Petition Docket No. M-2022-13-M

2/21/24
In the Matter of    Petition for Modification
Genesis Alkali LLC
Genesis Alkali @ Westvaco Mine
Mine I.D. No. 48-00152    Docket No. M-2022-13-M

PROPOSED DECISION AND ORDER

On November 1, 2022, Genesis Alkali LLC filed a petition seeking a modification of the application of 30 C.F.R. § 57.22305 to petitioner's Genesis Alkali @ Westvaco Mine located in Green River, Wyoming. The petitioner alleges that the alternative method outlined in the petition, operating a submersible mine pump in a flooded area of the underground mine, will at all times guarantee no less than the same measure of protection afforded by the standard.

The petitioned standard, 30 Code of Federal Regulations (30 C.F.R.) § 57.22305, states,

Equipment used in or beyond the last open crosscut and equipment used in areas where methane may enter the air current, such as pillar recovery workings, longwall faces and shortwall faces, shall be approved by MSHA under the applicable requirements of 30 CFR parts 18 through 36. Equipment shall not be operated in atmospheres containing
1.0 percent or more methane.

Petitioner is requesting a modification of the standard for approved equipment in Class III mines to allow the use of an extraction submersible pump (ESP) in an area of the mine site where methane may be present. The petitioner owns and operates the Westvaco mine, a Class III underground trona [soda ash] mine. Since 1988 underground tailings disposal and secondary recovery have been part of the mining operation. There are sections of mine workings that are flooded with water/tailings and considered abandoned. This area is no longer ventilated and is marked inaccessible, and access to this area is barricaded. The tailings dewater in the mine and the water soluble trona left by the primary room and pillar mining method enriches the trona content in the solution. The solution is pumped to the surface where the trona is recovered from these areas.

PETITION FOR MODIFICATION 
This Alternate Method is submitted by Genesis Alkali LLC, Petitioner on behalf of its Westvaco Mine (MSHA ID Number 48-00152) ("Westvaco") pursuant to 30 CFR §44.10 et seq., and Section 101(c) of the Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §81 l(c) ("Act"). Petitioner seeks relief from the application of 30 C.F.R. §57.22305 ("Standard") as applied to Westvaco.

Background and Overview 
Westvaco is an underground trona mine in south central Wyoming. Since 1988, underground tailings disposal and secondary resource recovery have been part of the mining operation. These are areas of the mine that have no further production plans and have been abandoned and flooded with water through in mine pumping and from slurry tailings generated by the mineral preparation process that are injected into the mine through surface injection holes.
Neither the filing of this Petition nor any of its contents constitutes an admission that Petitioner is in violation of any MSHA standard, nor does the Petitioner admit that MSHA has jurisdiction over the proposed activity. Petitioner reserves its right to contest any allegation that this activity is within MSHA 's jurisdiction, or that there is an MSHA standard applicable to the proposed condition.

Genesis Alkali LLC plans to install extraction non-permissible, submersible pumps ("ESP") through well-bores drilled and installed from the surface to access this trona-bearing solution contained in abandoned areas of the mine. The pumps will be located strategically in the mine based on the mining process and topography to ensure a large pool of water can be gathered in an abandoned area of the mine. The well-bores will be drilled such that the pump intake and electrical motors always remain below the mine floor and under water. Further, the ESP's design ensures that electrical components will always be submerged below the low water level or contained in a solid inner casing that is submerged below the low water level, preventing their exposure to air currents, or the mine atmosphere ("mine atmosphere").

STANDARD BEING MODIFIED
In this Petition, Genesis Alkali LLC requests a variance from application of the mandatory safety standard 30 CFR §57.22305, Approved equipment (III mines), states:
Equipment used in or beyond the last open crosscut and equipment used in areas where methane may enter the air current, such as pillar recovery workings, longwall faces and shortwall faces, shall be approved by MSHA under applicable requirements of 30 CFR Parts 18 through 36.
Equipment shall not be operated in atmospheres containing 1.0 percent or more methane.

Genesis Alkali LLC submits this Petition, further elaborating on its method of compliance with 30 CFR §57.22305, and the improved safety this method provides, and the diminution in safety that would be created by having to maintain abandoned areas as accessible to inspect and maintain permissible pumps.

DISCUSSION
As a Class III underground mine, "equipment used in or beyond the last open crosscut and equipment used in areas where methane may enter the air current" must be approved by MSHA under 30 CFR Parts 18 through 36. See 30 CFR §57.22305 (emphasis added).

Denial of the Petition Could Result in A Diminution of Safety.
If Genesis Alkali LLC is forced to undertake an alternative extraction method for the trona solution, the non-autonomous method will likely require miners to be involved in the extraction. Generally, it is axiomatic that the presence of miners underground is less safe than an autonomous operation that only requires miners on the surface. Autonomous extraction enables Genesis Alkali LLC to have miners involved in processing activities on the surface instead of extraction activities underground.

ALTERNATE METHOD
Genesis Alkali LLC Alkali submits this Alternate Method to support its use of non-permissible extraction submersible high-voltage pumps at Westvaco. The use of the term ESP encompasses from the first mine property transformer connected to the incoming utility power to the pump motor connection point in the well-bore and all electrical equipment in between. The Alternate Method contains terms and conditions under which any ESP would operate addressing the following design, installation, and operational processes: well-bore location, design, and construction to completely isolate the electrical systems from the mine atmosphere.
Electrical equipment including power cable, pump and motor specifications, transformers, water level monitoring device, grounding resistance system, ground relay, ground fault monitoring that are all isolated from mine atmosphere.

Isolation of the Electrical Equipment from the Mine Atmosphere
Isolation from Mine Atmosphere Using an Inner (Non-Perforated) Casing and an Outer Casing (Perforated)
The mine map contained in Exhibit 3 shows the location in the Westvaco mine of the proposed well-bore, the EW5 sump, and the ESP. This area of the Westvaco mine has been isolated and abandoned since the last conventional mining in the mid-1980's as designated by the green hashed area. This area has purposely been inundated with water and tailings slurry so that at some point secondary solution mining could be used to recover additional trona remaining after conventional mining. The topography of this isolated and abandoned mine area allows water levels to "roof-out" against the top of the mine roof at certain elevations isolating areas of the abandoned area with water barriers from the active workings. The mine map shows the water levels at various elevations with the water roofed-out at 4,775 feet above sea level with the mine floor at 4,765 feet above sea level.

The electrical equipment will be isolated from mine atmosphere by deploying a dual threaded inner casing that will extend below the low water level in the well-bore and thus provide a water seal to isolate the pump, pump motor, and power cable including the pigtail from the power cable

to the motor connection. This will ensure that all electrical equipment will be isolated from mine atmosphere by water and the unperforated, solid metal inner casing. The larger outer casing will contain perforations that will allow the water to flow from the mine into the well bore sump and into the pump intake for pumping out of the mine. The low water level will be the mine floor and the inner case will extend below the mine floor depending on the depth of penetrations on the 16" outer casing.

