Skip to main content
U.S. flag

An official website of the United States government.

Final Report - Fatality #8 - May 26, 2010

Accident Report: Fatality Reference

Fatality Overview

MAI-2010-08

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
Metal and Nonmetal Mine Safety and Health 

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION 

Underground Metal Mine 
(Uranium) 

Fatal Fall of Rib Accident
May 26, 2010 

Reliance Resources, LLC.
Contractor ID No. M879
at
Pandora Comple
Denison Mines (USA) Corporation
La Sal, San Juan County, Utah
Mine ID No. 42-00470 

Investigators 

Melvin M. Lapin
Mine Safety & Health Inspector 

James G. Vadnal
Mining Engineer 

Kent L. Norton
Mine Safety & Health Specialist 

Originating Office 

Mine Safety and Health Administration
Rocky Mountain District
PO Bo 25367, DFC
Denver, CO 80225-0367
Richard Laufenberg, District Manager



 


 

OVERVIEW



Hunter L. Diehl, Miner 1, age 28, died on May 26, 2010, when a section of rib fell on him. He was manually scaling loose material from the rib when it fell. The material that fell was about 15 feet wide, 11 feet long, and 4 to 30 inches thick. 



The accident occurred because management policies, procedures, and controls were inadequate. The area was not eamined or tested by an eperienced person designated by the mine operator prior to work commencing in the affected area. Additionally, procedures to ensure that persons scale loose ground from a safe location were not adequate. 

 

GENERAL INFORMATION



Pandora Comple, an underground uranium/vanadium mine, operated by Denison Mines (USA) Corporation, is located in La Sal, San Juan County, Utah. The principal operating official wasRandy Marsing, project manager. 



Reliance Resources, LLC., located in Moab, Grand County, Utah, was contracted by Denison Mines (USA) Corporation, to operate a portion of the mine. The principal operating official was Michael Shumway, general supervisor. 



Uranium/vanadium bearing ore was drilled, blasted, and transported to an off-site mill where it was processed into vanadium and uranium oide concentrate, commonly referred to as yellow cake uranium. The finished products were sold to commercial industries and utilities. 

 

DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT



On the day of the accident, Hunter Diehl (victim), reported for work at 6:00 a.m., his normal starting time. He attended a safety meeting with 19 other miners. After the meeting Diehl, Thayn Shumway, leadman, Jessie Wickham, leadman, and Audren Adams, miner, traveled together into the mine in a small utility vehicle. 



About 6:35 a.m., they stopped near the water tank area. Wickham directed Diehl to drive a 7-ton haul truck to the left heading of the 4500 left section and begin inspecting and scaling the area as needed. Diehl went to the 4500 left section, parked the truck, and walked into the drift. A short time later a large section of the right rib fell and struck him. There were no witnesses to the accident. 



About 6:48 a.m., Chris Lawson, truck driver, was driving by the 4500 left heading when he noticed Diehl signal for help using his cap lamp. Lawson stopped and asked Diehl if he was okay. Diehl stated that he needed help. 



Lawson used a telephone in the area to contact the surface and summon for emergency medical services. Several miners arrived at the scene to assist and administer Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR). Emergency Medical Services arrived at the mine and transported Diehl to a local hospital where he was pronounced dead by the attending physician at 8:48 a.m. The cause of death was blunt force trauma. 

 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCIDENT



The Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) learned of the accident through the media. Michael Okuniewicz, supervisory mine safety & health inspector, contacted Jick Taylor, co-owner, at 11:10 a.m., on May 26, 2010, and an investigation was started the same day. A Part 50 order was issued to Reliance Resources, LLC., for untimely reporting. A Part 50 citation was issued to Denison Mines (USA) Corporation, for untimely reporting. An order was issued under the provisions of Section 103(j) of the Mine Act to ensure the safety of the miners. MSHA's accident investigation team traveled to the mine, conducted a physical inspection of the accident scene, interviewed employees, and reviewed conditions and procedures relevant to the accident. MSHA conducted the investigation with the assistance of mine and contractor management and employees and the San Juan County Sheriff's Office. 

 

DISCUSSION



Location of the Accident



The accident occurred in the entrance of the drift accessing the left heading of the 4500 left section of the mine. The face of the drift was approimately 51 feet from the victim's location. The drift was approimately 12 feet wide and 12 feet high. Two days before the accident, this area was scaled and cleaned up in preparation for driving a ventilation drift from this area to another section of the mine on the 5000 level. This area had been inactive during the previous 18 months. 



The day before the accident, the heading was drilled, blasted, manually scaled, and mucked out. The heading was then drilled and blasted again at end of the shift. A 92-inch long hand scaling bar was found near the victim. By the position of his scaling bar, it appeared that Diehl was located near the center of the section of rib that fell. Geology Mining at the Pandora Mine Comple began in the early 1970's. The underground portion of the comple was etensive, measuring approimately 1� miles long by � mile wide, and trended in an east-west direction. The mine was accessed through the Pandora decline slope. Mining was not systematic and mine headings were driven in various directions and followed the trends of the uranium/vanadium ore. 



