybody. The system was down, and I could be corrected on this by Mr. Eslinger, I believe for 14 hours. It's in a report that we had and I understand he's got quite a few mines where that did happen. What we did get out of that was they would use the same guards and then they started using their own people, who were supplied people monitoring that. They never did it when we were in the mining production status. They were doing it when we were in idle status and that was before we went on weekend schedule, but we had people in the mine. And again, this was brought to us not because of an incident. It was because there was an interruption of the system and the mine was unprotected for so many hours. I can't be specific on that. MR. FRANCORT: So normally security guards don't monitor the system when people are working underground, is that what you mean? MR. SWEETEN: After the Local and MSHA got done with them, they don't ever do it at our place anymore. But they did before this came and they had. We weren't aware of it. They sat a different, complete part of the mine. We didn't know the security people were doing this, the guards. MR. FRANCORT: Thank you. MR. SEXAUER: I've received a couple of notes here from my panel. I think it's time for a break. So we'll go off the record. We'll come back in about 10 minutes. (Whereupon, a short recess was taken.) MR. SEXAUER: Okay, I would like for Butch Oldham to come back up to the microphone, please. MR. OLDHAM: Okay, yes. MR. SEXAUER: Butch, you indicated you had some updated information. MR. OLDHAM: Yes, I was just a little bit off on my date, but it's like my memory, it's a little short sometimes. We have the PDO for the Highland mine. I received it on January 30, 2003. And the agreement that we worked out with Peabody at Camp 11, I had it March 14th of 1994. So that was the two dates that was a little different than what I gave you. MR. SEXAUER: Thank you. MR. OLDHAM: I appreciate it. MR. SEXAUER: Our next speaker is Dan Spinnie? MR. SPINNIE: I am Dan Spinnie, S-P-I-N-N-I-E. I am chairman of the safety committee of Local 2161, Coulterville, Illinois. MR. SEXAUER: I'm sorry, the location again? MS. SPINNIE: C-O-U-L-T-E-R-V-I-L-L-E. I just have a few brief comments. On this belt air you've got a lot of petitions out there and they're mine-for-mine specific and as I recall -- don't hold me to this date, but in 1997 the mine where I worked at, along with me and Joe Urban and management, we wrote a belt air petition in '97, which we haven't used yet. It's in place. And in this petition we have a lot of the same things in it that's comparable to what Joe testified to and I think this is a good thing because each mine is different. Actually, I'm not in favor of belt air petitions, but if you have to do it, I think you have to do it where it works best for your location that way you can put the safeguards in place for your specific mine. But like I say, we haven't used it as of yet, and hopefully, we don't. But we have these safeguards in place if we do have to use it. That's really all I'd like to say on the issue at this time. If you'd I would submit my petition that we did do in 1997 for the record. I'll fax it to you. MR. SEXAUER: Okay, that'll be great. Thank you very much. Any questions? Dan, what mine do you work in? MR. SPINNIE: Ziggler No. 11. MR. SEXAUER: Okay, thank you. Our next speaker is Greg Mayhan. MR. MAYHAN: My name is Greg Mayhan, M-A-Y-H-A-N. I'm a representative of UMWA local in Taylorville, Illnois for 1969. I would like to thank everyone here today for allowing me to speak here. I'm here today to voice my opinion and to oppose the agency, the government's proposal to change underground mine coal mine ventilation safety standards for use of a belt entry as an intake air course to ventilate working sections in areas mechanized mining equipment is being installed or removed. A draft letter from the international union stated we will offer evidence that the new rule, which has been done, as currently written significantly reduces the safety and protection miners currently enjoy. If you, the agency, allow these changes, you are without a doubt putting disaster at the top of the list in the coal fields of America. You're probably sitting there thinking how does this long-haired, freaky person know anything about using belt air as intake air? Well, not a darn thing, but I do know about air on the belt line, substantial air on the belt line. I work in it every day. Volumes of air that not only blow your mind, but blow your hard hat of your head when you have to go under an overcast. How much you say? Well, a federal inspector had to use a high-speed axometer, and at that time it was over 75,000 cubic feet a minute. Now that is before the company changed from a 1000 horsepower motor to the 2000 horsepower motor of the fan. And yes, the travel weigh was over 100,000 cubic feet a minute. If and when an ignition would ever occur, an explosion at the face, everyone in my mind without a doubt would not exist, depending on where the belt fire would be. More likely, anyone out by the fire would be at high risk, because we have a blowing ventilation system. The agency now contends that this is not a problem. They're more than right because it's a total disregard for miner's safety. The agency should be cited with negligence, for total disregard for their safety. That they're proposal is inaccurate. The Constitution of this great land states "We the People" are to be the ones who decide how the government is to be governed, and in doing so, as part of the government, we the people of the United Mine Workers of America, and by the way, gentlemen and lady, from my great state of Illinois is why your agency was formed, to protect and serve the mine workers of this country," John L. Lewis. The agency is protecting and making it easier, not only for coal companies from an economic standpoint, but also in every respect and framework in this country to get a hold. I am making a challenge to the Mine Safety Administration to guarantee that from this forward that we are demanding what the laws were intended to do, provide protection for the mine workers. The agency must be held accountable. I thank you very much. MR. SEXAUER: Dennis Balm, please? MR. BALM: I pass. MR. SEXAUER: Nathan Grace? MR. GRACE: I pass as well. MR. SEXAUER: David Owen? MR. OWEN: I also pass. MR. SEXAUER; Okay, that comprises everyone on the speaker's list. Is there anyone else who would like to come up and speak? Any comments from the panel? Okay, if there are no other speakers, then this hearing is adjourned. (Whereupon, at 10:32 a.m., the hearing in the above-entitled matter was concluded.) // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE DOCKET NO.: None CASE TITLE: Underground Coal Mine Ventilation HEARING DATE: May 1, 2003 LOCATION: Lexington, Kentucky I hereby certify that the proceedings and evidence are contained fully and accurately on the tapes and notes reported by me at the hearing in the above case before the United States Department of Labor. Date: April 10, 2003 Laurie McClung Official Reporter Heritage Reporting Corporation Suite 600 1220 L Street, N. W. Washington, D. C. 20005-4018 ?? TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION Official Reporters 1220 L Street, N.W., Suite 600 Washington, D.C. 20005-4018 (202) 628-4888 hrc@concentric.net 50 Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 51 Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888