Exhibit 4, Extraction Well - Well Profile

Low Water Level Monitoring System Using Redundant Sensors

To ensure inner casing remains below the low water level at the mine floor level, a water level monitoring system consisting of two (2) redundant fiber optic pressure sensors with a low level alarm and interlock system which will shut down the pump motor in the event of “low" water level inside the well. These fiber optic sensors are intrinsically safe and are designed to withstand harsh environments as shown in the information provided by the manufacturer. These water level sensors measure pressure of the water column and convert to an elevation and thus will be able to determine the low water level which is above the pump before the pump motor is started. Thus, the low water level interlock system in each identical/redundant sensor will be set to the mine floor elevation (above the pump) and will trigger an alarm and automatically shut down the pump if the water level drops to that level, or if the discrepancy between the readings for each sensor is greater than one (1) foot (e.g., 10% of the Low Water Level elevation above the sensors). The sensors will be located at least ten (10) feet below the Low Water Level and above the pump. The density of the mine water ranges up to 1.21 so the sensors will be calibrated using 1.21. If the actual density is less than 1.21, the low water level will be higher than the sensors read.

If either water level sensor starts to drift or fail exceeding preestablished thresholds, then an alarm will be triggered and automatically shut off power to the ESP. Also, if the sensors need to be removed for any purpose, a workplace exam will be conducted, and the sensors will be slowly extracted from the conduit in the well-bore and stored on a reel. Then these water level sensors will be calibrated or replaced and reinstalled. A final water level will be determined upon installation and an "as built" well-profile will be created noting the location of the sensors.

Verification of Isolation Between the Inner Casing and Mine Atmosphere

All motor terminations and cable splices will be underwater and isolated from the mine atmosphere. To verify after installation that the inner casing is sealed/isolated from the mine atmosphere by water, this initial testing procedure will be followed.

1)    Measure initial static water level in inner casing with wireline.
2)    Set retrievable packer or other drillable plug at bottom of inner casing (13-3/8")
3)    Add water to inner casing to approximately 10 feet above static water level or 10 feet above base of casing grout, whichever is higher. Since the casing is grouted to the surface there is no need to test the entire length of the casing but only test that portion that is below the grout line.
4)    Wait on water to degas to ensure no air entrapment.
5)    Confirm and measure water level with wireline.
6)    Rest 30 minutes and measure water level again
7)    If water level change is less than 0.02 feet, isolation is in place (the wireline precision is 0.01 feet).

If water level change is greater than or equal to 0.02 feet, further testing of well will be used to locate leak off point and testing procedure will be repeated until isolation is demonstrated.

Once the inner casing is shown to be sealed by water and the casing is competent, no further pressure readings will be taken. Also, because the water seal exists, there is no mandatory requirement to measure for methane at the pump motor since it will always be submerged in water completely isolated from the mine atmosphere.

All Electrical Equipment Will Remain Isolated from Mine Atmosphere in the Event of a Deflagration and/or Detonation in the Outer Casing of the Well Bore.

Genesis Alkali LLC has designed the ESP to ensure the complete isolation of the well-bore from the mine atmosphere by using a metal inner casing that can withstand the pressure pulse of a deflagration or detonation in the well-bore, and by extending this inner casing to a level below the low water level (mine floor) to ensure the water plug inside the inner casing of the well-bore never allows hot gasses to escape the well-bore.

The attached engineering report generated by ABS Consulting ("ABS Report") provides mathematical modeling results based on prior tests conducted by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health ("NIOSH") at the Lake Lynn Laboratory on the methane-air detonation and other references as set forth in the ABS Report. (Exhibit 5 ABS Consulting Report). The ABS Report addresses the following issues: (1) determine the likelihood of an event inside the well bore rupturing the inner casing, and (2) determine the length of the inner casing necessary to prevent the water plug from allowing hot gasses to contact the mine atmosphere.

The physical design of the ESP places the intake nozzle and the pump systems' electrical components below the low water level which is constantly monitored by permissible low water level shutoff sensor that is positioned at least ten (10) feet above the pump's intake nozzle. Also, an inner casing without perforations completely isolates the power cable from mine atmosphere and is also located to a depth below the low water level that will not allow any deflagration or detonation occurring in the well-bore to push the plug of water out of the well bore in a manner that exposes the abandoned area to hot gases. Also, the report points out that the viscosity of the water was not considered in this analysis which would be an additional opposing force to any deflagration or detonation. The low water level will be the mine floor and the inner case will extend below the mine floor depending on the depth of penetrations on the 16" outer casing. For instance, if Genesis Alkali LLC decides not to have perforations in the outer casing below the mine floor, then the inner casing length is 21 feet below the mine floor.

The internal inner casing will contain any explosive forces based on the peak pressure pulses as provided in the ABS Report and the strength of the metal casing. The pipe that will be used (J- 55 material) has a minimum yield strength of 55 ksi and minimum tensile strength of 75 ksi equating to the ultimate elastic pressure resistance for the pipe of about 3,030 psi. The peak internal transient pressure that will be generated by a deflagration or detonation is between 260 and 580 psi which is well within the capabilities of the well-bore pipe.

The result of this design ensures that the electrical components will always be submerged, preventing their exposure to the mine atmosphere. Because the non-permissible components will always be submerged or isolated by the inner casing, that liquid barrier ensures that non- permissible equipment is not used in areas where methane may enter the mine atmosphere.

Electrical Equipment/System Overview 

System Overview
The electrical system design for the ESP is an industry standard design and encompasses the process from the first transformer on mine property with incoming utility power to the pump motor connection. The incoming power from the utility provider (35KV) is stepped down to 480V. Then the 480V feeds a variable speed drive ("VFD") assembly which output is then connected to a step-up transformer to increase the voltage to 4160. This is then fed to the extraction well pump motor approximately 1,700 feet underground via a power cable adequate in design to power the ESP. Also, other control and protection elements are contained within the ESP that allows Genesis Alkali LLC to safely operate.

The ESP system that Genesis Alkali LLC is proposing is designed for the type of application contemplated by this Alternate Method. All electrical equipment contained in this Alternate Method will never be exposed to the mine atmosphere because of the complete isolation created by the water seal and the inner/outer casing combination. The pump motors are paired in series and have a distinct connection point that does not require a ground wire since the pump motors are continuously submerged under water during operation. In the event of a fault or short circuit at the pump motor, there is no (zero) chance of a miner receiving a shock at the pump motor because the miner cannot touch the pump motor due to its location, and no (zero) electrical current could be transferred to the surface equipment affecting a miner who may contact surface equipment. Also, the power cable used in this application must be spliced to a pigtail that uses a connector designed for this pump.