The ore at the mine was composed of minerals deposited through secondary mineralization within sandstone units of the lower salt wash member of the Morrison formation. The ore appeared as dark bands and zones within the sandstone and was a well sorted medium to coarse grained sandstone that had been classified as a tabular fluvial deposit. Mining took place in the lower portion of the sandstone unit. Cover above the 4500 left section of the mine was about 400 to 450 feet. The mined sandstone had a distinct vertical joint set. Joints were naturally occurring fractures where there had been no lateral movement in the plane of the fracture of one side relative to the other. Joints generally occurred as sets, with each set consisting of joints roughly parallel to each other. Joint sets were formed when the rock layers were compressed and stretched as they were being uplifted. The mine's dominate joint set had a direction of approimately North 110 degrees East. The joints at the mine had a random spacing of several inches to several feet. Numerous closely spaced joints, between 3 and 8 inches apart, over a distance of 12 feet, were observed in the right rib at the intersection of 4500 left, center heading and 4500 left section, left heading (See Appendi D). These closely spaced joints were observed in the roof crossing the intersection and intersecting the mine rib between the left and center headings at what is commonly referred to as the point (or nose) of the intersection. These joints at the point of the intersection ran parallel to the left rib in the 4500 left section, left heading. The orientation of both the left heading and the closely spaced joint set contributed directly to the rib failure. 



Ground Support



At the time of the accident, the eisting ground support plan stated that ground support would be installed randomly, on an as needed basis, as determined by each worksite inspection. The types of ground support used included: steel sets, timbers, split set bolts, resin grouted bolts, steel mats, and reel lock fencing. The typical type of ground support used in the mine was 5 foot long split set bolts installed with 6-inch square plates. Ground support was not installed on the section of rib that fell. 



Training and Eperience



Hunter L. Diehl had 10 weeks of mining eperience, all at this mine, and had been trained in accordance with 30 CFR Part 48. 

 

ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS



A root cause analysis was conducted and the following root causes were identified. 



Root Cause: Management policies, procedures, and controls failed to ensure that eperienced persons, eamined and tested for loose ground in areas prior to work commencing. 



Corrective Action: Management amended the written work procedures to ensure that eperienced persons test for loose ground in areas prior to work commencing. The miners received additional training regarding eamining and testing for loose ground. 



Root Cause: Management policies, procedures, and controls failed to ensure that scaling of loose ground was performed from a safe location. 



Corrective Action: Management amended the written work procedures to ensure that persons engaged in the scaling of loose ground perform the task from a safe location. The miners have received additional training regarding proper manual scaling methods. 

 

CONCLUSION



The accident occurred because management, policies, procedures, and controls were inadequate. The area was not eamined or tested by an eperienced person designated by the mine operator prior to work commencing in the affected area. Additionally, procedures to ensure that persons scale loose ground from a safe location were not adequate. 

 

ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS



Issued to Reliance Resources, LLC. Order No. 6580467 was issued on May 26, 2010, under the provisions of Section 103(j) of the Mine Act: 

  • A fatal accident occurred at this operation on May 26, 2010, at about 6:30 a.m. As rescue and recovery work is necessary, this order is being issued, under Section 103(j) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, to ensure the safety of all persons at this operation. This order is also being issued to prevent the destruction of any evidence which would assist in investigating the cause or causes of the accident. It prohibits all activity at Reliance Resource's portion of the Pandora Comple mine, ecept to the etent necessary to rescue an individual or prevent or eliminate an imminent danger, until MSHA has determined that it is safe to resume normal mining operations in this area. This order applies to all persons engaged in the rescue and recovery operation and any other persons onsite. This order was initially issued orally to the mine operator at 11:10 a.m. 
    This order was subsequently modified to Section 103(k) and was terminated on July 13, 2010. Conditions that contributed to the accident no longer eist. 

    Citation No. 6459286 was issued on June 30, 2010, under the provisions of Section 104(d)(1) of the Mine Act for a violation of 30 CFR 57.3401: 

    • A fatal accident occurred at this operation on May 26, 2010, when a miner with 10 weeks total mining eperience was struck by falling debris from a rib near the entrance of the left heading of the 4500 left section. A person eperienced in eamining and testing for loose ground designated by the mine operator had not made an examination of the area before the miner entered the area. The lead man engaged in aggravated conduct constituting more that ordinary negligence, in that, he had instructed the miner to enter the area before he made his examination of the area. This is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard. 
      The citation was terminated on July 14, 2010. Management amended the written work procedures to ensure that only eperienced persons test for loose ground in areas prior to work commencing. All miners received additional training regarding eamining and testing for loose ground. 

      Citation No. 6459287 was issued on June 30, 2010, under the provisions of Section 104(a) of the Mine Act for a violation of 30 CFR 57.3201: 

      • A fatal accident occurred at this operation on May 26, 2010, when a new miner with 10 weeks of total mining eperience was struck by falling material when a section of the right rib fell while he was hand scaling the roof and rib in the entrance of the left heading of the 4500 left section of the mine. The scaling was not performed from a location which would not epose him to injury from falling material as required, nor was other protection from falling material provided. 
        The citation was terminated on July 14, 2010. Management amended the written work procedures to ensure that persons engaged in the scaling of loose ground perform the task from a safe location. All miners received additional training regarding proper manual scaling methods. 
         
         
        APPENDIX A

        Persons Participating in the Investigation 

        Denison Mines (USA) Corp.

        • Phillip Buck .......... . Vice President, Mining Reliance Resources, LLC
        • Jeff Mogensen .......... Mine Manager/Co-Owner
          Jick Taylor .......... Co-Owner
          Jerry Cowan .......... Co-Owner
          Michael Shumway .......... Co-Owner/General Supervisor San Juan County Sheriff's Office
        • Adam Young ..Deputy Coroner Mine Safety and Health Administration
        • Melvin M. Lapin .......... .Mine Safety & Health Inspector
          James G. Vadnal .......... Mining Engineer
          Kent L. Norton. .......... Mine Safety & Health Specialist