The regulation requires a Part 18 certified power cable (electrical equipment) where methane may enter the air current. Genesis Alkali LLC has established that the well-bore is isolated from the mine atmosphere by its configuration and location, thus a Part 18 power cable is not required. In active areas of the mine where a power cable may be exposed to methane, all the features of the Part 18 power cable are necessary. Genesis Alkali LLC has provided multiple layers of protection through the complete isolation of all electrical equipment from mine atmosphere, and the use of the most appropriate power cable for this pump as evidenced by the successful use for many decades without incident of a similar
ESP at Genesis Alkali LLC ' Granger mine as well as petitions that have been granted in the coal industry.

Electrical Equipment
The one-line electrical drawing reflects the design metrics of the ESP. (Exhibit 6) The drawing shows a square with several protection functions. This square depicts a microprocessor relay. This relay will have one trip circuit wired to the shunt trip of the main breaker. Within the relay, all the protection functions will have the logic to send a trip to the main breaker shunt trip. In other words, all protective functions can trip the main breaker if their respective settings and conditions are met.

SOP - Short circuit protection 
50G- Instantaneous ground fault 
51P – Overload protection
51G - Time over current ground fault 
27 - Undervoltage

The following is a summary of the specifications for each of the major components of the ESP. Genesis Alkali LLC has provided initial manufacturers, models, and descriptions of equipment; however, this may change due to a variety of reasons such as availability. Regardless, any equipment deployed will meet the specifications required by MSHA and set forth in this Alternate Method. Also, an as built electrical schematic or other document will provide the final and installed design.

a)    Baker Hughes Centri-Lift Variable Frequency Drive specially designed for ESP applications. The VFD does not have an automatic restart and requires an operator to push the start/stop button in the HMI if the VFD is shut down for any reason. This VFD does come with standard protection functions, however Genesis Alkali LLC decided to set up a motor protection relay which can be fine-tuned to accommodate all protection requirements. The motor protection that will be used will be the overload protection which will be set to 120% of the motor full load amps. This will provide protection in coordination with the relay overload protection (Exhibit 7).

b)    Southwest Electric 480V/4160 Transformer with Multi Tap Switch (Exhibit 8).

c)    High Resistance Grounding System which consists of a 15A, 160-ohm Neutral Grounding Resistor connected to the Step-up Transformer (480V/4160V) Neutral (Exhibit 9). The appropriate box that should be checked on (Exhibit 9), page 1 is the box associated with a "Ten Second Time Rating with a 760C Temperature Rise Rating".

d)    Baker Hughes ESP Pump and Motor Assembly rated 350 HP, 125A@3450V (Exhibit 10). Two (2) pump motors with the specifications noted above will operate in series. Genesis Alkali LLC ' experience is that these types of down hole submersible pumps used in the oil and gas industry are not designed for use with Part 18 type cables but rather paired with the Baker Hughes Centerline cable as Genesis Alkali LLC has done in this Alternate Method. Also, the pump motor is not capable of being modified for this singular use. This unique set-up further necessitates using the power cable paired with this configuration. Further, this cable meets stringent construction specific codes, however its uses have not required third-party certification.

e)    Baker Hughes Centerline CPS76932 power cable -5KV Rated Cable #1 AWG with an ampacity of 183A, approximately 1,700 ft Cable length from VFD to motor. The initial installation of the power cable will be a continuous run. The power cable will have current carrying capacity of not less than 125 percent of the FLA of the submersible pump motor and an outer jacket suitable for "harsh locations" and high voltage. The power cable will be banded to the discharge casing at intervals of 9 feet per the manufacturer. Also, the power cable's armored jacketed construction makes it fire resistant. Further, this is the optimal power cable for this installation, avoiding having to attempt a splice at the connection point to the motor which would be infeasible. This Centerline power cable is being selected because it is optimally designed to be used with the Baker Hughes ESPs in harsh conditions and has been successfully used at the Genesis Granger Mine for many years and is still in use. The proposed power cable, pigtail, connector, splice method, and pump motor selected are designed to operate as a unit for this type of down hole application (Exhibit 11).

f)    Opsens Solutions OPP-C, MEMS-based fiber optic pressure sensor water level monitoring system consisting of two (2) redundant fiber optic pressure sensors with a low-level alarm and interlock system which will shut down the pump motor to ensure it always remains submerged under water while operating. This system shall be fail-safe in that it will always trip the pump motor circuit in the event of loss-of-signal, loss-of-power, or a pre-established discrepancy between the sensors and not allow the circuit to reclose. The light source used is a white light, not a laser. These fiber optic pressure sensors along with their amplifiers have a typical output of between 10 milli-Watts (mW) to 100 mW. The maximum output energy coming out of the sensor (when the light source burst) is around 150 mW (Exhibit 12). The accuracy is cited as instrument precision at+/- 0.2% of full scale at 100 psi. 

g)    SEL-710-5 Motor Protection Relay with a 50P/51P Phase Overcurrent Protection Function, 27 Undervoltage Protection function and a 50G/51G Residual Ground Overcurrent protection function. This relay has a shunt trip to the VFD Main Breaker (Exhibit 13).

h)    Bender RC48 C ground fault ground and ground continuity monitoring system which monitors the residual ground current and monitors the grounding conductor for low resistance, high resistance, and a short circuit. As noted above, the ES6 diode will be located on the surface since it cannot be attached to the pump motor and will provide another level of protection not required by the pump manufacturer. The relay monitor will be installed in a non-hazardous area and is a typical setup used in high resistance grounded systems at mines that operate with high voltage. The relay monitor shall conform to the applicable NEC requirements and provides safeguards equivalent to pertinent MSHA standards and this application. This proposed monitor meets the following standards.

NEC 250.188(D) (2017): Ground of Systems Supplying the Portable or Mobile Equipment 

Canadian Standards Association (CSA) M42 l-16 (2016): Use of electricity in mines.

International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 60204-11 (2000): Safety of machinery - Electrical equipment of machines.

IEC 62020 (1998): Residual Current Monitors (Exhibit 14).

1)    Baker Hughes Cable Splice Instructions REGIONAL POWER CABLE AND MLE SPLICE (Exhibit 15) and Baker Hughes Connector (Exhibit 16). The pigtail is necessary to take the incoming power conductors (l AWG) and down-size them to a 4 AWG power conductor that fits the connector that is used to connect to the pump motor. The pigtail is short in length (typically< 15 feet) and can carry the necessary amperage for this short distance. The paired pigtail/connector is another feature of this pumping system that makes it unique. All equipment associated with this ESP and located on the surface of the Westvaco mine shall be protected from dust rain, and rodents by suitable enclosures.

Monitoring of Electrical Equipment 

Ground Monitoring Relay:

MSHA requires all power cables feeding high voltage equipment to be protected against ground faults. A grounding circuit, originating at the grounded side of the grounding resistor, will extend along with the power cable (conductors) to the pigtail and serve as the grounding conductor for the ESP. No other electric equipment shall be supplied power from this circuit.

This relay takes a zero sequence CT input for ground fault protection and uses termination devices at the motor to monitor the continuity of the ground wire and check for low resistance, high resistance, and shorted faults. This ground check circuit shall cause the circuit breaker to open when either a ground fault is present, or ground wire is broken.

The grounding circuit will include the pigtail splice through the termination device which will be installed on the surface since the Baker Hughes pump does not provide for termination devices for grounds and ground checks. The pigtail splice armor will provide the ground continuity connection all the way to the motor/pump casing to prevent shock hazard. Additionally, the pump/motor casing is inaccessible to personnel, mitigating the shock hazard.

Grounding Resistor
The grounding resistor will limit the ground-fault current to not more than 15 amperes. The grounding resistor shall be rated for the maximum fault current available and shall be insulated from ground for a voltage equal to the phase-to-phase voltage of the system.

A lightning arrestor will be provided and will be grounded to low resistance grounding medium and separated from the pump power neutral grounding circuit by not less than 25 feet.

Circuit Breaker
The circuit breaker will be of adequate interrupting capacity with auxiliary relay protection to provide protection against under-voltage, grounded phase, short-circuit, and overload.
The grounded phase protection device must be set not to exceed 40 percent of the current rating of the neutral ground resistor.

High voltage pump shall be provided with instantaneous ground fault protection set at no more than 0.125 amperes and the time delay setting must not exceed 0.25 seconds, or minimum setting that will allow the pump to start without nuisance tripping.

The short circuit protection device must be set not to exceed the required short circuit protection for the power cable, or 75 percent of the minimum available phase to phase short circuit current, whichever is less. Based on the SKM model for this installation, the following summary is for the two bus points for where the short circuit has been calculated,
a.    Short Circuit@ Motor Feeder Transformer connection (4160V) - 3Phase - 1579 amps, LG 14.10 amps.
b.    Short Circuit@ Motor Feeder Motor connection (4160V) - 3Phase - 1525 amps, LG 14.10 amps
c.    Based on this short circuit study, the trip point will be set at 1140 amps. 

Simulations with the different transformer impedances were run. The following are the results and the trip set points associated with them.

a.    Impedance 5% - Short Circuit Current 1525A, Trip Set Point=l 140A
b.    Impedance 7% - Short Circuit Current 1403A, Trip Set Point=1052A
c.    Impedance 8% - Short Circuit Current 1353A, Trip Set Point=1014A 

Based on these results, there should be sufficient available fault current to trip the breaker in the event of a short circuit fault.

4)    The settings for the protection functions are noted below.
a.    51P:160A, Class 20 Overload Curve
b.    50P: 1140A.
c.    51G: SA, 3 second time delay.
d.    50G: 0.25A, Time Delay is just enough to allow Pump starting.

5)    The overload protection or the motor will be set at 125% of the full load amps.

6)    The undervoltage connection device must operate on a loss of voltage to prevent automatic restarting of the equipment.
The disconnect device installed in conjunction with the circuit breaker shall provide a visible disconnect.

Testing
All surface installed electrical equipment associated with the pump shall be accessible for inspection.
A functional test shall be conducted for the motor ground conductor every time prior to any energization of the pump/motor system. This test checks the integrity and continuity of the ground wire. There is no need to perform this test while the equipment is running. A record that such tests were conducted shall be kept by the operator for a period of one year and shall be made available for review by the Secretary or his/her authorized representative. A look-ahead circuit shall be provided to detect ground-fault condition and prevent the circuit inte1Tupting device from closing so long as the ground-fault condition exists.

The surface pump control and power circuit must be examined at least every six (6) months. The examination shall include a test that simulates the functional test of all protective devices (ground fault, short circuit, overload, ground monitor, grounded phase, under voltage) to determine proper operation. This functional test will be performed according to the inspection and test procedures outlined in Genesis Alkali LLC ' Extraction Submersible Pump (ESP) - Instrumentation and Electrical Testing Procedure which may be modified to a no less safe means of testing to accommodate for software and hardware changes and configurations (Exhibit 18).

A record of these tests shall be recorded. The record shall be made in a secure book or in a computer system that is not susceptible to alternation. Records shall be retained by the operator for at least one year and shall be made available for review by the Secretary or his/her authorized representative.

Every twelfth (12th) month, the operator shall conduct an examination that shall include a full functional test of all protective devices (ground fault, short circuit, overload, ground monitor, grounded phase, under voltage) to determine proper operation. A record of these tests shall be recorded. The record shall be made in a secure book or in a computer system that is not susceptible to alternation. Records shall be retained by the operator for at least one year and shall be made available for review by the Secretary or his/her authorized representative.

The Genesis Alkali LLC ' Extraction Submersible Pump (ESP)-Instrumentation and Electrical Testing Procedure also addresses procedures for testing simulation and functional testing of the level water monitoring system.
Installation Procedures and Practices for the ESP Drilling Well-Bore Process Genesis Alkali LLC will be drilling with water-based drilling fluid circulation when it breaches the mine roof. Even if circulation is lost during drilling, the drilling fluid is still being pumped over the drill bit eliminating any potential for dry drilling.

Installation of ESP
Genesis Alkali LLC will install the ESP using installation procedures which many be modified to a no less safe means of installation to accommodate for onsite conditions. (Exhibit 19) These

documents identify and address the hazards associated with the installation and operation of an ESP facility. The Petitioner added the following to the alternate method Maintenance program for installed equipment will be developed based on review of OEM recommendations, site specific factors, and good manufacturing practices.
Assessment of Well-Bore Installation on Mine Genesis Alkali LLC has assessed any mine-wide impacts lowering the water level in this isolated area of the Mine and has not identified any adverse safety impacts. A similar assessment will be completed for each well-bore installed under this Alternate Method.

Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law
Genesis Alkali @Westvaco Mine mines trona from its underground operation, located 20 miles west of Green River, Wyoming. The mine employs approximately 907 employees. Alkali @Westvaco Mine works two 12-hour production shifts, 7 days a week.

The mine methane liberation recorded on 07/10/2023 with 3,170,743 cubic feet in 24 hours. This mine entered into the 103(i) Status on July 4, 1976, and meets Mine Gas Category III because of the quantity of methane liberated in a 24-hour period.

Alkali @Westvaco Mine has 3 escapeways to the surface, 7 impoundments, and 5 hoists. According to the Mine Information Form the primary commodity is trona, a mineral used in many household and industrial products. The mine site has the following mining procedures/operations: dredge, mill, preparation plant, loading dock, remaining culm bank, refuse pile, tailings, longwall, room and pillar, shaft, and in-situ leaching. Westvaco Mine extracts most of the trona from the mine utilizing a longwall mining system, with a room and pillar development, at a depth of approximately 1,500 feet below the surface. Trona mining operations produce large quantities of methane emissions through fracturing of the rock to extract the ore that releases methane, which must be vented from the mine for safety reasons.

Since 1988, underground tailings disposal and secondary resource recovery have been part of the mining operation. These processes take place in areas of the mine that have no further plans of production with mechanized mining equipment. These areas have been flooded with water through pumping water and slurry tailings back into the mine. These slurry tailings are generated by the mineral preparation process and then injected into the mine through surface injection holes. There is no access to these abandoned areas because they have been left to deteriorate naturally as water and slurry tailings continue to be pumped into the flooded area, they are stated to have, they are not ventilated, and they are not accessible for travel, though (Genesis) states they have been barricaded with wooden blocks in some cases. However, these flooded areas remain part of the mine on mine property. As the tailings dewater in the mine, the water recovers trona that was left by the room and pillar mining techniques employed in these areas, becoming a solution. Westvaco Mine achieves secondary recovery of trona using a solution mining method. This process currently involves flooding areas of previously mined room and pillar workings underground then pumping out the resulting water solution or brine containing trona for processing on the surface. The mine currently pumps this water solution containing trona from accessible and ventilated areas of the underground area. This process is accomplished via several large pumps installed throughout the mine in accessible underground areas.

Genesis’ alternative method proposal includes this same process of secondary recovery of trona by pumping water/trona solution from abandoned flooded areas of the room and pillar workings underground. However, Genesis proposes to position pumps in multiple locations throughout underground areas of the mine that are not accessible from the underground mine. The proposed alternative method includes installing these pumps through a bore hole drilled from the surface. The proposal is to use submersible pumps that are not MSHA-approved in underground mine areas that are not ventilated, not examined, and not monitored. This petition for modification will only address the EW#5 pump, location, and borehole. This is the only underground mine area that Genesis addressed in this proposal to install such a pump (EW#5 on Exhibit 3). It's located within an estimated area of approximately 84 acres that impounds approximately 22 million gallons of water. This proposed pump location is within a flooded area of the mine works and therefore not accessible.

MSHA reviewed all of the information available that was originally included in the petition for modification request. A limited field investigation was conducted as the pump location is not accessible and there are no facilities on the surface to examine. All information was obtained from the petition submission and maps and diagrams in the district files. Site visits were conducted on March 3 and March 7, 2023. Alkali @Westvaco Mine ’s labor force is represented by United Steel Workers of America 1321A USWA and miners’ representatives and miners participated in the petition investigation. Miners voiced their concerns about the hazards of drilling into an inaccessible area of the mine. MSHA followed up with several teleconferences to gain a better understanding of petitioner’s alternative method including the submersible pump system installation, maintenance and functional testing and the mine environment including potentially hazardous atmosphere in the inaccessible environment and water levels in the flooded area of the mine. This enabled MSHA to better evaluate the hazard to miners including the potential of igniting methane with an energized circuit.

Genesis indicates that pumps will be strategically placed in topographically lowest developments in the lowest part of the flooded area, to ensure a flooded condition. Gensis also indicates that they currently monitor wells near these areas which indicate the areas are flooded with water completely. However, Genesis proposes to pump the water to a level where the water level will be maintained at least 3 feet above the inner casing (13 3/8-inch STC Casing – (Exhibit 4 Extraction Well). Genesis states that the pump system’s design ensures that the electrical components will always be submerged preventing their exposure to the atmosphere however the high voltage cable will not entirely be submerged and therefore be exposed to the atmosphere.

The pump is intended to be installed from the surface. The submersible pumps and technological upgrades that Genesis intends to install to perform liquid mining in underground flooded areas potentially create less exposure to miners who would normally be present. There is still a potential hazard of unplanned inundation of water and gas in a mine where miners are currently working below grade of the impounding water.

Technical Support assisted in this investigation and directed several inquiries about the pump system to Genesis. The petitioner provided responses to MSHA’s request including clarifications, general statements of conformance with NEC requirements, updating drawings, adding notations to drawings specifying more details, specifying primary and secondary protective systems schemes, stating that final configurations will be determined upon installation and based upon performance, providing that equipment is wired per manufacture’s recommendations, and clarifying ABS consulting’s report.

This standard being petitioned here is 30 C.F.R. § 57.22305, approved equipment, states in part, Equipment used in or beyond the last open crosscut and equipment used in areas where methane may enter the air current, such as pillar recovery workings, longwall faces and shortwall faces, shall be approved by MSHA under the applicable requirements of 30 C.F.R. §§ 18 through 36. Equipment shall not be operated in atmospheres containing 1.0 percent or more methane. This provision requires MSHA approved equipment in areas where methane may enter the atmosphere and that any equipment shall not operate in atmospheres containing 1.0% or more of methane.

Additional measures shall be taken to protect persons if unusual hazards are encountered. The area at Genesis @ Westvaco Mine that can’t be examined is located within an estimated area of approximately 84 acres that impounds approximately 22 million gallons of water. This proposed pump location is in a flooded area of the mine works and therefore not accessible.

Genesis in this petition has requested to pump trona-bearing solution however they have not provided facts to support why this petition is warranted. Other petitions have been deemed warranted as they request to pump water to maintain their air courses in their return and bleeder entries as maintaining these entries are crucial to controlling methane and respirable dust.

The petitioner has agreed to implement safety precautions that reduce the potential of methane from entering the wellbore from the mine atmosphere. However, methane is also present in strata above the mine, it could migrate into the wellbore through an inadequate grout job or a defective threaded casing joint. In order to verify the integrity of the casing joints and cement bond, it is recommended that the petitioner monitor the wellbore annulus below the surface for the presence of methane on a regular basis.    

Methane will layer and will accumulate in the areas closer to the top of the borehole normally within the first 50 feet below the surface. If no methane is found, after 7-days of monitoring that provides a factual basis that the integrity of the joints is effective and will require no additional monitoring. If methane is detected, further evaluation is needed. The wellbore annulus should be examined for methane as part of a workplace examination before miners approach the well head or work within 25-feet of the well bore. This monitoring can be established and conducted in many different ways. MSHA shall have access to the results of tests for concentrations of methane.

There are several strategies to control these hazards. These details include monitoring, and making the information available that can be addressed in a mine plan submitted, reviewed, and approved by the district manager.

MSHA believes that in order to provide the same level of protection to miners afforded by the standard the petitioner must prevent the combination of these two potentially hazardous elements of heat that can be generated by electricity and hazardous volumes of methane from existing in the same area and the same time. The petitioner’s alternate method proposes separation from the mine atmosphere.

MSHA evaluated the petitioner’s response and determined that the alternative method proposed by the petitioner still exposes miners to plausible harm. For example, the petitioner’s alternative method does not verify the mechanisms employed to isolate the mine atmosphere from the electrical circuit providing power to the submersible pump are effective in preventing entry of explosive gas. The reference of equipment under 30 C.F.R. § 57.22305 is broad therefore it includes more than just the pump and the electric motor that drives the pump, but it also includes the power cable providing power to the pump. All of these components are considered equipment as defined in this provision that shall not be operated in atmospheres containing 1.0 percent or more methane.

According to 30 C.F.R. § 57.22234, actions at 1.0 percent methane (I-A, I-B, III, V-A, and V-B mines) it states in pertinent part:

(a)    If methane reaches 1.0 percent in the mine atmosphere, ventilation changes shall be made to reduce the methane. Until such changes are achieved

(1)    All persons other than competent persons necessary to make the ventilation changes shall be withdrawn from affected areas.

(2)    Electrical power shall be deenergized in affected areas, except power to monitoring equipment determined by MSHA to be intrinsically safe under 30 CFR Part 18.

The provision under 30 C.F.R. § 57.22234 provides that when methane reaches 1.0 percent in the mine atmosphere ventilation changes shall be made to reduce the methane. The high voltage cable that provides power to the submersible pump is not isolated from the mine atmosphere.

The mine atmosphere in this area of the mine, as reported by the petitioner, is in excess of the Upper Explosive or Flammable Limit" (UEL/UFL) (% by volume of air) around the proposed submersible pump location. The petitioner claims that the methane concentration in the atmosphere is not relevant to safety. The petitioner states should an explosive atmosphere exist in an area where the roof is not topped out, the submersible pump is separated from that atmosphere. According to the petitioners consulting report if an explosion occurs then the explosion will be contained and confined to only the abandoned area and not affect the mine. 30 C.F.R. § 57.22234 also states that electric power shall be deenergized in affected areas, except power to monitoring equipment determined by MSHA to be intrinsically safe under 30 CFR part

18. The alternate method proposed by the petitioner does not address the hazard that the plain language of this provision is intended to prevent. The petitioner seeks to isolate the atmosphere rather than deenergize the pump or the high voltage cable supplying power to the pump when the methane reaches 1.0 percent inside the casing. The petitioner does not seek to monitor or reduce the methane. MSHA has requested the petitioner to address the concerns raised during MSHA’s investigation. The petitioner has indicated that they have addressed all hazards.
The provision points out the hazard of the energized 4160 VAC cable supplying power to the submersible pump in the mine atmosphere when the methane is in excess of the UEL percent by volume at the proposed location of the submersible pump, (Exhibit 3).

The petitioner did not provide specificity of the proposed equipment or specificity to the alternate method that describes any testing, examination, of the atmosphere that they propose to operate the proposed electrical pump. Therefore, MSHA requested additional information that included specific equipment information related to the pump, motor, power cable, grounding and lightning arrester, and control components of the automated submersible pump system (manufacturer, model, voltage, and amperage). The petitioner proposed to only specify performance data. The petitioner also proposed to notify the MSHA District Manager and obtain their approval prior to their installation and operation. MSHA agrees with this as there are still many unknowns as it relates to this petition and having those facts are important in this evaluation.

An engineering report generated by ABS Consulting ("ABS Report") provided mathematical modeling results based on prior tests conducted by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health ("NIOSH") at the Lake Lynn Laboratory on the methane-air detonation and other references as set forth in the ABS Report. The ABS Report addresses the following issues:

(1)    determine the likelihood of an event inside the well bore rupturing the inner casing,
(2)    determine the length of the inner casing necessary to prevent the water plug from allowing hot gasses to contact the mine atmosphere.

The operator contends that based on this report that the internal inner casing will contain any explosive forces based on the peak pressure pulses as provided in the ABS Report and the strength of the metal casing. The pipe that will be used (J-55 material) has a minimum yield strength of 55 kilo per square inch (ksi) and minimum tensile strength of 75 ksi equating to the ultimate elastic pressure resistance for the pipe of about 3,030 pounds per square inch (psi). The peak internal transient pressure that will be generated by a deflagration or detonation is between 260 and 580 psi which is well within the capabilities of the well-bore pipe.

The result of this design ensures that the electrical components will always be submerged, preventing their exposure to the mine atmosphere. Because the non-permissible components will always be submerged or isolated by the inner casing, that liquid barrier ensures that non- permissible equipment is not used in areas where methane may enter the mine atmosphere.

This mine previously experienced an unplanned inundation of the mine by water. The petitioner stated the inundation was caused by a barrier pillar failure within a solution mining area.
Another failure to a barrier pillar would increase the potential a non-permissible pump igniting hazardous methane.

The petitioner previously provided the following information.
1.    Installation Procedure
2.    Instrumentation and Motor Protection Testing Procedure
3.    Sensor information which shows the PSI is 50, so that the tolerances can be determined.
4.    Electrical One Line Diagram
5.    Genesis Alkali best practices around well sites (additional information)
6.    Typical Well Bore Profile

The petitioner responded to the request for information and provided additions to their alternative method including more details of their plan. However, the discrete hazard of electrical power cable remaining energized when methane in excess of the UEL percent by volume at the proposed location of the submersible pump still exists. The potential hazard of electrical power remaining energized in excess of 1.0 percent in a mine atmosphere exists as proposed in the alternative method. The petitioner responded to MSHA’s concerns in putting in place barriers that could be effective in isolating the electrical circuit. The petitioner included a method to extend an inner steel casing that would remain underwater, maintaining the water level above the proposed perforated steel casing to separate the energized cable from the mine atmosphere.

The safety purpose of 30 C.F.R. § 57.22305 is to ensure that electric equipment will not cause a mine ignition, fire, or explosion in areas where methane may be present. Similarly, the safety purpose of 30 C.F.R. § 57.22234 is to ensure that when potentially explosive levels of methane exist the ignition source is removed by deenergizing the electrical power in the mine atmosphere.

There are also safety concerns related to boring into an inaccessible area. All potential hazards must be addressed through a mine plan submitted and approved by the district manager. The mine plan must include the miners’ concerns to protect all personnel at the mine. The plan should include; removing miners from the mine when drilling is within 30-feet above the mine until a successful connection is made and drill operations are complete, no smoking or smoking articles, no burning, welding, or open flames within 100 feet of the drill hole, continually monitor oxygen and methane levels by an MSHA approved detector and every 30-minutes, results shall be recorded and made available, if at any time 1% or more of methane is detected, all operations shall cease. Genesis Alkali LLC submitted to drilling with a water-based drilling fluid circulation when it breaches the mine roof. Even if circulation is lost during drilling, the drilling fluid is still being pumped over the drill bit mitigating potential for dry drilling. At no point will the wellbore be left opened, if unmanned the wellbore shall be covered with a locking type of cap with warning signs posted. The mine plan should not be implemented before it is approved by the district manager and all persons affected by the mine plan are instructed by the operator of its provisions.

The petitioner agreed to conduct some monitoring to determine whether the inner casing would maintain a certain water level with a given loss. This procedure is provided below:

An initial test shall be performed after installation of the inner casing. This initial testing procedure will be followed.

•    Measure initial static water level in inner casing with wireline.
•    Set retrievable packer or other drillable plug at bottom of inner casing (13-3/8").
•    Add water to inner casing to approximately 10 feet above static water level or 10 feet above base of casing grout, whichever is higher.
•    Since the casing is grouted to the surface there is no need to test the entire length of the casing but only test that portion that is below the grout line.
•    Wait on water to degas to ensure no air entrapment.
•    Confirm and measure water level with wireline.
•    Rest 30 minutes and measure water level again.
•    If water level change is less than 0.02 feet, isolation is in place (the wireline precision is 0.01 feet).

If water level change is greater than or equal to 0.02 feet, further testing of well will be used to locate leak off point and testing procedure will be repeated until once the inner casing is shown to be sealed by water and the casing is competent, no further pressure readings will be taken.

This test is effective to a degree and is credible dependent upon where the water is present within the inner casing. The provision that is being petitioned does not stipulate water however it does provide a threshold for the value of methane that is allowed to be present with energized circuits.

This mine atmosphere may contain potentially hazardous amounts of low oxygen, high methane, and dangerous amounts of hydrogen sulfide. This petition is for the life of the mine and all potential hazards to miners as mining advances must be considered. The mine projections are not all to the south and east for the life of the mine. The mine is working west and north in 3MWD near shaft #8 shaft. This will head north toward 2MWD. If any flooded solution can permeate into the barrier pillar south of 1MWD it can potentially impact active areas 2W8P in 2MWD. MSHA believes that the mine operator must conduct additional mine site specific examinations to address these potential hazards. The Petitioner’s method includes monitoring to ensure continued integrity of barrier pillars that bound districts of ponded water from adjacent, active, down-dip dry mining areas. Records shall be kept by the operator for a period of one year and shall be made available for review by the Secretary or his/her authorized represent.

The Petitioner plans to submit an as-built drawing for the installed equipment (of similar specificity to the Typical Mine Water Extraction Well / Pump Profile included with the Petition), a one-line electrical schematic and a final equipment list to provide MSHA opportunity to conduct an inspection of the pump and associated electrical installation(s), to the District Manager.
The Petitioner’s alternate method includes developing a maintenance program for installed equipment based on review of OEM recommendations, site specific factors, and good manufacturing practices.

MSHA personnel conducted a limited investigation of the petition, due to equipment wasn’t on- site, the area the non-permissible electric pump will be installed is inaccessible, the surface area that borehole will be drilled is not accessible, but miners were interviewed and allowed to express their concerns.

MSHA believes additional terms and conditions are necessary in achieving the result of the standard that will at all times guarantee no less than the same measure of protection afforded by the standard. These additional terms and conditions are included based upon MSHA’s investigation and the entire record.

After a careful review of the entire record, including the petition and MSHA's investigative report the Administrator issues this Proposed Decision and Order. MSHA finds that the alternate method proposed by the petitioner (as amended herein by agreement between petitioner and MSHA) will at all times guarantee no less than the same measure of protection afforded the miners under 30 C.F.R. § 57.22305.

Order
Wherefore, pursuant to the authority delegated by the Secretary of Labor to the Administrator for Mine Safety and Health Enforcement, and pursuant to Section 101(c) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, as amended, 30 U.S.C.§ 811(c), it is ordered that Genesis Alkali LLC’s Petition for Modification of the application of 30 CFR 57.22305 at Genesis Alkali @ Westvaco Mine, is hereby:

GRANTED, for the operation of a non-permissible submersible high-voltage pump conditioned upon compliance with the following terms and conditions:

1.    The high-voltage, three-phase, alternating-current, electric power circuit for the submersible pump shall be designed and installed to
a.    Contain either a direct or derived neutral which shall be grounded through a suitable resistor at the source transformer or power center. A grounding circuit, originating at the grounded side of the grounding resistor, shall extend along with the power conductors and serve as the grounding conductor for the frame of the pumps and all associated electric equipment enclosures that may receive power from this source.
b.    Provide high, low water probes and electric equipment enclosures that may receive power from this source. No other electric equipment shall be supplied power from this circuit.
c.    Contain a grounding resistor which limits the ground-fault current to not more than 0.5 amperes. The grounding resistor shall be rated for the maximum fault current available and shall be insulated from ground for a voltage equal to the phase-to-phase voltage of the system. 
d.    Contain a circuit-interrupting device of adequate interrupting capacity with devices to provide protection against under-voltage, grounded phase, short-circuit, and overload.
i.    The grounded phase protection device must be set not to exceed 40 percent of the current rating of the neutral ground resistor.
ii.    High voltage pump shall be provided with instantaneous ground fault protection set at no more than 0.125 amperes, and the time delay setting must not exceed 0.25 seconds.
iii.    The short circuit protection device shall not be set to exceed the required short circuit protection for the power cable, or 75 percent of the minimum available phase-to-phase short circuit current, whichever is less.
iv.    The undervoltage connection device must operate on a loss of voltage to prevent automatic restarting of the equipment.
e.    Contain a disconnecting device installed in conjunction with the circuit breaker to provide visual evidence that all power is disconnected from the pump.
f.    Include a fail-safe ground check circuit or other no less effective device approved by the Secretary, which shall cause the circuit breaker to open when either the ground or ground check wire is broken; and
g.    Ensure all equipment associated with this pump and located on the surface of the mine shall be installed as specified by the most current NFPA 70 National Electrical Code.
h.    Include lightning arrestors be connected to a low resistance grounding medium on the surface and shall be separated from the neutral grounds by a distance of not less than 25 feet.

2.    The electric control circuit for the pump shall be designed and installed to:
a.    Maintain the electric connections of the pump and pump motor under three feet or more of water at all times and always isolate the pump circuit components including the cable from potentially hazardous atmospheres and from the rest of the mine atmosphere.
b.    Automatically de-energize the pump motor when the water level falls below the feet level at the top of the perforated casing.
c.    Prevent the restarting of the pump motor anytime the water level is below the top of the perforated casing if the electrical components are not otherwise isolated from the mine atmosphere via an air-tight, water-tight casing.

3.    The pump installation shall be equipped with a water level indicator system located at its electrical controls such that the water level at the pump can be precisely determined before the pump motor is restarted. The mine operator shall follow the testing procedure to examine the system’s functionality.
a.    All high and low water probes and float circuits associated with the pump shall be MSHA approved intrinsically safe circuits and shall be installed and maintained. Redundant water level indication and safeguards shall be provided.
b.    If either water level sensor starts to drift or fail exceeding pre-established thresholds, then an alarm will be triggered and automatically shut off power to the ESP. Also, if the sensors need to be removed for any purpose, a workplace exam shall be conducted, and the sensors will be slowly extracted from the conduit in the well-bore and stored on a reel. Then these water level sensors will be calibrated or replaced and reinstalled. A final water level will be determined upon installation and an "as built" well-profile shall be created noting the location of the sensors.

4.    All motor terminations and cable splices shall be underwater.

5.    The power cable to the pump will be a continuous run and properly rated and suitable for this application and have current carrying capacity of not less than 125 percent of the motor full-load current rating and suitable for this installation for a “wet location”, adequate ampacity and properly rated for high voltage.

6.    The design of the ESP shall include using a metal inner casing and extending this inner casing to a level below the low water level (mine floor). A minimum of three feet of water shall always be maintained on the inner casing.

7.    The physical design of the ESP shall place the intake nozzle and the pump systems' electrical components below the low water level which is constantly monitored by a permissible low water level shutoff sensor that is positioned at least ten (10) feet above the pump's intake nozzle.

8.    The power cable shall be installed and maintained within the inner casing. The water level shall be maintained at a depth below the low water level that will not allow any deflagration or detonation occurring in the well-bore to push the plug of water out of the well bore in a manner that exposes the abandoned area to hot gases. The low water level will be the mine floor and the inner case will extend below the mine floor depending on the depth of penetration of at least 3 feet or greater.

9.    The petitioner shall submit to the District Manager for approval a mine plan to be followed. The plan shall include all safeguards to protect miners as stated within the Order.

10.    All power cables feeding high voltage equipment shall be protected against ground faults. A grounding circuit, originating at the grounded side of the grounding resistor, will extend along with the power cable (conductors) to the pigtail and serve as the grounding conductor for the ESP. No other electric equipment shall be supplied power from this circuit.

11.    The undervoltage connection device must operate on a loss of voltage to prevent automatic restarting of the equipment.

12.    A disconnect device installed in conjunction with the circuit breaker shall provide visible disconnect. All surface installed electrical equipment associated with the pump shall be accessible for inspection.

13.    A functional test shall be conducted weekly for the grounded-phase protective device(s) to determine if it is operating properly.

14.     A look-ahead circuit shall be provided to detect ground-fault condition and prevent the interrupting device from closing so long as the ground-fault condition exists.

15.    The surface pump control and power circuit must be examined at least once per calendar month. The examination shall include a functional test of all protective devices (ground fault, short circuit, overload, ground monitor, grounded phase, under voltage) to determine proper operation.

16.    At least fifteen (15) days prior to implementing this Proposed Decision and Order, the mine operator shall submit an as-built drawing for the installed equipment (of similar specificity to the Typical Mine Water Extraction Well / Pump Profile included with the Petition), a one-line electrical schematic and a final equipment list so as to provide
MSHA opportunity to conduct an inspection of the pump and associated electrical installation(s), to the District Manager. The petitioner shall comply with the information submitted with this Petition for Modification, including the Exhibits (“considered proprietary diagrams by the operator”)

17.    Maintenance program for installed equipment will be developed based on review of OEM recommendations, site specific factors, and good manufacturing practices.

18.    The Petitioner shall monitor to ensure continued integrity of barrier pillars that bound districts of ponded water from adjacent, active, down-dip dry mining areas.

19.    All results of examinations/test required by this Proposed Decision and Order and 30 CFR shall be made in a secure book or in a computer system that is not susceptible to alternation. Records shall be retained at the mine for at least one year and shall be made available for review by the Secretary or an authorized representative.

20.    Within 60 days after this Proposed Decision and Order is effective, the petitioner shall submit proposed revisions for its approved 30 CFR Part 48 training plan to the MSHA District Manager. These revisions shall specify new task training for all electricians who will perform electrical work on this pump. All personnel involved in the implementation of this Proposed Decision and Order shall be trained on all provisions.

21.    Unless specifically mentioned herein, nothing in this Order changes or supersedes the requirements otherwise imposed by the Mine Act, other mandatory standards
or regulations, or approved plans.

22.    The operator shall post this Order in unobstructed locations on the bulletin boards and/or in other conspicuous places where notices to miners are ordinarily posted.

23.    The petitioner shall include the above terms and conditions in the initial and annual refresher training as required in its approved Part 48 training plans to ensure that miners are aware of the stipulations contained in this petition.
Any party to this action desiring a hearing on this matter must file in accordance with 30 C.F.R. §44.14 within 30 days. The request for hearing must be filed with the Administrator for Mine Safety and Health Enforcement, 201 12th Street South, Suite 4E401, Arlington, Virginia 22202.

If a hearing is requested, the request shall contain a concise summary of position on the issues of fact or law desired to be raised by the party requesting the hearing, including specific objections to the proposed decision. A party other than the petitioner who has requested a hearing shall also comment upon all issues of fact or law presented in the petition. Any party to this action requesting a hearing may indicate a desired hearing site. If no request for a hearing is filed within 30 days after service thereof, the Decision and Order will become final and shall be posted by the operator on the mine bulletin board at the mine.

Brian Goepfert
Administrator for Mine Safety and Health Enforcement

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that a copy of this proposed decision was served personally or mailed, postage prepaid, or provided by other electronic means this day 21st of February 2024, to:

Barbara E. Ritchie                            Michael Peelish, Esq.
Director, EHS and Sustainability     Law Office of Adele Abrams PC 
Genesis Alkali                                  4740 Corridor Place,
1735 Market Street                         Suite D
Philadelphia, PA 1910317                Beltsville, MD 20705
Barbara.ritchie@genlp.com             Michael.Peelish@Steptoe-Johnson.com

Ryan Pauley                                     T.J Kelso-Miner's Representative
EHS Operations Manager                541 Schultz St.
Genesis Alkali                                  Green River, WY 
82935 580 Westvaco Road
Green River, WY 82935 
Ryan.pauley@genlp.com

Vernus W. Sturgill
Mine Safety and Health Administration

cc: Heather Kroupa, State Inspector of Mines, Dept. of Workforce Services, Office of Inspections and Safety, P.O. Box 1094, Rock Springs, WY 82902. Heather.kroupa@wyo.gov
 

Exhibit List